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Executive Director’s introduction 
This is ASPI’s thirteenth annual Defence Budget Brief. Our aim remains to inform discussion 
and scrutiny of the Defence budget and the policy choices it entails.   
As has been the custom in the past, we explore new areas in this year’s Brief. The new 
entrant this year, Delivering Capability, brings together material on the planning and delivery 
of new capability for the Australian Defence Force.  
Acknowledgements are due. The not inconsiderable task of preparing the document for 
publication has been ably taken care of by Janice Johnson. Many others have helped by 
providing comments, offering advice, and checking facts. Our thanks go out to them all. 
Special thanks go to Tom Muir who contributed an in-depth examination of the Landing 
Helicopter Dock project and Karl Claxton who provided important insights to the Foreign Aid 
chapter. Finally, Kristy Bryden again undertook the Herculean task of proofreading every 
chapter.   
Also, Defence was kind enough to look over a preliminary draft of this Brief and provide 
valuable comments. This helped clarify some important points and resulted in improved 
accuracy in many areas. Of course this does not in any way imply that Defence endorses this 
document or even supports its conclusions.  
My colleague Mark Thomson, who is ASPI’s Senior Analyst for Defence Economics, has once 
again pulled together the brief in the short time available. For this I extend my sincere 
thanks. As always, responsibility for the judgements contained herein lie with Mark and me 
alone. 
Lastly we should acknowledge that we at ASPI are not disinterested observers of the 
Defence budget. Our funding from government is provided through Defence at the rate of 
eight thousand, five hundred and forty-two dollars and eighty cents ($8,542.80) per day. 
Details can be found in our 2012-13 Annual Report. 
 
Peter Jennings 
Executive Director  
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Executive summary 
This year’s federal budget was dominated by 
budget repair. Yet amid the spending cuts and tax 
increases, Defence did very well. Nominal defence 
spending will grow by $2.3 billion next financial 
year (2014-15) to $29.3 billion, representing 1.8% 
of GDP. In real terms, the year-on-year increase 
amounts to a 6% boost.  
The increase would have been larger still but for 
extra funding provided for the current year 
(2013-14) by the Gillard ($359 million) and Abbott 
($500 million) governments in response to 
mounting funding pressures.  
Critically, this year’s budget establishes a credible base from which the government can 
deliver its promise to spend 2% of GDP on defence by 2023-24. 
Key initiatives in this budget included the shifting of $2 billion of funding previously planned 
for 2017-18, of which $1.5 billion was brought forward to address immediate pressures, and 
$520 million was deferred until 2019-20 and 2020-21. By doing so, near-term budget 
pressures have been reduced and the medium-term funding profile has been smoothed.  
Funding was also provided to reintroduce the ADF gap-year program ($192 million) and 
provide more generous indexation arrangements for some legacy military superannuation 
schemes—each an election pledge made good. At the same time, the existing defined 
benefit military superannuation scheme is being closed to new entrants and a new 
accumulation scheme introduced.  
Despite a promise of ‘no further cuts to Defence spending’, an increase to the efficiency 
dividend on non-operational areas will see $75 million returned to Treasury over four years.  
Next year’s boost to defence spending was not entirely, or even predominately, the result of 
funds brought forward by the new government. The previous government had already 
budgeted for a substantial recovery in defence spending in 2014-15. Setting aside automatic 
supplementation for foreign exchange movements and operational costs, and allowing for 
the additional funds provided by the previous government mid-year, this government’s first 
budget only boosted the GDP share in 2014-15 from 1.78% to 1.80% of GDP. In fact, the 
largest contributions to the result relative to the estimate from May 2013 were slower than 
expected nominal GDP growth leading to a 0.05% increase in the defence GDP share and 
foreign exchange supplementation leading to a 0.04% increase.  
Nonetheless, the government clearly demonstrated a strong commitment to defence in the 
2014 budget; every extra dollar allocated to Defence meant deeper cuts to social programs 
and higher increases to taxes than would have otherwise been the case to achieve its fiscal 
goals.  
Defence Budget 2015 
Defence funding 2014-15:  $29.3 billion 
Share of GDP:   1.8% 
Share of Commonwealth spend: 7.1% 
Real growth on prior year:  6.1% 
 
Expenditure shares 
Investment:   $8.6 billion   (29.3%) 
Personnel:  $11.1 billion (37.8%) 
Operating:  $9.6 billion   (32.9%) 
 
Cost of deployments 
Afghanistan & Middle East:    $350 million    
Border protection:     $60 million     
 
Key budget measures  
$192 million for Gap-year reinstatement 
$1.5 billion brought forward over 4 years 
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Over the next three years, defence spending is slated to remain largely steady in real terms 
before jumping up in the fourth year. Because the economy is expected to grow in the 
intervening period, on current plans the share of GDP will decline to 1.75% in 2017-18.   
Defence will face two challenges over the next several years; accommodating rapid growth 
in capital investment, and rebuilding ADF numbers after three successive years of unplanned 
decline.  
Recent cuts to defence spending fell disproportionately on the capital investment program. 
So although total spending will only rise in real terms by around 6% next year, investment in 
new equipment will grow from $3.6 billion this year to $6.1 billion. Experience shows that 
such rapid growth will be very difficult to achieve. Hopefully, the relatively large number of 
off-the-shelf purchases in the portfolio will lessen the challenge. But even if money is 
handed back, it’ll have been worth the risk to regain momentum in the investment program.  
On the personnel front, the size of the permanent ADF has fallen three years in a row 
despite attempts otherwise. Several factors are likely at play, including a higher than 
anticipated separation rate and overly conservative recruiting targets. Given the stubborn 
persistence of the problem, it may be that Defence’s workforce analysis and planning 
capability needs a revamp. 
Finally, and as usual, this year’s budget announced yet another round of savings and 
efficiencies. According to the budget night press release; ‘$1.2 billion in back office savings 
over the Forward Estimates will be reinvested into Defence capability’. So the good news is 
that funding will not be lost. However, looking to the Treasury Papers for more detail, it 
turns out that the savings include a delayed investment in military accommodation 
($300 million), reduced Smart Sustainment initiatives ($64 million) and reduced use and 
support of military trucks ($60 million). In terms of what might be labelled ‘back office’, 
civilian numbers will fall by 1,200 and there’ll be 300 fewer service provider staff 
($606 million), although the latter does not accord with figures given elsewhere for the 
contractor workforce. Again, as usual, we’ve been given an incomplete and confusing picture 
of what’s happening with internal savings.  
Is 2% of GDP feasible in 2023-24? 
The government hasn’t disclosed its plans for defence spending beyond four years into the 
future. Nonetheless, we can make a reasonable estimate for the next six years on the basis 
of reaching the government’s stated goal of spending 2% of GDP by 2023-24. Assuming a 
steady increase over the six years beginning in 2017-18, we’ll need 5.3% real growth each 
year to make it. While it’s theoretically possible to delay spending increases until the final 
years of the decade, this would almost certainly exceed the capacity of Defence and defence 
industry to absorb. With only six years to reach 2% of GDP, it’s going to be steady growth or 
not at all.  
In terms of raw spending, there’s no reason why defence expenditure can’t be increased to 
2% of GDP a decade hence. After all, six years was long enough to mobilise, fight and 
conclude WWII. With four years to go, there’s plenty of time to plan and prepare. It would 
be learned helplessness to throw up our hands and declare the goal unachievable. It’s of 
course open to the government to make the job easier by commencing growth towards the 
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2% target earlier; the sooner growth begins, the less steep it’ll need to be. No doubt that’s 
one of the options being considered for the 2015 Defence White Paper.  
 
The critical question is not whether funds can be spent, but whether they’ll be made 
available to be spent. In the medium term, the government’s commitment to defence 
spending will be tested by the siren song of returning to surplus. In the next three to five 
years the government will want to balance the books. On current estimates, a surplus will be 
within easy reach as early as 2017-18, or 2016-17 with a bit of effort. It remains to be seen 
what will happen if the choice is between sustaining defence spending and delivering an 
early surplus at an opportune point in the electoral cycle. 
In the longer term, there’s no economic impediment to Australia spending 2% of GDP on 
defence. But the government’s ability to do so will depend on the electorate’s willingness to 
incur the resulting opportunity cost of forgone social services and higher taxes. On current 
estimates, each of Australia’s roughly 10 million workers will be contributing around $5,000 
a year each to sustain the promised defence budget in 2023-24. Yet, according to opinion 
polls, support for higher defence spending has fallen from 60% in 2001 to less than 40% 
today. Absent a strategic crisis to shake off the complacency, sustained increases to defence 
spending will only be possible if the government makes a convincing case for doing so.   
It’s not my job to make the government’s case. But it’s worth pointing out how the promise 
of spending 2% will play into Australia’s credibility down the track. The 2009 Defence White 
Paper set out an ambitious vision of the ADF and promised 21 years of funding growth to 
pay for it. Over the subsequent three years, funding was cut in successive waves in an 
unsuccessful attempt to deliver a fiscal surplus. The 2013 Defence White Paper then did little 
to redress the gap between means and ends. To anyone who was paying attention, including 
our allies and friends, we showed that we were all talk and no action.  
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By promising to spend 2% of GDP on defence in 2023-24, the incoming government has set a 
benchmark against which our commitment will again be tested. If we once more fail to 
follow through, it’ll be a second strike against our credibility. In an era when the United 
States is looking for its allies to step up rather than free ride, there’s much at stake.  
Where is the ADF headed? 
On the basis of projected economic growth, 2% of GDP will amount to around $52 billion in 
2023-24, equivalent to almost $42 billion in today’s terms. It’s natural to ask what sort of 
defence force it’ll buy. Assuming current targets for the size for the defence force (just under 
60,000 permanent personnel) and historical trends in personnel and operating costs, there’ll 
be around $112 billion available over the next decade for capital equipment. In comparison, 
we’ve spent just $66 billion over the decade just past (both figures expressed in today’s 
dollars taking account of inflation).  
If nothing else happens, the share of the budget going to capital equipment will rise from an 
anomalous low of 23% today to around 39% in a decade’s time. On this projection we’ll be 
spending $16 billion on capital in 2023-24 as measured in today’s dollars. In comparison, the 
average capital share over the past almost quarter century (since 1991) has been 27%.  
 
This mountain of funds can be spent in two ways. First, by increasing the ratio of equipment 
to people (what economists call ‘capital deepening’) and, second, by increasing the number 
of people in the defence force. For example, if capital investment is constrained to 30% of 
defence expenditure, there’ll be enough money to add an extra 11,000 people to the force.  
It’s likely that we’ll see a combination of both in the years ahead. While it’s true that projects 
such as the future submarines and replacement frigates will be costly ventures, they’ll each 
only represent $1 or $2 billion a year in the investment budget. Ships and submarines are 
expensive, but they take time to build. The essential point is this; to sustain spending at 2% 
of GDP over the long run, the size of the defence force will need to grow. Consistent with 
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x 
this, we’ve already seen the long-term military personnel target ratcheted up in this budget 
(curiously without the government making an announcement). 
So far, the government has been silent on expanding the force. To the contrary, most of the 
public discussion has been focused on the poor state of the books left by their predecessors. 
It’s entirely likely, indeed probable, that they haven’t fully worked through the 
consequences of spending 2% of GDP in 2023. They certainly couldn’t have foreseen what it 
meant from opposition when the promise was made.  
The risk in all of this is that proposals of diminishing worth—for both extra personnel and 
new equipment—will arise. In a funding regime driven by GDP share rather than by 
balancing costs and benefits, there’s no lower limit on the marginal worth of proposals. Such 
is the nature of a policy based on input costs rather than capability outcomes.  
The recent proposal to retire the Anzac frigates early to provide work for soon to be 
dormant shipyards, or the equally profligate proposal to build support ships in-country when 
they can be purchased more cheaply offshore, exemplify the risk of generous funding 
leading to wasteful spending. By setting a generous financial target for Defence, the 
government has effectively sent the military on a shopping expedition.  
Is Defence ready for what comes next? 
The Abbot government went to the 2013 election with a strong reform agenda for Defence 
and its acquisition and support agency the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO). Hopefully, 
the promised ‘first principles’ review of Defence will commence soon. When it does, there 
are a range of issues to be examined, from the status of DMO, to the role of the service 
chiefs. My instinct is that there is more to be gained from building on the present model 
than by radically reshaping either Defence or DMO.  
In particular, suggestions to drastically reduce the size of DMO need to be treated with 
caution. With a mountain of capital investment looming on the horizon, there’ll be work 
aplenty for folks in DMO and for those who plan capability in Defence. The surest way to 
sabotage the path to 2% of GDP would be strip away the people needed to conceive and 
execute defence projects. 
That’s not to suggest that further reform is unwarranted. There are real questions about the 
accumulation of executive and middle management positions in Defence and DMO over the 
past decade (as there are across every agency in Canberra), and opportunities to better 
exploit information technology and leverage private sector capacity remain. Then there’s the 
untouchable frontier of the military workforce. There’s now more than one officer for every 
three enlisted personnel in the ADF, yet military positions have been strictly quarantined 
from recent savings measures. If the government wants value for money from Defence, it 
needs to look as closely at its military workforce as it does at its civilian.   
Conclusion 
In the present fiscal environment, the budget was unexpectedly favourable for Defence. 
More importantly, the government appears serious about increasing defence spending to 
2% of GDP within the decade. All that remains is for the 2015 Defence White Paper to tell us 
why it is necessary, and what it is that we are going to get for our money. 
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Chapter 1 – Background  
1.1 Strategic Context  
Absent the passage of time, it can be hard to 
discern history’s turning points. For a while, it 
seemed as though the attacks of 9/11 had changed 
everything. Terrorism had become an enduring 
threat, US foreign policy had become unashamedly 
neoconservative, and counterinsurgency had 
become the future of war. But the so-called ‘War 
on Terror’ has since faded into memory. Far from 
being a defining moment for the 21st century, it 
now seems a distant aberration—albeit a costly 
one. 
The other contender for the century’s watershed 
moment is the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). While only time will tell how enduring its 
impact will be, its repercussions continue to be felt. From a strategic perspective, two things 
stand out. 
First, the GFC accelerated the shift of economic weight from advanced to emerging 
economies, and left many advanced economies with a legacy of crippling debts. In contrast, 
debt in key emerging economies such as China remained modest. Slower growth and rising 
debts in advanced economies is exerting downward pressure on defence spending in many 
countries. From Australia’s perspective, the critical outcome is that China’s economic 
capacity is rivalling that of the United States much sooner than would otherwise have been 
the case—with the military balance in the Western Pacific set to follow suit in the years 
ahead. 
Second, the GFC heralded a more assertive and nationalistic posture by China.  Prior to 2008, 
China appeared to be committed to cooperation and ‘peaceful rise’, but after the financial 
crisis the tone and substance of its international relations hardened. While it’s difficult to 
draw a causal link between the GFC and China’s behaviour, the timing suggests an attempt 
to capitalise on perceived US weakness.   
These two factors—the accelerated shift in the distribution of power and China’s newfound 
assertiveness—naturally bring into question the future strategic role of the United States in 
the region.  No question is more critical to Australia’s security; for the past 60 years plus 
we’ve benefited from the strategic stability that the United States has brought to our part of 
the world. 
In 2011, the United States moved to allay regional concerns by announcing its ‘pivot’ to Asia. 
Since renamed a ‘rebalance’ (lest America’s non-Asian allies feel neglected), it’s a multi-
faceted program of US reengagement in the economic, military and diplomatic affairs of the 
region.  
Key Points 
The repercussions of the Global 
Financial Crisis continue to be felt in 
the strategic affairs. In particular, 
Defence spending in many advanced 
economies is being constrained by high 
debt and slow growth. 
Given the accelerated shift in 
economic and strategic weight, the 
critical question for Australia is 
whether our defence policy needs to 
take into account the risk that the 
United States will play a diminished 
role in regional security in the future. 
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Yet, when all’s said and done, the rebalance has made precious little difference to the 
military balance in the region, and its headline economic initiative—the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership—will do as little to alter the shifting regional economic balance. To put things in 
perspective, there’s nothing approaching a Marshall Plan or NATO alliance anywhere to be 
seen.  
But the substance of the rebalance may not be as important as its strategic signalling. At the 
very least the rebalance has helped reassure US allies and friends in the region; questions 
over US commitment to the region are less acute than they would have otherwise been. 
Conversely, given recent events, it’s hard to argue that the rebalance has resulted in greater 
caution on China’s part—though it must have served as a reminder of the risks they’re 
taking.  
On any rational scale, the potential cost of a trans-Pacific conflict would be exceedingly 
high—even without the risk of nuclear escalation. So although there are no guarantees, the 
situation is likely to remain stable as long as the resolve of the United States to support its 
allies appears unwavering. But here we run into murky territory; resolve and perceptions of 
resolve are as intangible as they are changeable.  
Recent events have only added to the uncertainty. Clumsy handling of the Syrian crisis and 
its rapidly fading red lines has eroded perceptions of American power, as has its impotence 
in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine. But take care not to read too much into these 
events. In Syria it would be a mistake to confuse diplomatic missteps with weakness, and in 
Ukraine, the United States is being asked to take an exam in a course it never signed up for. 
Nonetheless, fairly or otherwise, US strength and resolve is being questioned, and not just 
by outsiders but within the United States itself.  
Looking back to the 1970s, and even to the 1990s, it’s easy to find episodes where question 
marks hung over the willingness and capacity of the United States to continue its post-WWII 
role. Perhaps the present situation will prove to be every bit as transient, I suspect it will. But 
what about next time, and the time after that when China’s military muscle is full blown and 
the risks to the United States are amplified well beyond where they are today?  
The fundamental strategic question for Australia is whether we should plan on the basis of 
the United States continuing to keep the peace in our part of the world the way it has in the 
past. Given the long-term horizons inherent to building defence capability, it’s a question the 
authors of the next White Paper have to answer, not for today and tomorrow, but for 10 and 
20 years hence.  
The 2013 Defence White Paper reassured us that, the ‘United States will continue to be the 
world’s strongest military power and the most influential strategic actor in our region for the 
foreseeable future.’ Its 2009 predecessor took a somewhat more equivocal view. Despite 
concluding that the ‘United States will remain the most powerful and influential strategic 
actor over the period to 2030 - politically, economically and militarily’ the possibility of the 
United States playing a diminished role in the region was canvassed.  
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How should we deal with the risk of the United States becoming a less able or less willing 
strategic actor in our region? The first option would be reasoned complacency: simply 
declare the likelihood too small, or too distant in the future to worry about. Effectively, this 
has been our position to date—and it has worked fine for over six decades. But all good 
things must come to an end. If and when the time comes to take the risk of US 
disengagement seriously, we’ll be looking for ways to reduce the likelihood and hedge 
against the consequences of it occurring.  
A serious effort to hedge against being left to defend ourselves would be both costly and 
difficult. Defending our expansive continent and our dispersed broader interests, in a region 
of growing great powers such as China, would place higher demands on our small economy 
than presently envisaged. I doubt that 2% of GDP would cut it. Nonetheless, we could 
probably fashion a conventional force capable of imposing high costs on even the largest of 
potential adversaries without crippling the economy.  
But when the dust settled, and our submarines were tucked away in their hardened pens, 
and our fighters were lined up on the taxiway wingtip to wingtip, we’d have to ask ourselves 
whether we’d made the mistake of getting ready to bring a knife to a gunfight. Absent at 
least a nuclear breakout capability, we would’ve spent a lot of money to mitigate the 
Goldilocks set of threats that entail major industrial age attrition warfare but stop short of 
nuclear exchange.  
A less costly alternative would be a hedging strategy built around a ‘core force’ to allow the 
ADF to expand quickly in the event of deterioration in our security situation. Although 
questions of timing would be critical to the efficacy of such a strategy, it would have some 
intrinsic merit and limited costs. The risk is that it would become an excuse for even more 
costly overstaffing of senior military ranks and featherbedding of our defence industrial 
base. And when all was said and done, in terms of the risk of US disengagement, it would 
ultimately face the same limitations as a serious hedging strategy. 
If hedging isn’t the solution, we’re left with shaping the environment to reduce the 
likelihood of the United States decamping for Pearl Harbour. In case my bias hasn’t yet 
become obvious, shaping is my preferred option. While I think that a hedging strategy would 
be both costly and ineffective in all but very special instances, I believe that a determined 
shaping strategy can materially reduce the likelihood of US departure.  
In the first instance, it would simply mean redoubling our efforts in many areas. For 
example, assisting the United States to engage with the countries of Southeast Asia, and 
working more closely with other US allies and friends in the region. A further demonstration 
of our commitment would be to pay greater attention to C4ISR and logistical interoperability 
with the US military, including by further strengthening our preference for US sourced 
equipment. And if we were really serious about encouraging the United States to stay 
around, we’d also have to demonstrate that we’re serious about defence—and that would 
mean spending more than we’ve done in recent times.  Finally, we’d continue our present 
practice of providing prompt and clear political support to the maintenance of norms in the 
region, as we did when China announced its East China Sea ADIZ last year.  
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The obvious counter to the foregoing argument is that the United States will act in its own 
strategic interests irrespective of how helpful we are. I’m not sure that’s true. The United 
States bases its national identity on providing leadership to like-minded countries. By 
responding to US leadership and encouraging others to do so, we reinforce the value of 
leadership from a US perspective. Leaders need followers.   
But there’s also something that Australia can offer the United States which goes to the heart 
of its economic and security interests—access to 7.7 million km2 of terrain stretching from 
the Pacific to Indian Ocean and from the Great Southern Ocean to the base of the Asian 
archipelago.  
As the Western Pacific becomes more contested, the value of access to Australian ports, 
airfields and training grounds will surely grow. It’s arguably the most valuable thing we can 
offer our ally, and it’s certainly unique in its scale and location.  If the emerging strategic 
concern of the 21st century is that the United States will find its position in Asia untenable, 
we could do worse than offer them a solid strategic base straddling the sea lanes passing 
from the Indian to Pacific Oceans. 
It remains to be seen how much the next defence white paper grapples with the issues 
outlined above. On past experience, we shouldn’t expect a frank and fearless discussion 
about our strategic prospects. There’s little to be gained by expressing alarm at China’s 
behaviour or admitting doubts about US resolve. Instead we’ll get carefully drafted passages 
that are Delphic and anodyne in equal measure. The real test will be what the government 
decides about the size and shape of the ADF.   
If the fundamental underpinnings of our security really are changing, we should expect a 
departure from the ‘balanced force’ approach of collegiately sharing the pie between the 
three services.  
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1.2 Political Context  
As a political issue, defence is competing for 
attention with economic issues as the newly elected 
Abbott government gets on with what it calls ‘budget 
repair’. At the same time, the new government has 
promised to rectify the systemic underfunding of 
current defence plans, including through its election 
promise to boost defence spending to 2% of GDP by 
2023-24.  
The tension between balancing the budget and 
properly funding existing plans for defence will play 
out over the next several years. Absent the emergence of an unforseen issue, political 
debate is likely to centre on the question of defence spending and the opportunity cost it 
imposes from a fiscal and political perspective.  
Moreover, it’s likely that most of the debate will occur within the government itself and 
across the broader media rather than between the government and the opposition. 
Although defence isn’t a high priority in people’s minds—as explained below—the 
opposition has shown no readiness to argue against higher defence spending. Indeed, in 
April when the government announced approval of the next tranche of F-35 JSF aircraft at a 
cost of $12.3 billion dollars (on the same day the Treasurer made his pre-budget austerity 
pitch) it was left to the media to respond. And respond they did, with a torrent of critical 
commentary on what was a veritable field day for cartoonists.   
The unlikelihood of a broader debate on defence issues reflects the substantial bipartisan 
agreement on most aspects of defence policy. The underlying concepts laid out in the Fraser 
government’s 1976 Defence White Paper have been echoed in every subsequent document. 
Where changes have occurred, they’ve been evolutionary adaptations to our changing 
circumstances. And while some changes have given rise to political debate at the time—such 
as the priority to be accorded to ‘expeditionary’ operations—bipartisan support has 
eventually been found. More generally, successive governments have been largely happy to 
take the advice tendered to them from the ADF leadership tempered only by the fiscal 
constraints of the day.  
Politics and money 
From 2009 until 2012, the previous government’s commitment to defence funding was all 
but totally eclipsed by the political imperative to deliver a fiscal surplus—a goal embraced 
equally by the then opposition. Why the rush to get out the red? 2012-13 was the last 
opportunity for the Gillard government to demonstrate (not just promise) a surplus before 
the 2013 federal election. And how important was that? As Figure 1.2.1 shows with alarming 
clarity, it was very important; the last federal Labor treasurer to deliver a surplus was Paul 
Keating in 1989-90. Given the context, a surplus in 2012-13 was the political equivalent of a 
holy grail worth seeking at just about any cost.  
So far, the Abbott government has adroitly avoided putting a hard date on when it plans to 
return the budget to surplus—though projections in the budget papers point towards 
Key Points 
Only 1% of Australians think 
defence/security is the most 
important problem facing Australia. 
Confidence in Australia’s defences 
has trended downwards over the past 
decade. 
Only 38% of Australians support 
higher defence spending, down from 
60% in 2001. 
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2018-19. But make no mistake; a rapid return to surplus is firmly in its sights. The imperative 
goes beyond economics; the sooner the Coalition can bring the Commonwealth’s finances 
into surplus, the sooner they’ll be able lay claim to being better economic managers.  
Figure 1.2.1: Underlying cash balance 1984 to 2017  
Source: Treasury Papers 
Public opinion 
At the moment, Australians place a relatively low priority on security. Figure 1.2.2 shows the 
percentage of respondents who identified particular issues as the most important problem 
facing either the world or Australia in February 2014.  
Figure 1.2.2: What do people worry about?
Source: Ray Morgan Research, Finding No. 5432, February 2014. 
The relatively low priority currently given to defence is consistent with the deterioration in 
public perception of the seriousness of defence-related matters over the period November 
2005 to February 2013, see Figure 1.2.3.  
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Figure 1.2.3: Less important than it used to be 
Source: Ray Morgan Research, Finding No. 5432, February 2014. 
The seemingly dramatic change in public sentiment in Figure 1.2.3 is at least partially an 
artifact of respondants being asked to identify a single ‘most important’ issue. It’s entirely 
possible for defence to still be important in its own right, even if it’s not the most important 
issue of the day. With this in mind, we turn now to examine a more graduated measure of 
the perceived priority of defence-related issues over time.  
Figure 1.2.4 plots the percentage of Australians polled who rated ‘national security’ and/or 
‘the economy’ as very important in the context of the question: Would you say each of the 
following issues is very important, fairly important or not important on how you personally 
will vote in the federal election?  
Figure 1.2.4: Guns versus butter 
Source: Newspoll for The Australian newspaper, June 2004 to February 2014. 
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As expected, the falling priority for national security is less dramatic in a survey where 
respondents can choose more than one item from a list of possiblilities. Nonetheless, it’s still 
clear from the data that the GFC heralded a higher priority for the economy, partially at the 
expense of national security. It’s interesting to note that after a pronounced swing in favour 
of the economy around the time of the GFC, sentiment subsequently plateaued at new 
levels more favourable to economic issues and less favourable to national security.  
And it’s not simply that other problems (such as the fragility of the economy) have taken 
greater prominence in people’s assessment. Australians actually feel much more confident 
that our defence arrangements are effective (see Table 1.2.1). Although there was a small 
drop between 2010 and 2013 in the number of people who agreed that ‘Australia would be 
able to defend itself successfully if it were ever attacked’, the longer term trend since 2004 
has been toward greater confidence, as shown in Figure 1.2.5.  
Table 1.2.1: Confidence in Australia’s defences  
Would Australia would be able to defend itself successfully if it were ever attacked? (%) 
 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Agree or strongly agree  14.8 19.7 15.7 19.2 22.9 30.5 28.2 
Neither agree nor disagree 20.3 20.2 22.2 24.5 28.9 30.1 29.1 
Disagree or strongly disagree 64.9 60.2 62.1 56.3 48.2 39.4 42.6 
Source: McAllister et al: Trends in Australian political opinion: results from the Australian election study, 1987-2013. 
Figure 1.2.5: Confidence in Australia’s defences  
Source: McAllister et al: Trends in Australian political opinion: results from the Australian election study, 1987-2013. 
Paradoxically, at the same time as confidence in Australia’s ability to defend itself has grown, 
perceptions of the strength of our defences have fallen—especially between 2010 and 2013.   
See Table 1.2.2 and Figure 1.2.6.  
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Table 1.2.2: Getting stronger or weaker?  
Australia’s defence is stronger now than it was 10 years ago (%)  
 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Agree or strongly agree  27.9 22.8 31.5 54.5 54.0 49.6 38.7 
Neither agree nor disagree 43.1 42.2 40.1 30.7 33.2 42.1 43.6 
Disagree or strongly disagree 29.0 35.0 28.3 14.8 12.8 8.4 17.7 
Source: McAllister et al: Trends in Australian political opinion: results from the Australian election study, 1987-2013. 
Figure 1.2.6: Getting stronger or weaker? 
Source: McAllister et al: Trends in Australian political opinion: results from the Australian election study, 1987-2013. 
These seemingly contradictory trends might be taken to imply that respondents perceive the 
world to be a safer place. Logically, at least, in a safer world a weaker defence force could 
nonetheless be more able to defend us than was previously the case. And although it’s 
dangerous to make such an indirect inference from survey responses, perceptions of 
country-specific security threats also fell between 2010 and 2013 for the key countries of 
Indonesia and China (see Table 1.2.3 and Figure 1.2.7). 
Table 1.2.3: Threat perceptions (%) 
In your opinion, are any of the following countries likely to pose a threat to Australia’s security?  
Indonesia 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Very likely 23.6 23.1 31.3 28.8 28.1 22.6 16.1 
Fairly likely 35.9 38.8 42.2 43.1 44.7 39.4 36.0 
Not very likely 40.5 38.1 26.6 28.1 27.2 38.0 47.9 
        China 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Very likely 18.6 14.3 9.0 7.7 10.4 14.7 13.7 
Fairly likely 41.1 37.7 33.0 31.7 35.3 41.8 37.7 
Not very likely 40.4 47.9 57.9 60.6 54.3 43.5 48.7 
Source: McAllister et al: Trends in Australian political opinion: results from the Australian election study, 1987-2013. 
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Figure 1.2.7: Threat perceptions 
Source: McAllister et al: Trends in Australian political opinion: results from the Australian election study, 1987-2013.  
As might be expected, the combination of falling fears and growing confidence translates 
into reduced support for increasing the amount of money going to defence (see Table 1.2.4 
and Figure 1.2.8). Note that the source for 2013 varies from that for previous years. As can 
be seen, the proportion of Australians willing to spend more on defence has fallen from a 
high of 60% in 2001 down to 38% in 2013.  
Table 1.2.4: How much is enough? 
Do you think that the government should spend more or spend less on defence?’ (%) 
 1987 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Spend much more on defence  14.1 10.2 18.5 20.6 15.5 14.9 15.1 
38 
Spend some more on defence 48.9 27.5 28.8 33.6 39.7 36.4 31.9 29.4 
About right at present* 24.5 43.3 45.7 38.4 33.2 37.7 41.2 45.3 47 
Spend less on defence 26.6 11.3 11.2 7.5 4.7 8 8.4 7.7 
12 
Spend a lot less on defence  3.8 4.1 1.9 1.7 2.4 3.6 2.4 
Don’t know         3 
* 'Doesn't matter' 1987.  
Sources: McAllister et al: Trends in Australian political opinion: results from the Australian election study, 1987-2010. 2013 
figures from Lowy Institute Poll 2013. 
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Figure 1.2.8: How much is enough? 
Sources: McAllister et al: Trends in Australian political opinion: results from the Australian election study, 1987-2010. Lowy 
Institute Poll 2013. 
Consistent with the long-term trend in public sentiment, the substantial cuts to the defence 
budget in 2012 were approved by a greater share of respondents (48%) than those who 
disapproved (43%), according to the Essential Report poll of 14 May, 2012. More generally, 
recent polling shows that voters favour spending cuts to higher taxes, see Table 1.2.5. 
Figure 1.2.9 shows the responses of those who favoured spending cuts in August 2013 and 
March 2014 when asked which areas of spending should be cut.  
Roughly speaking, defence comes out in the middle of the pack, with 34% of respondents in 
2013 and 38% in 2014 supporting reduced spending. Both of these results are substantially 
higher than the 10-12% who supported defence cuts in the polls represented in Figure 1.2.8. 
Perhaps the critical difference is that higher results arose in the context of choosing between 
tax hikes and spending cuts, and then only counted respondents who supported cuts.  
Table 1.2.5: Raise taxes or cut spending? 
Do you think the Government should raise taxes or cut spending to reduce the national debt or 
should they do neither? (%) 
 
May 2013 August 2013 March 2014 
Raise taxes 13  6  6  
Reduce spending 55  45  47  
Both n/a 21  19  
Neither 20  18  20  
Don't know 12  10  8  
Source: Essential Media Report May 2013, August 2013 and March 2014 
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Figure 1.2.9: Where to swing the axe 
Source: Essential Media Report August 2013 and March 2014 
*Industry support was ‘Support for manufacturing industry’, Subsidies refers to ‘Subsidies for business’. 
Who is trusted to handle defence? 
Figure 1.2.10 shows polling results over the past 13 years on who is best able to handle 
defence/national security. Although confidence in the relative merits of Labor and the 
Coalition converged around the time of the 2007 federal election, the results diverged in 
favour of the Coalition following the 2009 Defence White Paper.  The Coalition has 
maintained a strong lead since at least late 2009. 
Figure 1.2.10: Who is best able to handle defence/national security? 
Source: Newspoll for The Australian newspaper, January 2001 to February 2014.   
(Defence pre-June 2004, National Security post-June 2004) 
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Interesting polling following the April 2014 announcement of the purchase of 58 F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighters revealed systematic differences between how supporters of different political 
complexions view defence (see Table 1.2.6). The results speak for themselves, while fewer 
than 13% of Greens voters and 20% of Labor voters supported the purchase, 49% of Liberal-
National coalition voters did.  
 
Table 1.2.6: Polling results on F-35 JSF purchase 
Q. Do you approve or disapprove of the Government’s decision to purchase 58 fighter jets from the US at a 
cost of $12 billion? 
 Total Vote Labor Vote Lib/Nat 
Vote 
Greens Vote other 
Strongly approve 7% 3% 13% <1% 5% 
Approve 23% 17% 36% 12% 15% 
Disapprove 27% 30% 23% 28% 29% 
Strongly disapprove 25% 35% 10% 45% 30% 
Don’t know 18% 15% 18% 15% 21% 
Source: Essential Media Report, 30 April 2014 
A new government 
The September 2013 federal election saw the Abbott government elected with a 
comfortable majority in the lower house; 90 seats to the Coalition and 55 seats to Labor. As 
Table 1.2.7 shows, the electoral system rewards larger parties at the expense of the smaller 
when it comes to proportioning seats. Of particular note is the large swing to ‘other’ 
candidates— fully three times larger than the swing to the Coalition.  So while Labor and the 
Greens fared badly in the December poll, only around a quarter of their lost primary votes 
went to the Coalition.  
Table 1.2.7: Lower house primary votes and seats, 2013 federal election 
 Votes % Swing Seats % 
Liberal/National Coalition 5,882,818 45.55 +1.93 90 60.00 
Australian Labor Party 4,311,365 33.38 -4.61 55 36.67 
The Greens 1,116,918 8.65 -3.11 1 0.67 
Other 1,603,826 12.42 +5.79 4 2.67 
Source: Australian Electoral Commission 
A similar trend can be observed in the results for the Senate in the 2013 election (see Table 
1.2.8). The Greens and Labor lost 9.5% of the primary vote, the Liberal/National coalition 
lost almost 1% and ‘other’ candidates enjoyed a collective swing of more than 10%. The April 
2014 West Australian Senate recount saw the major parties punished again, with swings in 
the primary vote of 5% against Labor and 7% against the Liberal/National coalition.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, the Greens enjoyed half of the 12% collective swing away from the two main 
parties.  
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Table 1.2.8: Upper house primary votes and seats, 2013/2014 federal election 
 
Votes % Swing Seats % 
Liberal/National Coalition 5,057,218 37.71 -0.92 17 42.5 
Australian Labor Party 4,038,591 30.11 -5.02 12 30 
The Greens 1,159,588 8.65 -4.46 4 10 
Palmer United Party 658976 4.91 4.91 3 7.5 
Other 2,498,646 15.66 6.28 4 10 
Source: Australian Electoral Commission 
Note: votes are taken from September 2013 election, seat numbers and percentages include April 2014 Senate re-election 
The final result of the September 2013 election and the April 2014 re-election for the Senate 
in WA is that the Liberal/National coalition has a commanding majority in the House of 
Representatives but will have to rely on the crossbenchers to pass legislation in the Senate. 
But this is unlikely to affect the Abbott government’s ability to pursue its defence agenda 
since most defence policy initiatives rely on executive power rather than legislation.    
Notwithstanding its strong parliamentary position, the new government’s willingness to 
pursue unpopular policies is likely to be tempered by the electorate’s demonstrated 
volatility and dissatisfaction with the major parties.  If so, the government may find it 
politically difficult to deliver a surplus and boost defence spending as promised. 
The government’s election platform 
Although Defence wasn’t a central issue in the 2013 federal election, the government came 
to power with an official platform covering a range of matters.  Key points from its election 
policy document The Coalition’s Policy for Stronger Defence appear in Table 1.2.9 along with 
an assessment of progress to date. 
Despite a promise of ‘no further cuts to defence spending’, the government imposed an 
increase to the efficiency dividend on non-operational areas of Defence which will see 
$75 million returned to Treasury over four years. In fairness, the Public Service wide 
efficiency dividend was disclosed in the Coalition’s election platform in what amounts to a 
case of incompatible promises.  However, at election time, the anticipated savings from 
across the Public Service amounted to $428 million whereas a total of $544 million was 
harvested this budget—more than enough to quarantine Defence and still deliver greater 
than expected savings.  
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Table 1.2.9: Coalition defence election platform 
Policy Status 
Continuation of the fundamental defence policy objectives as set out in the 2000 
Defence White Paper—i.e. Defence of Australia with concentric circles (p.3).      
‘There will be no further cuts to Defence spending under a Coalition government.’ 
(p.4) 
$76 million in efficiency 
dividends were taken 
from Defence in the 2014-
15 Budget. 
Savings will be sought from Defence but ‘any savings that the Coalition finds from 
rationalising the Defence bureaucracy will be reinvested in greater military 
capacity and front line capabilities’. (p.4) 
See above. 
‘….decisions necessary to ensure that Australia has no submarine capability gap 
within 18 months of the election. (p.4)   
‘….replacement of the current submarine fleet will centre around the South 
Australian shipyards. (p.4)  
Contingent of advice from Defence chiefs, ‘we will proceed with the initial 
purchase of up to 72 JSFs.’ (p.5) 
Approval announced 23 
April 13. 
‘The Coalition’s Defence White Paper will closely consider the need for unmanned 
aerial surveillance vehicles’. (p.5) 
Commitment to purchase 
Triton UAV made on 13 
March 2013. 
‘We will look for areas where it would be in the mutual interest of Australia and 
the United States to deepen our longstanding alliance relationship building on the 
recent announcement to rotate a marine brigade through Darwin’. 
(p.6) 
  
‘….publish an objective replacement Defence White Paper with costed, affordable 
ways to meet Australia’s defence and national security objectives.’ (p.6)  
‘The Coalition will appoint a high-profile team to undertake a first-principles 
review of the structure of the Defence Department and all its major processes.’ 
(p.6) 
 
‘We will work with the Australian defence industry to avoid production troughs by 
co-operating closely with companies…’ (p.7)  
‘We will reform the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) to ensure it employs 
commercially experienced procurers with an understanding of commercial 
principles and risk.’ (p.7) 
 
‘…consider further options for reforming the DMO, including proposals for 
establishing it as a more independent agency driven by cost-benefit assessments’. 
(p.7) 
 
Recipients of the Defence Forces Retirement Benefits (DFRB) and the Defence 
Force Retirement and Death Benefits (DFRDB) military superannuation pensions 
will see their payments indexed in the same way as aged and service pensions.’ 
(p.7) 
Funding provided in 2014 
Budget. 
‘….all ADF dependants will be eligible to claim for out of pocket expenses for GP 
services. Additionally, each ADF dependant will be able to claim up to $400 per 
year for allied health services such as physiotherapy, psychology, dentistry and 
podiatry. 
(p.8) 
Funding provided in 2014 
Budget. 
‘The Coalition will re-build ADF Gap Year programme, progressively increasingly 
numbers until an average of 1,000 places per annum is made available in the 
programme.’ 
(p.9) 
Funding provided in 2014 
Budget. 
‘Within a decade, Defence spending will be two per cent of GDP’. (p.10)  
Source: The Coalition’s Policy for Stronger Defence, 2013. 
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1.3 Economic Context  
From the early 1990s until late 2008, Australia enjoyed relatively favourable economic 
conditions, see Figure 1.3.1. Three things stood out: 
• In the 1990s, inflation fell to effectively half of what it was in the 1970s and 1980s, 
notwithstanding a short-lived spike in 2008.   
• Economic growth was healthy, averaging 3.4% during the 1990s and 3.2% from 2000 to 
2007, despite a fall in labour productivity growth.  
• Unemployment fell from a peak of 10.8% in late 1992 to a 34-year low of 4% in early 
2008 (at the same time as workforce participation edged up from 62.7% to 65.2%).   
 Figure 1.3.1: Australian economic performance 1980 to 2014  
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and Treasury statistics.  
Strong economic growth allowed the Howard government to simultaneously increase 
spending and cut taxes in its later years. It was a happy time all around. Few areas were 
happier than Defence, which saw its funding grow more or less in tandem with GDP from 
1999 onwards. But from around 2004, when unemployment fell below 5%, capacity 
constraints started to be felt in the economy and in 2008 inflation began to rise quickly.  
Then, in late 2008, the GFC hit and it looked as though a substantial recession was on the 
cards. But Australia weathered the economic storm better than expected and only 
experienced a limited slowdown. Nonetheless, a return to trend growth is yet to emerge. 
Indeed, economic growth for the decade prior to the GFC averaged 3.55% compared with 
2.48% subsequently (see Figure 1.3.2).  
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
pe
rc
en
t (
an
nu
al
ise
d)
 ch
an
ge
 
Unemployment
CPI Inflation
2000s: avg 3.0% GDP growth 
avg labour productivity 1.2% 
1990s: avg 3.2% GDP growth 
avg labour productivity 2.1% 
1980s: avg 3.4% GDP growth 
avg labour productivity 1.2% 
Recession we had to have 
Intro of GST 
2008 inflation  
spike 
 
GFC 
RBA inflation target range 
 17 
 
Figure 1.3.2: Seasonally adjusted annual GDP growth by quarter
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).  
The timing of the events is reflected in the changes to the RBA target cash rate set out in 
Figure 1.3.3. From late 2009 until late 2010, rising inflation and restored growth saw the 
official interest rate rise progressively by 1.75%. Over the same period, unemployment fell to 
around 5.2%. In late 2011, however, the RBA changed tack and cut rates by 1% in three steps 
over a six month period to an expansionary 3.75% as inflation moderated. Over the next 
year, from May 2012 to May 2013, the cash rate fell by another 1% as unemployment 
hedged upwards. After a further downward revision in August 2013, the cash rate fell to a 
post-1990 low of 2.5%. (The average cash rate since 1990 has been 5.6 %.)  
 Figure 1.3.3: RBA target cash rate 2001 to 2014 
 Source: RBA  
Defence funding is affected by two economic parameters; the value of the Australian 
dollar—particularly relative to the US dollar—and the rate of inflation. These are explored 
below beginning with foreign exchange.  
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Se
p-
98
Ap
r-
99
No
v-
99
Ju
n-
00
Ja
n-
01
Au
g-
01
M
ar
-0
2
O
ct
-0
2
M
ay
-0
3
De
c-
03
Ju
l-0
4
Fe
b-
05
Se
p-
05
Ap
r-
06
No
v-
06
Ju
n-
07
Ja
n-
08
Au
g-
08
M
ar
-0
9
O
ct
-0
9
M
ay
-1
0
De
c-
10
Ju
l-1
1
Fe
b-
12
Se
p-
12
Ap
r-
13
No
v-
13
Average GDP growth  
Sept 1998-2008: 3.55% 
Onset of Global Financial Crisis 
September 2008 
Average GDP growth  
post Sept 2008: 2.48% 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
ta
rg
et
 ca
sh
 ra
te
 - 
pe
rc
en
t 
Rates rise to combat inflation 
Rates cut in response to GFC 
Rates rise with recovery  
Low inflation and uneven growth prompts cuts 
 18 
 
Defence spends something like $5 billion a year offshore (no official figure is available) 
mostly in contracts written in US dollars. And while Defence is insulated from foreign 
exchange fluctuations on a no-win, no-loss basis, the government, and ultimately the 
taxpayer, feels the pain or gain. In recent years, the USD–AUD exchange rate has fluctuated 
substantially, as Figure 1.3.4 shows. At the time of writing, the exchange rate was around 
US$0.93 having reached a post-float high of $1.11 against the US dollar in July 2011. The 
budget assumes a continuing rate of US$0.93.  
 Figure 1.3.4: Foreign exchange   
 Source: RBA  
Since 2009-10, the Defence budget has received fixed 2.5% annual indexation, calculated 
from 2009-10 but only applied from 2013-14. (This is separate from and in addition to the 
adjustments made for foreign exchange). The relative percentage gain or loss compared with 
CPI and ‘core’ inflation is calculated in Table 1.3.1, including historical figures for 
comparison.   
Table 1.3.1: CPI inflation, ‘core’ inflation and 2.5% indexation  
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1.4 Fiscal Context  
Between 1970 and 1984, annual Australian Government payments grew from 18.3% to 
27.6% of GDP (see Figure 1.4.1). Subsequently, payments moderated downward to around 
23% and then fluctuated around an average of 24.8% of GDP up until the present day.  
Figure 1.4.1: Australian Government payments and receipts 1970 to 2017 
Source: Treasury Budget Papers, MYEFO 2013-14 and Budget 2014-15. Note: receipts are exclusive of Future Fund earnings.  
Over the period 1970 to 2013, the Australian Government ran deficits in 25 out of 44 years, 
as marked in grey overshadow in Figure 1.4.1. The most recent excursion into deficit 
budgeting was caused by the GFC, which precipitated falling receipts, rising ‘automatic 
stabiliser’ spending and policy-led Keynesian spending. From 2009 onwards, there was a 
further deterioration of the government’s fiscal outlook as revenues failed to materialise. 
Figure 1.4.2 graphs the dramatic changes to the fiscal outlook in successive official estimates 
from 2009 onwards.  
Figure 1.4.2: The changing outlook—fiscal balance per cent GDP 
Source: 2009-10 to 2014-15 Budget Papers 
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A more detailed comparison appears in Table 1.4.1, which compares the outlooks in May 
2012, May 2013 and May 2014. Note the severe and continuing deterioration in the 
government’s fiscal position between 2012 and today, deficits are shaded in grey. Key 
figures are as follows, the planned surplus (as at May 2012) for 2012-13 blew out by around 
$22 billion, and the predicted deficit (as at May 2013) for 2013-14 grew from $18 billion to 
$50 billion.  
Table 1.4.1: Budget aggregates 2012-13 and 2013-14 Budgets (nominal billion dollars)  
 Historical Figures Budget Estimates 
20
07
-0
8 
20
08
-0
9 
20
09
-1
0 
20
10
-1
1 
20
11
-1
2 
20
12
-1
3 
20
13
-1
4 
20
14
-1
5 
20
15
-1
6 
20
16
-1
7 
20
17
-1
8 
Bu
dg
et
  
20
12
-1
3 
Underlying cash  
Per cent of GDP 
19.7 
1.7 
-27.1 
-2.2 
-54.8 
-4.3 
-47.7 
-3.4 
-44.4  
-3.0  
1.5  
0.1  
2.0  
0.1  
5.3  
0.3  
7.5  
0.4 
  
Fiscal balance  
Per cent of GDP 
21.0 
1.9 
-29.7 
-2.4 
-52.9 
-4.1 
-42.0 
-2.8 
-42.0  
-2.8  
2.5  
0.2  
2.6  
0.2  
7.0  
0.4  
9.5  
0.5 
  
Bu
dg
et
  
20
13
-1
4 
Underlying cash  
Per cent of GDP 
19.7 
1.7 
-27.1 
-2.2 
-54.8 
-4.3 
-47.7 
-3.4 
-43.4  
-2.9  
-19.4 
-1.3  
-18.0 
-1.1  
-10.9 
-0.6  
0.8 
0.0 
6.6 
0.4 
 
Fiscal balance  
Per cent of GDP 
21.0 
1.9 
-29.7 
-2.4 
-52.9 
-4.1 
-42.0 
-2.8 
-44.5  
-3.0  
-20.3 
-1.3  
-13.5 
-0.8  
-6.3 
-0.4  
6.0 
0.3 
10.8 
0.6 
 
Bu
dg
et
  
20
14
-1
5 
Underlying cash  
Per cent of GDP 
19.7 
1.7 
-27.1 
-2.2 
-54.8 
-4.3 
-47.7 
-3.4 
-43.4  
-2.9  
-18.8 
-1.2 
-49.9 
-3.1 
-29.8 
-1.8 
-17.1 
-1.0 
-10.6 
-0.6 
-2.8 
-0.2 
Fiscal balance  
Per cent of GDP 
21.0 
1.9 
-29.7 
-2.4 
-52.9 
-4.1 
-42.0 
-2.8 
-44.5  
-3.0  
-23.5 
-1.5    
-45.1 
-2.8   
-25.9 
-1.6   
-12.2 
-0.7  
-6.6 
-0.4  
1.0 
0.1 
Source: Treasury Budget Papers No. 1 for 2014–15 and beyond.  
The worsening fiscal position was caused by a combination of increased spending and falling 
revenues. The Parliamentary Budget Office has produced a graph that succinctly captures 
the spending situation by plotting together the growth in GDP and government spending for 
the period 2002-03 to 2012-13 (see Figure 1.4.3).  
Figure 1.4.3: Growth in government spending and GDP 
 Source: Australian Government Spending Part 1, February 2013, Parliamentary Budget Office. 
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Consistent with Figure 1.4.1, Figure 1.4.3 shows that the GFC saw growth in government 
spending outpace GDP growth in 2008-09 and 2009-10. The result was an increase in 
government spending as a share of GDP that persists to this day, despite a downward 
excursion in 2012-13 reflecting a failed attempt to achieve a surplus in that year.   
The recent deterioration in government revenues is due to several factors; including reduced 
company profits and sluggish nominal GDP growth (tax depends on nominal rather than real 
GDP levels). A key factor overall was the substantial fall in Australia’s terms of trade, as 
shown in Figure 1.4.4.  
Figure 1.4.4: Australia’s terms of trade  
Source: ABS Australian National Accounts 5206.0.  
The terms of trade measure the quantity of imports an economy can purchase per unit of 
exports. Concurrent with the mining boom, Australia’s terms of trade grew substantially, 
reaching a historical peak in September 2011 before falling 18% to its current level. This 
year’s budget assumes the terms of trade will decline 5% in 2013-14, 6.75% in 2014-15 and 
1.75% in 2015-16. If larger falls occur, there’ll be added pressure on government revenues.  
The longer term fiscal picture is far from encouraging. As a result of temporarily favourable 
economic conditions last decade, Australia developed an unnoticed structural deficit that 
will persist even if and after growth returns to trend. The structural budget balance is an 
estimate of the difference between revenues and expenditure when transitory factors are 
accounted for. Put simply, as the one-off mining boom and terms of trade surge abated, 
rising expenditure quickly outstripped revenues and we moved into a structural deficit. 
Figure 1.4.5 shows the projected budget balance as estimated by Treasury in the May 2014 
Budget. 
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Figure 1.4.5: Australia’s estimated structural budget balance 
 
Source: Treasury Papers, May 2014-15. 
The slow return to a structural surplus shown in Figure 1.4.5 belies the true situation. Much 
of the fiscal recovery arises due to fiscal drag, or bracket creep, the process by which 
inflation progressively shifts individuals into higher tax brackets. Fiscal drag shifts the burden 
of taxation away from companies and onto individuals, thereby reducing the incentive to 
work. At the same time, fiscal drag lowers the balance point for progressivity in the income 
tax schedule.  
In reality, future governments will almost certainly find it politically expedient to return at 
least some of the gains from fiscal drag by way of tax cuts. And if a future government wants 
to reform the taxation and welfare systems, fiscal drag provides a war chest to soften the 
blow of policy changes. So while it’s possible to rely on fiscal drag to redress the structural 
balance, doing so would be both lazy and suboptimal. What’s really required are long-term 
structural changes to government spending and revenues, hence the government’s 
attention to such matters in this year’s Budget. 
Deficits result in debt. Fortunately, unlike most other advanced economies, Australia 
entered the GFC with no debt. As a result, our accumulated and projected debt is far below 
the daunting levels—typically 80-100% of GDP—faced by many European economies and the 
United States. Figure 1.4.6 shows the past and projected net Australian Government debt 
out to 2017-18. Note that growth in the economy coupled with the assumed slow 
remediation of the structural deficit (as explained above) results in debt peaking as a share 
of GDP in 2016-17. 
 
Although a net debt of around 16% of GDP is far from alarming, the ongoing impost of 
interest payments is substantial. For example, in 2017-18 the Treasury estimates that the 
cost of servicing the debt will be $12.9 billion—more than enough to deliver a generous 
basket of government programs or around $1,000 in tax cuts for every worker in the nation. 
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Figure 1.4.6: Australian Government net debt 
Source: Treasury Papers, May 2014. 
To put defence spending properly into a fiscal context, we turn now to examine the 
structure of Australian Government spending. Figure 1.4.7 shows Australian Government 
spending by function for 2014-15. As can be seen, defence spending accounts for a relatively 
small part of the total. The reputation of defence as a ‘big spender’ probably arose because 
it involves a small number of very large purchases rather than millions of small payments as 
occurs in health, education and social security. Note that in this chart defence spending 
excludes capital investment. 
Figure 1.4.7: Australian Government expenses by function 2014-15
Source: 2014-15 Budget Papers 
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A time-series of Australian Government spending by function (Figure 1.4.8), reinforces the 
relative scale of defence spending and demonstrates that rising government spending has 
largely occurred in areas outside of defence. 
Figure 1.4.8: Australian Government spending by function time series (% GDP)  
 
Source: Australian Government Spending Part 1, February 2013, Parliamentary Budget Office. 
Comparing defence spending with other components of federal (i.e. Australian Government) 
spending fails to take into account the additional public revenues expended at the state and 
local level. In 2011, for example, federal spending accounted for only around 2/3 of public 
spending (source OECD statistics). Taking local and state government spending into account, 
defence spending represents only 3.9% of public expenditure in Australia.   Even this figure 
fails to properly put defence spending into context. The denominator in the ratio (general 
government expenditure) is highly dependent on the extent to which the government 
intermediates between individuals and the providers of services such as health and 
education. The level of intermediation varies substantially between different countries, as 
demonstrated in Figure 1.4.9, which shows general government expenditure across the 
OECD.  
Because of Australia’s relatively low level of general government expenditure, the 
percentage devoted to defence is higher than it would be otherwise. A better way to capture 
the true scale of defence spending relative to the usual cited ‘opportunity cost’ areas of 
social spending, health, pensions and education is to compare defence spending to the total 
(public plus private) expenditure in those areas.  This is done in Figure 1.4.10. 
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Figure 1.4.9: General government expenditure 2010 
 
Source: OECD Factbook, 2013. 
Figure 1.4.10: Australian public and private expenditure in key functions 2010, circa 2009 
 
Source: OECD Factbook, 2013 (Defence OECD figure is actually NATO European average for 2011). . 
As is clear from the figure, defence expenditure is small compared with combined public and 
private expenditure in the four areas. Moreover, although Australia’s general government 
expenditure is small by OECD standards, our public plus private expenditure in these areas is 
fully commensurate with the aggregate OECD expenditure.  
The critical point to observe is that defence is different from the competing areas of 
expenditure in a very important respect. Although a shortfall in government spending on 
social, health, pensions or education can be made up for through private spending, only the 
government can provide the public good of defence in practice. Thus, any shortfall in the 
provision of defence by the government can’t be remediated.    
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1.5 Defence Organisation and Management 
The Outcomes and Program Framework 
Since 2009-10, the Defence budget has been set out according to a framework of ‘outcomes’ 
and ‘programs’. This replaces the ‘outcomes’ and ‘outputs’ framework established in 1999. 
Outcomes are the results or benefits that the Commonwealth aims to deliver to the 
community through the work of its agencies. They are specified for each agency, and are 
meant to express the purpose or goal of each agency’s activities. 
Programs are activities that agencies undertake in pursuit of the outcomes they are 
expected to deliver. 
The performance of agencies is measured under the framework. This is done through 
specific targets (like flying hours for Air Force) and, ultimately, the extent to which their 
programs actually deliver the outcomes intended. So the aim is to show not only how much 
an agency is doing, but how much it’s actually achieving.  
The Defence Outcomes 
Since 2009-10, the Defence Outcomes have been: 
Outcome 1: The protection and advancement of Australia’s national interests through the 
provision of military capabilities and the promotion of security and stability.  
Outcome 2: The advancement of Australia’s strategic interests through the conduct of 
military operations and other tasks as directed by Government.  
Outcome 3: Support for the Australian community and civilian authorities as requested by 
Government.  
The programs that contribute to these three outcomes are set out in Figure 1.5.1. Note that 
the programs are closely aligned with the actual organisational structure of Defence, as can 
be seen by comparison with the Defence ‘wiring diagram’ in Figure 1.5.2.  
This framework provides greater visibility of resources consumption within the organisation 
than the output-based approach that was in place up to 2007-08. But this comes at the loss 
of knowing what it costs to deliver military capability, which is what the old framework 
attempted to do. Ultimately, what really matters is how much it costs to deliver ships, planes 
and battalions ready for deployment, not how much money is spent on health services, legal 
advice or personnel management. Of course, in a perfect world we would be told both.  
Curiously, at the same time as Defence’s formal budget framework abandoned the concept 
of outputs in favour of an organisation-based program approach, the 2009 White Paper said 
Defence would move to an output-driven internal budgeting model. Forty-eight months on, 
we still don’t know what this will entail or the extent—if any—to which it will be visible to 
the public. It would be ironic if Defence finally moved to an internal output-based budget 
after abandoning output-based external budgeting and reporting.  It may be that the whole 
idea has been abandoned.
 Defence Portfolio 
Defence  
Outcome 1 
Contributing to the 
preparedness of the 
Australian Defence 
organisation through 
acquisition and 
through-life support 
of military equipment 
and supplies. 
Program 1.1  
Management of 
Capability 
Acquisition 
DMO 
Outcome 3 
 Support for the Australian community 
and civilian authorities as requested by 
Government. 
Outcome 2 
 The advancement of Australia’s strategic 
interests through the conduct of military 
operations and other tasks as directed by 
Government. 
 
Outcome 1 
 The protection and 
advancement of Australia’s 
national interests through the 
provision of military 
capabilities and the promotion 
of security and stability.   
Program 1.2 
Capability 
Sustainment 
Program 1.3   
Policy Advice and 
Management 
Services 
Program 3.1 
Defence contributions to 
national support tasks in 
Australia. 
Program 2.1  
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security in the immediate 
neighbourhood. 
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Operations in support 
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 Office of CDF 
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Program 1.2 
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Air Force 
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Intelligence 
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Program 1.9 
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and Technology  
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Chief Information 
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Joint Operations 
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Chief Financial 
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Administered 
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Figure 1.5.1: The Defence Outcome-Program framework 
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Figure 1.5.2: Defence organisational structure (as May 2014) 
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ADF command structure 
It’s important not to confuse the day-to-day management of the Department of Defence 
with the command of military operations. The former occurs through the diarchy of the CDF 
and Secretary and group/program arrangements outlined above. The latter is exercised 
through a formal command chain and dedicated headquarters structure.  
On a day-to-day basis, the three Services (Navy, Army, and Air Force) are responsible for 
raising, training and sustaining their forces. When forces are deployed on operations or 
major exercises, the designated force elements are assigned to Headquarters Joint 
Operations Command (HQJOC) for that purpose. Since late 2008, HQJOC has been housed at 
a purpose-built facility near Bungendore in rural NSW and is staffed by around 750 
personnel.  
A more detailed outline of ADF command and HQJOC appears in Chapter 2.6 of this brief 
under Program 1.11.  
Figure 1.5.3: ADF command structure 
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1.6 National Security Spending 
The events of 9/11 prompted the recognition that no single agency has the capacity, or 
range of capabilities, necessary to ensure our security. The threat of terrorism within 
Australia, and to Australians abroad, has forced a whole-of-government approach to 
national security at the federal level. Even beyond the threat of terrorism, it’s increasingly 
recognised that our national security interests are best served by a coordinated approach 
that uses all of the levers available to government. 
It’s beyond the scope of this Defence Budget Brief to analyse and explain the budgets of all 
the agencies that contribute to national security. Instead, we’ll content ourselves with a 
broad-brush description of how much is spent in key agencies. If nothing else, it provides a 
useful yardstick against which we can measure what’s spent on defence. Unfortunately, 
because of the difficulty in finding data, our discussion excludes spending at the state and 
local levels.  
In late 2008 the government foreshadowed the introduction of a ‘national security budget’. 
Nothing appeared in the 2009 Budget and the closest last year’s budget came to it was a 
graph in the Budget Overview of Defence, non-Defence and Defence Operational spending.  
This reflects the high-level outcome of the government’s coordinated national security 
budget process. A similar graph appeared in 2011 but has not been repeated. Given the 
absence of any further detail, we’ve updated our usual assessment of national security 
spending. 
A number of federal agencies can make a credible claim to delivering some part of our 
national security. In selecting agencies, we’ve taken a liberal view of what constitutes 
national security, although we’ve excluded funding for outcomes within agencies that are 
clearly unrelated. Here’s our list, which can’t claim to be exhaustive, in alphabetical order: 
• Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
• Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) 
• Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) 
• Department of Defence (DOD) 
• Overseas Development Assistance (DFAT) 
• Office of National Assessments (ONA). 
Clearly, some of the activities of the listed agencies (even with the restriction to specific 
outcomes) go beyond national security. Conversely, other agencies that have been left out, 
like the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, make a significant contribution to 
national security within their broader range of responsibilities. Such is the challenge of 
dealing with the aggregated data available in the budget papers.  Figure 1.6.1 compares the 
appropriations allocated to each of the aforementioned agencies in 2014-15. Note that 
because of the absorption of AusAID into DFAT, care should be taken comparing Overseas 
Development Assistance in 2014-15 to that in earlier years.  
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 Figure 1.6.1: Federal national security spending  
  
Source: 2014-15Budget Paper No. 4 and ASPI calculation of Net Defence Funding   
Figure 1.6.2 shows the real growth in spending by various national security agencies since 
2000-01. Because changes in outputs and the presentation of budget figures make it difficult 
to extract precisely comparable figures from year to year, the numbers should be used with 
caution—though the broad trends are clear.  
Figure 1.6.2: Federal national security appropriations 2001-02 to 2013-14 
 Source: 2002-03 to 2014-15 Budget Paper No. 4 and ASPI calculation of Net Defence Funding. [All growth rates compounding.] 
 
Defence   
82% 
Foreign Aid   
12% 
Federal Police  
4% 
ASIO  
1% 
ASIS  
1% 
ONA 
0% 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
20
14
-1
5 
$ 
(b
ill
io
ns
) 
ONA (10.3% p.a. growth)
ASIS (10.6% p.a. growth)
ASIO (12.6% p.a. growth)
Federal Police (5.8% p.a. growth)
Foreign Aid (4.3% p.a. growth)
Defence (3.8% p.a. growth)
 32 
 
1.7 Measuring Defence Spending 
The amount a country spends on defence is a direct measure of its commitment to protect 
itself. Accordingly, a lot of attention is placed on comparing levels of defence spending 
between countries and on tracking the rates at which those levels are increasing or 
decreasing. For example, here in Australia, a lot of attention was placed on achieving 3% real 
growth in the Defence budget during the 2000s. It’s important, therefore, that reporting of 
defence spending captures what’s actually going on. 
Table 1.7.1 sets out the presentation in the 2014-15 Portfolio Budget Statement (PBS) [Table 
2, p.16] excluding the administered appropriations. (We ignore the administered 
appropriations for superannuation and housing because they aren’t controlled by Defence 
and are appropriated through the organisation for convenience.) The bottom line is Total 
Defence Funding which, in the past, has been presented in the PBS as ‘the most common 
way of presenting the Defence budget’ [2008-09 PBS, p.119].  
Table 1.7.1 Total Defence funding FY 2014-15 
 2014-15  $’000 
Departmental  
1. Output Appropriation  25,882,986 
2. Equity Injection  2,463,678 
3. Prior Year Appropriation   
4. Current year’s appropriation (1+2+3) 28,346,664 
5. Drawdown of appropriations carried forward  
6 Other appropriation receivable movements  
7. Returns to Official Public Account (OPA) -853 
8 Funding to/from OPA (5+6+7) -853 
9. Funding from Government (4+8) 28,345,811 
9. Capital Receipts  97,224 
10. Own-source Revenue 859,673 
11. Funding from other sources (9+10) 956,897 
12. Total Defence Funding (9+11) 29,302,708 
Source: 2014-15 PBS  
The easiest way to explore what a better approach might be is to examine each of the 
elements appearing in Table 1.7.1.   
Current year’s appropriations: This is the least ambiguous part of the problem. Each year 
the government formally appropriates money to Defence. The breakdown of the 
appropriation in terms of outputs and equity is an artefact of accrual accounting that 
needn’t concern us. What matters is that this is the quantum of cold hard cash the 
government plans to make available to Defence for the financial year. As such, any credible 
measure of Defence funding must include this money.  
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Drawdown of appropriations carried forward: Because funding may either be spent or 
received in a year other than the appropriation year, an Appropriation Receivable account is 
utilised. This recognises that departmental Appropriations don’t lapse unless specifically 
extinguished by the Minister for Finance and shifts to this account represent either the 
expenditure of additional public funds by Defence or the return of unspent funds. To 
properly track the funding employed by Defence, it makes good sense to take account of 
increases and decreases to the Appropriation Receivable account. However, if this is 
accepted, it follows that changes to Defence’s cash holdings must also be accounted for 
(since that’s where the money in the appropriation receivable came from originally).  
Capital Receipts: As custodian of more than $50 billion of public assets including land, 
buildings and military equipment, Defence inevitably receives cash from the disposal of 
items that are no longer needed. Some of this money is returned to government via a Return 
to the OPA. The remainder is retained by Defence and is called Net Capital Receipts. Given 
that Net Capital Receipts are generated from the sales of public assets, it’s correct to count 
this income as part of Defence funding.  
Own-source Revenues: Defence receives revenue from a number of sources. These include 
the supply of goods and services to third parties such as Defence personnel, who pay a share 
of the cost of their food and lodging provided by Defence, and foreign governments that 
purchase items like fuel. It makes little sense to include this as part of Defence funding. 
While it’s perhaps reasonable to include revenue raised by using public assets (like Defence 
accommodation), the vast bulk of Own-source Revenue reflects Defence acting as an 
intermediary that transfers goods between 3rd party providers and 3rd party customers.  
For example, the sale of fuel to a foreign government or rations to personnel delivers no 
revenue to Defence that’s not at least equal to the cost of doing so. Or to put it another way, 
no one could seriously contend that Defence funding has risen by $50 million simply 
because, for example, an extra $50 million of fuel was purchased and sold on to the United 
States.  
Own-source Revenues also includes transfers from the Defence Materiel Organisation 
(DMO) to Defence. For example, DMO will pay Defence $266 million in 2014-15 [PBS page 
137] primarily for the cost of the military personnel provided by Defence to DMO. The DMO 
is appropriated for civilian and military personnel as it requires the expertise of military 
personnel within its project delivery and equipment sustainment functions. The DMO then 
pays Defence to offset Defence’s cost of providing the military expertise. This works in a 
similar fashion to fuel sales where Defence 'sells' goods and services to DMO to offset the 
cost of providing those goods and services. This isn’t double counted in Table 2 (page 16) of 
the PBS as these figures are only those of Defence.   
There are a number of tables that consolidate the Defence and DMO picture but another 
way of doing this is to combine Table 2 with DMO’s direct appropriations and any revenue 
received by DMO from sources other than Defence. Figure 1.7.1 is our best attempt to 
depict the situation graphically, though some simplification has been necessary.  
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Figure 1.6.1: Defence Cash and Resource Flows 
 
To complicate matters further the estimated actual figure for the current financial year in 
PBS Table 2 includes payments to DMO that may eventually remain unspent (noting that 
some underspends have been dealt with by extinguishing appropriations). Indeed, over a 
four-year period last decade, more than $927 million accumulated in the DMO Special 
Account, including $414 million from 2007-08. In some years, the Special Account is drawn 
down while in others it grows.  
From a strict accounting perspective, no rules have been broken. Defence reports its funding 
accurately, and DMO reports its cash flow properly. Yet there’s something surreal about 
failing to reconcile the net impact of the two things to show what’s actually going on, 
especially given the high prominence of Defence funding in recent years.  
So what is the ‘Defence budget’?  
While there’s an accounting distinction between Defence and DMO, any sensible calculation 
of the ‘Defence budget’ must reflect the total impost on the taxpayer in delivering defence 
capability. This is easily achieved by adding DMO funding to the calculation and ignoring the 
transfer back and forth of money in between. Once again, the PBS contains a consolidation 
of the Defence and DMO budgets but it isn’t especially illuminating.  
In light of the foregoing discussion, it seems sensible to include Funding from Government, 
Net Capital Receipts (= Capital Receipts – Return to OPA), Net Bank Balance Shifts, 
Appropriation Receivable and Special Account Shifts, but to exclude Own-source Revenue. 
And then to do the same for DMO and then add the results together, safe in the knowledge 
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that the accounting transfers between the two entities have been excluded (Table 1.7.2). 
The addition of DMO appropriations is especially important because under present 
arrangements, DMO directly receives around $881 million which used to be provided by 
Defence.  
Table 1.7.2: Total Defence resourcing FY 2014-15 
 Total  
Defence 
Funding 
ASPI Net 
Defence 
Spending 
Departmental   
1. Output Appropriation  25,882,986 25,882,986 
2. Equity Injection  2,463,678 2,463,678 
3. Prior Year Appropriation     
4. Current year’s appropriation 28,346,664 28,346,664 
5. Drawdown of appropriations carried 
 
  
6 Other appropriation receivable movements   
7. Returns to OPA -853 -853 
8. Funding from Government  28,345,811 28,345,811 
7. Capital Receipts  97,224 97,224 
8. Own-source Revenue 859,673   
9. Funding from other sources 956,897 97,224 
10. DMO Appropriation     881,031 
11. DMO drawdown of Special Account   -4,088 
12. Total Defence Funding 29,302,708  
13. ASPI Net Defence Funding  29,319,987 
 
The difference isn’t large. Our calculation of Net Defence Funding yields a figure only 0.06% 
higher than Total Defence Funding. The difference would be larger if not for the almost 
complete (but entirely coincidental) cancellation of Own-source Revenues and direct 
appropriation to DMO. Nonetheless, we believe ASPI Net Defence Funding is a better 
measure of the ‘Defence budget’ than Total Defence Funding.  
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Chapter 2 – Defence Budget 2014-15 PBS Explained 
The 232 pages of the 2014–15 Defence Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS) set out the 
government’s plan for the expenditure of around $29.3 billion by Defence in the coming 
financial year.  
This guide explains and where possible analyses the information in the PBS. In doing so, we 
skim over those parts of the PBS that are relatively clear, and focus on those areas where 
explanation might be useful.  
Some of the material that follows is unavoidably technical due to the disciplines and 
complexities of accounting. However, it is not necessary to read this chapter as a whole, or 
in sequence, to gain insight. Every attempt has been made to enable the reader to jump in 
and look at those items of most interest.  
This Brief does not cover in any detail the funds administered by Defence on behalf of the 
government for superannuation and housing support services for current and retired 
Defence personnel. 
Most parts of the guide are best read with the PBS at hand. Copies can be downloaded from 
the web at <http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/>. 
The PBS begins with something akin to an executive summary [PBS p. 1–12] that provides a 
useful snapshot of governance arrangements, resources and portfolio structure for Defence 
plus DMO. Rather than recount this material, we turn now to examine the main body of the 
document.   
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2.1: Strategic Direction Statement [PBS Section 1.1] 
The overview chapter of the PBS begins with a discussion of Defence’s role; ‘to protect and 
advance Australia's strategic interests through the provision of appropriately prepared and 
equipped armed forces’. It goes on to discuss the forthcoming 2015 Defence White Paper 
and details current initiatives, including operations, force development and international 
defence engagement. Specific issues noted include continuing operations in the Middle East 
and Afghanistan, the introduction of new amphibious vessels into service, the reorganisation 
of the Army under Plan BEERSHEEBA and the US marine training program in Northern 
Australia. 
2.2: Resourcing [PBS Section 1.2 & 1.3] 
The ‘rubber hits the road’ in Sections 1.2 and 1.3 of the PBS, in terms of allocating money to 
get things done. It contains the resource statements, new budget measures and the funding 
bottom line. 
How much money will Defence get?   
On page 16 of the PBS, we get to the heart of the issue. Table 1 gives three key figures for 
the Defence budget: 
• Funding from Government, being those funds formally appropriated to Defence by the 
government for departmental purposes along with shifts in appropriations receivable 
(unspent money from previous years). In 2014-15 this will amount to $28,345,811,000. 
• Total Defence Funding, being those funds actually available to Defence including 
appropriations and revenue from other sources. In 2014-15 this will amount to 
$29,302,708,000. 
• Total Defence Resourcing, being Total Defence Funding plus those funds appropriated 
administratively through Defence for superannuation and defence housing subsidies. In 
2014-15 this will amount to $34,219,310,000. 
Of these three figures, Total Defence Funding is the one most usually quoted as the Defence 
budget. It represents the funds expended by Defence to deliver the departmental outcomes 
and maintain the ongoing program of investment in new equipment and facilities. Note, 
Total Defence Funding does not include administered funds for superannuation and defence 
housing subsidies.  
However, as explained in the last chapter, Total Defence Funding is inflated by a churning of 
money that delivers no military capability or outcome, and ignores funds appropriated 
directly to DMO. What’s more, Total Departmental Funding ignores the money which has at 
times accumulated or been drawn out of the DMO Special Account—in effect transferring 
money from one year to another. We believe that the ASPI Net Defence Spending figure 
accounts for these issues properly and therefore gives a more accurate picture of how much 
is being spent on delivering defence capability and outcomes. Henceforth, we will only 
present the ASPI Net Defence Funding figure. Fortuitously, it does not make a lot of 
difference; the inclusion of churned money in Total Defence Funding more or less 
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compensates for omitting the money appropriated to DMO—around $900 million in each 
case. 
How much money will Defence receive? 
Table 2.2.1 displays Defence funding for the past thirteen, and next four, financial years. Also 
shown are both the nominal and real year-to-year percentage growth rates.  
Table 2.2.1: ASPI Net Defence Funding – real (2014-15$) and nominal  
 
Funds 
(nominal) 
Growth 
(nominal) 
Funds 
(real) 
Growth 
(real) 
01-02 13,191 7.08% 18,810 4.11% 
02-03 14,216 7.78% 19,681 4.63% 
03-04 15,439 8.60% 20,871 6.05% 
04-05 16,224 5.09% 21,417 2.61% 
05-06 17,547 8.15% 22,443 4.79% 
06-07 19,140 9.08% 23,776 5.94% 
07-08 20,038 4.69% 24,081 1.28% 
08-09 22,933 14.45% 26,727 10.99% 
09-10 25,104 9.46% 28,593 6.98% 
10-11 24,403 -2.79% 26,956 -5.73% 
11-12 26,381 8.10% 28,485 5.67% 
12-13 24,417 -7.44% 25,778 -9.50% 
13-14 27,027 10.69% 27,636 7.21% 
14-15 29,320 8.48% 29,320 6.10% 
15-16 30,432 3.79% 29,690 1.26% 
16-17 30,472 0.13% 29,003 -2.31% 
17-18 32,988 8.26% 30,633 5.62% 
Source: 2014-15 PBS, and earlier Defence Annual Reports (DAR).  
When calculating the real growth rate, the nominal dollar values of the individual years have 
been converted to a single base year using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) so as to reflect 
the opportunity cost incurred by the taxpayer. Note that this is not the deflator used within 
government to adjust the defence budget from year to year. From 2001-02 until 2009-10 
this was the implicit Non-Farm GDP Deflator (NFGDPD) and from 2009-10 onwards it has 
been fixed at 2.5% in accord with the funding model introduced in the 2009 Defence White 
Paper.  
Those who believe that 3% is somehow a magic benchmark of merit for defence spending 
should be pleased. The average arithmetic annual rate of real growth in the budget since 
2000-01 (the last year prior to the 2000 White Paper) to 2014-15 is 3.7%. Over the same 
period, the effective compounding annual rate of real growth is 3.5%.  
Looking forward, things are not so encouraging. Over the four years covered by the budget 
and estimates, the average arithmetic annual rate of real growth in the budget from 2014-15 
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to 2017-18 comes out to be 1.5%. Over the same period, the effective compounding annual 
rate of real growth is the same.  
These calculated growth figures should be viewed with some caution due to the perturbing 
effect of operational supplementation, see Figure 2.2.1. A fuller analysis of trends in defence 
spending appears in Chapter 3 of this brief, including the prospects for the government 
achieving its promise of 2% of GDP by 2023-24.  
Figure 2.2.1: Real Net Defence Funding – 2000 to 2017 
 Source: 2014-15 PBS, 2012-13 PAES and earlier DAR. 2005 = 2005-06 etc. 
What is the Defence share of GDP? 
Table 2.2.2 gives Net Defence Funding as a percentage of GDP for recent and future years. 
As shown, the share of GDP will rise from 1.71% in 2013-14 to 1.80% in 2014-15. (Last year’s 
estimate has gone up due to shifts in both foreign exchange, spending and GDP.) Over the 
following three years, sluggish real spending growth and a rising economy will depress the 
GDP share. Note that, current and recent spending is boosted by high levels of operational 
supplementation that are not reflected in the latter years of the forward estimates.  
Table 2.2.2: ASPI Net Defence Funding as a percentage of GDP 
00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 17-18 
1.74 1.75 1.77 1.79 1.76 1.76 1.77 1.70 1.83 1.94 1.74 1.78 1.60 1.71 1.80 1.78 1.70 1.75 
Source: Analysis of data from 2014-15 Budget Overview, 2014-15 PBS and earlier DAR  
What is the Defence share of Commonwealth payments? 
Defence spending as a percentage of total Commonwealth payments is shown in Table 2.2.3. 
On current plans, Defence’s share of payments will rise slowly over the forward estimates 
period. Figure 2.2.2 graphs the percentage GDP and share of Commonwealth payments from 
1997 to 2017. 
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Table 2.2.3: ASPI Net Defence Funding as a percentage of Commonwealth payments 
00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 17-18 
6.96 6.99 7.21 7.36 7.29 7.31 7.56 7.37 7.26 7.45 7.05 7.11 6.65 6.58 7.11 7.17 6.86 7.06 
Source: Analysis of data from 2014-15 Budget Overview, 2014-15 PBS and earlier DAR 
Figure 2.2.2: Net Defence Funding as a Percentage of payments and GDP 
Source: Analysis of data from Budget Overview, 2014-15 PBS and earlier, DAR 2005 = 2005-06 etc. 
Changes since the last budget  
Since the last budget, measure and adjustments have been undertaken that provide context 
for this year’s budget. Table 2.2.4 shows the key items from the 2013-14 Portfolio Additional 
Estimates Statement (PAES) [Table 7, p.15].  
Table 2.2.4: Key measures and adjustments from the 2013-14 PAES (million $) 
 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 4 year 
total 
Defence Budget Rephasing 359.4 304.0 -89.0 -1,000.4 -426.0 
Operational supplementation 127.6   4.2      131.8  
Free ADF Family Health Care* - - - - $225.4 
PNG Regional Resettlement 5.6    5.6 
Efficiency Dividend (temp increase)  -28.3 -67.6 -106.8 -202.7 
Reform Savings -11.9 -15.4 -20.5 -13.1  -60.9 
Foreign exchange movements 381.7  428.3  480.8  528.2  1819.0  
Carried Forward Appropriation  67.3        67.3  
DMO appropriation  adjustment 35.6  39.4  41.1  43.5  159.6  
TOTAL 965.1 732.2 344.8 -548.6 1,493.5  
Source: 2013-14 PAES. Note: Ten-year totals were not disclosed. *Absorbed measure. 
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Defence Budget Rephasing 
A total of $1.1 billion was removed from 2015-16 and 2016-17 allowing $663.4 million to be 
brought forward to 2013-14 and 2014-15. It’s likely that the money was shifted to address 
near-term budget pressures, most especially in the capital investment program. The residual 
-$426 million has presumably been removed from the defence funding envelope. 
Operational supplementation 
Defence is funded on a no-loss/no-win basis for the net additional cost of operational 
deployments. Additional funding of $131.8 million over two years was provided for 
operations in Afghanistan and Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO) as well as for 
Operation Sovereign Borders.  
Free basic health care to all Australian Defence Force family members 
According to the budget papers, the ‘Government will provide $225.4 million over four years 
for a national Australian Defence Force Family Health program commencing in January 2014. 
Families of permanent Australian Defence Force (ADF) and continuous full-time service 
members within Australia will be eligible to be reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses for 
Medicare-recognised general practice services. Additionally, each ADF dependant will be 
able to claim up to $400 per year for allied health services, such as physiotherapy, 
psychology, dentistry and podiatry’. Defence will absorb the cost of this measure.  
PNG Regional Resettlement 
This measure relates to the cost of initiatives to deter people smuggling. 
Efficiency Dividend—Temporary Increase 
This represents yet another (but, as it turn out, by no means the last) increase to the 
efficiency dividend imposed on ‘non-operational’ components of Defence.  
Reform Savings 
These savings relate to reforms to APS management and efficient procurement of agency 
software, presumably a whole-of-government initiative.  
Foreign Exchange Movements  
Defence is funded on a no-win/no-loss basis for foreign exchange movements. Depending on 
how the Australian dollar moves relative to currencies that Defence plans to make purchases 
in, adjustments are made to maintain the buying power of the Defence budget. As a result of 
depreciation in the value of the Australian dollar in 2013-14, Defence received $381.7 million 
in 2013-14 and $1,819 million over the budget and forward estimates.  
DMO appropriation adjustment and Carried Forward Appropriation 
Due to functions and staff movements between Defence and DMO, DMO received 
$36.5 million in the budget year and $159.6 million across the Budget and Forward 
Estimates. The Carried Forward Appropriation relates to the drawdown of previous years’ 
appropriations that have been carried forward. 
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2.3: Funding from Government [PBS Section 1.3]   
The 2014-15 Budget Measures and Adjustments [PBS p. 17 – 18] 
Each year, changes to the Defence budget are set out in the PBS. Usually the changes fall 
into three categories: budget measures, savings measures and budget adjustments. The 
distinction between the three is variable, with identical items classified differently from one 
year to the next. There are also so-called ‘absorbed measures’, these are unfunded 
initiatives that must be funded from within existing Defence resources. Inevitably, this 
means that either other activities have to be foregone or efficiency savings created. For ease 
of reference, the individual measures and adjustments have been detailed in Table 2.3.1.  
The budget initiatives in detail  
In the past, the PBS contained detailed explanations of the various measures. However, the 
PBS has been silent on such matters for several years now. Fortunately, further information 
is available in Treasury’s Budget Paper Number 2 regarding Defence measures. This 
information is reproduced below—often verbatim—along with supporting data where 
available. Regrettably, and as was the case last year, the impact of measures and 
adjustments beyond the forward estimates is no longer disclosed. 
See Chapter 6 of this Brief for more on the cost and composition of ADF deployments.  
Table 2.3.1: 2014-15 Budget Measures and Adjustments (million $)  
  2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 Total 
Measures        
Middle East Area of Operations   128.1 -33.7 18.5 - 112.9 
Coastal Surveillance—Op Resolute  59.7  0.6   60.3 
ADF Support to G20 Summit*  - -  - - - 
Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 - search 25.0 3.0 -1.0    28.0 
Defence funding profile 500.0 300.0 550.0 150.0 -2,020.0 -520.0 
ADF Gap Year re-establishment  18.3 37.5 57.5 78.5 191.8 
Property Sales Retained 45.5 37.9 45.2 13.5 14.1 156.2 
Superannuation Indexation  -2.3 -4.3 -8.5 -12.0 -27.1 
New Military Superannuation    -87.6 -143.1 -230.7 
US Force Posture Initiative*  - - - - - 
Savings and efficiencies  - - - - - 
Communications and Public Affairs   - - - - - 
Efficiency Dividend 0.25% increase  -7.4 -16 5 -24.8 -27.0 -75.8 
Adjustments            
DMO direct appropriation adjustment  29.4 32.1 33.2 34.6 129.4 
Housing disposal adjustment  - - - - - 
Foreign Exchange adjustment 91.1 223.9 125.7 117.4 162.6 720.7 
Total Variation to Funding 663.9  790.5 736.6  269.1 -1,912.2 547.8 
Source: 2014-15 PBS and Budget Paper #2. Numbers may not add up due to rounding. *Absorbed measure. 
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Measures  
Middle East Area of Operations — continuation  
The Government will provide $116.2 million over three years for the net additional cost 
(including remediation costs) of continuing Australia’s military contribution to international 
stabilisation and counter-terrorism efforts in the MEAO in 2014-15. The cost will be reduced 
by the recovery of $3.3 million from other Coalition forces for logistic support provided by 
the Australian Defence Force (ADF). 
Operation Resolute — extension 
The Government will provide $60.3 million over two years for the net additional cost of 
continuing Operation Resolute until June 2015. Op Resolute is the ADF contribution to the 
whole-of-government effort to protect Australia’s borders and offshore maritime interests. 
Australian Defence Force Support to the G20 Summit 
The Government will provide $8.0 million in 2014-15 for the Australian Defence Force to 
provide security support to the G20 Summit. The cost of this measure will be met by 
Defence. 
Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 — search 
The Government will provide up to $89.9 million over two years from 2013-14—including 
$28 million for Defence—as part of Australia’s contribution to the search for Malaysia 
Airlines flight MH370. 
Defence funding profile 
The Government will bring forward $1.5 billion from 2017-18 and distribute it over the 
period 2013-14 to 2016-17. Funding of the Approved Major Capital Investment Programme 
and important capabilities to support networked operations will be accelerated to reduce 
the risk of capability gaps. 
Bringing forward $500 million to 2013-14 will help fund priority foreign military asset 
purchases, including the Growler electronic attack aircraft, the Romeo Naval anti-submarine 
combat helicopter and the upgrade to the Naval Standard Missile-2 long-range anti-aircraft 
missile. The funds brought forward to the period 2014-15 to 2016-17 inclusive will address 
underinvestment in a range of important capabilities. 
This measure also includes a movement of funds beyond the forward estimates period 
(2019-20 and 2020-21) to smooth the defence funding profile and put defence spending 
back on an achievable growth path towards the Government’s objective of defence funding 
of 2% as a share of GDP.  
Australian Defence Force Gap Year Programme — re-establishment 
The Government will provide $191.8 million over four years to re-establish the Australian 
Defence Force Gap Year Programme. Australians aged 17 to 24 years who have completed 
year 12 or equivalent studies will be eligible to apply for the Gap Year, with the first intake of 
the programme to occur in January 2015. 
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Defence real estate sales — direction of proceeds towards Defence projects 
The Government will direct the net proceeds from the sale of Defence real estate to 
approved Defence projects. Defence will receive additional funding, estimated to be $156.2 
million over five years, over and above the costs of preparing the land and buildings for sale. 
Defence Forces Retirement Benefits and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits 
superannuation payments — indexation 
The Government will allocate $1.4 billion over four years as a result of improvements to the 
indexation of payments made under the Defence Forces Retirement Benefits (DFRB) and 
Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits (DFRDB) superannuation schemes. The impact 
of this measure is $135.1 million in underlying cash terms over the forward estimates. 
From 1 July 2014, DFRB and DFRDB superannuation scheme members aged 55 and over will 
have their superannuation benefits indexed by the better of the Consumer Price Index and 
the Pensioner and Beneficiary Living Cost Index, with reference also to a benchmark level of 
Male Total Average Weekly Earnings. 
Military Superannuation — establish new accumulation arrangements 
From 1 July 2016, the Government will establish a modern fully funded, accumulation 
superannuation scheme for new members of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The 
existing Military Superannuation and Benefits Scheme (MSBS) will be closed to new 
members from this date. 
United States Force Posture Initiative 
The Government will provide funding for the up-front costs of infrastructure development 
for the United States Force Posture Initiatives at Robertson Barracks and RAAF Base Darwin 
in the Northern Territory. The cost of this measure will be absorbed by Defence. The 
financial arrangements with the United States are still under negotiation. The cost of the 
infrastructure development is not for publication due to the commercial-in-confidence 
nature of the tender processes involved. 
Savings and efficiencies  
The Government will achieve savings of $1.2 billion over four years in the Defence portfolio 
through initiatives to increase efficiency, reduce spending in lower priority areas, and defer 
lower priority projects. All savings from this measure will be reinvested in Defence capability, 
resulting in no impact on overall Defence funding.  
The major components of this measure are:  
• a reduction in Defence civilian staff numbers, resulting in 1,200 fewer Australian 
Public Service staff and 300 fewer service provider staff by 2017-18, saving $606 
million over four years  
• a deferral of Phase 3 of the Single Living Environment and Accommodation Precinct 
project, saving $300 million;  
• a reduction in Smart Sustainment initiatives, saving $63.6 million over four years  
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• a reduction in the use and support of the Australian Defence Force’s fleet of General 
Service B-Vehicles, saving $60 million over four years.  
Apart from the APS and contractor staff reductions, the details given in Budget Paper 2 
(reproduced above) are difficult to reconcile with the description in the Budget night 
Ministerial press release of $1.2 billion of ‘back-office’ savings. There is nothing back-office 
about B-vehicles, military accommodation or capability sustainment. 
Moreover, although we are told that service provider numbers will decline by 300 over four 
years, the number of contractors employed by Defence actually increases out to 2017-18 
(see Table 9, page 24). In contrast, the reduction of 1,200 civilians over four years appears to 
understate the difference between previous workforce estimates and the latest.  
Communications and Public Affairs Functions — targeted savings 
The Government will achieve savings of $43.3 million over four years by moving to more 
efficient practices for public affairs and internal communications within Australian 
Government agencies. Savings from the Department of Defence of $6.4 million will be 
reinvested in Defence capability. (This measure may be embedded within the Savings and 
Efficiencies measure above). 
Efficiency Dividend — a further temporary increase of 0.25 per cent 
The Government will achieve savings of $569.0 million over four years (including $25.0 
million in capital savings) by increasing the annual Efficiency Dividend by 0.25 per cent for 
2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17, with savings to be targeted in areas such as reduced 
advertising, consultancy and travel costs and deregulation efficiencies. 
Adjustments 
DMO direct appropriation adjustment 
Due to functions and staff movements between Defence and DMO, DMO will receive 
$29.4 million in the budget year and $129.4 million across the Budget and Forward 
Estimates. 
Foreign Exchange adjustment 
Defence is funded on a no-win/no-loss basis for foreign exchange movements. Depending on 
how the Australian dollar moves relative to currencies that Defence plans to make purchases 
in, adjustments are made to maintain the buying power of the Defence budget. As a result of 
depreciation in the value of the Australian dollar in 2013-14, Defence received $91.1 million 
in 2013-14 and $629.6 million over the budget and forward estimates.  
So what happened? 
This year’s Defence budget is easy to understand. Three things have happened: 
• Funding has been reprogrammed out of 2017-18 to address near-term funding 
pressures in the capital investment program and provide a smoother and more 
achievable funding profile. 
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• Despite the government’s promise of ‘no more cuts’, $75 million has been taken 
from defence funding through an increase to the Public Service wide efficiency 
dividend also announced in the election campaign. 
• Savings and efficiencies of $1.2 billion are planned with the money to be reinvested 
in defence capability. Some of the initiatives are related to more efficient use of 
resources, others are simple cuts and deferrals of low-priority activities without any 
improvement to efficiency.   
2.4: Capital Investment Program [PBS Section 1.4]   
Information on the Capital Budget is spread across several areas of the PBS. The Capital 
Budget represents Defence’s plans for capital investment in new equipment, upgrades, 
facilities and other non-military capital items. It’s formally described in accounting terms in 
the Capital Budget Statement in Table 57 on page 97 of the PBS, although that is not very 
revealing.  
Capital Investment Program [PBS p.19]  
The Capital Investment Program is detailed in Table 5 page 19 of the PBS, which we have 
reproduced in part in Table 2.4.1. Unfortunately, the projected result for 2013-14 has not 
been included in this year’s PBS so we have been forced to use the revised estimate from the 
2013-14 PAES. Similarly, because the Defence Annual Report no longer reports on the capital 
investment program, we’ve had to use the revised estimate from the 2012-13 PAES for that 
year. 
Table 2.4.1: The Capital Investment Program (million $)  
 06-07 
actual  
07-08 
actual  
08-09 
actual  
09-10 
actual  
10-11 
actual 
11-12 
actual 
12-13 
proj. 
13-14 
proj. 
14-15 
budget  
15-16 
est.  
16-17 
est.  
17-18 
est. 
Unapproved 
Major Capital 
Investment 
(DCP) 
-  -  -  - - - 30 14 671.5 1,579 3,524 3,048 
Approved 
Major Capital 
Investment 
4,019 4,030 3,943 5,150 4,838 4,208 3,327 3,544 5,389 5,173 3,823 4,489 
Subtotal 4,019 4,030 3,943 5,150 4,838 4,208 3,357 3,558 6,061  6,752  7,347  7,537 
Capital 
Facilities 
Approved & 
Unapproved 
653 570 963 1,504 1,211 997 1,019 1,222 1,190 516 753 1,179 
Other  
Capital 
925 829 742 626 883 739 276 1,482 1,335 1,387 155 997 
Total Capital 
Investment 
Program 
5,598 5,429 5,648 7,280 6,932 5,944 4,652 6,262 8,585 8,655 8,255 9,713 
Source: 2012-13 PAES, 2013-14 PBS and various DAR. The AMCIP figure for 2011-12 does not take into account the additional 
$825 million booked in 2010-11 by DMO and paid for by Defence in 2011-12. Where possible, large shifts due to accumulation 
and drawdown of the DMO special account have been accounted for. 
There are four components to the Capital Investment Program:  
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Unapproved Major Capital Investment Program or Defence Capability Plan (DCP): This 
represents Major Capital Investment projects that have not yet received second pass 
approval from government. Major Capital Investment projects are generally of more than 
$20 million value and predominantly involve the purchase of military equipment, (previously 
called ‘Pink Book’ projects). The preparation of these projects for approval is the 
responsibility of the Chief of the Capability Development Group. Once approved, projects 
generally pass to the DMO for delivery.  
Approved Major Capital Investment Program: Projects already approved by government 
and under way, previously called the ‘White Book’. Once approved, projects generally pass 
to the DMO for delivery.  
Capital Facilities: Approved and Unapproved Capital Facilities Projects, including everything 
from new barracks to upgrades of existing facilities. These projects are the responsibility of 
the Infrastructure Division in the Defence Support Group. 
Other Capital: including Minor Capital Investment (projects costing less than $20 million), 
repairable items, non-capital facilities, plant and equipment, and software and intangibles.  
What are the trends in the Capital Investment Program? 
Recent actual and projected real spending in the Capital Investment Program is shown in 
Figure 2.4.1 in terms of 2013-14 dollars. Note that the figures for 2012-13 are uncertain 
because no official figures have been released for the anticipated outcome for that year. The 
reduction in funding in recent years is a hangover from the attempt to get back to surplus in 
2012-13. Further discussion of the capital investment program appears in Chapter 3.  
Figure 2.4.1: Recent and planned trends in the Capital Investment Program  
Source: 2013-14 PBS and various DAR. The AMCIP figure for 2011-12 does not take account of an additional $825 million booked 
in 2010-11 by DMO and paid for by Defence in 2011-12.  
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Unapproved Major Capital Investment Program [PBS page 117]  
The PBS again contains a list of DCP projects planned for first (5) and second pass (12) 
approval in the forthcoming year. The Future Submarine Program (SEA 1000) is also planned 
for government consideration during 2014-15 without seeking formal first or second pass.   
Approved Major Capital Investment Program [PBS page 146] 
The approved Capital Investment Program is mainly, but not exclusively, the responsibility of 
DMO. As a result, most of the information on approved projects can be found in the DMO 
section of the PBS, including details of the top 30 projects. We examine the Capital 
Investment Program more closely in Chapter 2.7 of this Brief.  
Major Capital Facilities Program [PBS pp.119–129] 
The PBS lists 55 approved Major Capital Facilities projects (worth $15 million each or more) 
at various locations with a total value $3.7 billion. In the past, medium projects of between 
$25,000 and $15 million were also listed but have been omitted this year. In the 2014-15 
Budget the government has foreshadowed 8 new major capital works projects for 
parliamentary consideration and 6 medium capital works projects. These are listed in 
Table 75 of the PBS. Expenditure on facilities projects in 2014-15 is planned at $1.19 billion.  
Table 75 of the PBS lists the approved major facilities projects. The largest such projects are 
the Enhanced Land Force Phase 2 facilities at various locations ($1,458 million), Defence 
Logistics Transformation Program ($753 million), Moorebank Units Relocation ($353 million), 
MH-60R facilities ($189 million), RAAF Amberley Redevelopment Stage 3 ($332 million), 
Albatross Redevelopment Stage 3 ($192 million), and the redevelopment of East Sale 
($186 million).  
Other Capital Purchases  
Other capital purchases include Minor Capital Investment, Repairable Items and Other Plant 
and Equipment. Defence plans to spend $1,355million on other capital purchases in 2014-15. 
The year-to-year volatility in this category is difficult to understand.  
Retained Capital Receipts [PBS page 20] 
The Capital Budget is funded in part through the proceeds from sales of property, plant and 
equipment and other capital receipts (see Table 7 on page 20 of the PBS). On a year by year 
basis some or all of this money is returned to the government through a capital withdrawal. 
This is taken into account in determining the appropriations to Defence. Table 2.4.2 shows 
recently planned and achieved assets sales (including both property and other assets.  
Capability Sustainment Program [PBS page 20] 
Since 2013-14 the PBS has listed the Capability Sustainment Program by group. This year, the 
figures appear in Table 6. As data accumulates, an interesting time series will become 
available. Figure 2.4.2 plots the five years of data that is available. Note that sustainment 
costs are rising in real terms by 5.8% p.a. compounding.  
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Table 2.4.2: Proceeds from the sale of assets ($ million) 
 Budgeted Achieved Shortfall  Budgeted Achieved Shortfall 
pre 2000 – 77 – 2010-11 156 138 18 
2000–01 820 87 733 2011-12 118 134 -16 
2001–02 1023 199 824 2012-13 127  undisclosed  
2002–03 700 632 68 2013-14 102 undisclosed   
2003–04 306 184 122 2014-15 73    
2004-05 231 143 88 2015-16 79    
2005-06 95  108   -13  2016-17 23   
2006-07 38  134 -96 2017-18 61   
2007-08 99 65 -34     
2008-09 285 5 280     
2009-10 287 61 226      
Source: DAR, 2014-15 PBS and 2013-14 PAES 
 
Figure 2.4.2: The Capability Sustainment Program  
 Source: 2014-15 PBS and 2013-14 PAES 
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2.5: People  
Overview  
Over the past fifteen years, Defence’s military and civilian workforces have been on a roller 
coaster ride. There have been periods of unplanned and planned growth and periods of 
unplanned and planned reductions in both workforces. Over the same period, the long-term 
target strength of the ADF has slowly but surely grown from around 50,000 to around 
59,600, while the long-term target size of the civilian workforce grew to a peak in excess of 
22,000 around 2009 before being repeatedly cut to just over 18,100 today. 
Since 2000, there have been a range of initiatives to improve the management of personnel 
from a business and planning perspective, and to enhance the development, care, 
recruitment and retention of personnel. The most substantial changes arose in late 2006, 
when the then-government allocated another $1 billion for recruitment and retention over 
ten years, with a further $2.1 billion made available the next year. The 2006 and 2007 
funding initiatives were a response to unplanned reductions in the preceding years. In the 
late 2000s, ADF numbers grew more quickly than planned (after the GFC) but have since 
fallen three years in a row despite plans to grow the force.  
At present, Defence is trying to once again turn around declining permanent ADF numbers in 
order to build the force to target levels. At the same time, the change of government has 
seen the target strength of the ADF grow by 570 positions above the level set out in the 
2013 Defence White Paper. It’s curious that the new government has not taken credit for 
this boost to planned numbers, most of which are planned for Army. Over the next four 
years, permanent ADF numbers are planned to increase by 3,200 above 2013-14 levels.  
On the civilian side, numbers are being driven down by wave after wave of efficiency 
measures, the latest of which is a reduction of 1,200 positions over the next four years. 
Numbers have already fallen substantially but the yet-to-be implemented impact of the 
successive cuts is a further reduction of 2,400 between 2013-14 and 2017-18.  
How big is the workforce? 
According to the PBS, in 2014–15 Defence will be funded to maintain an average of: 
• 58,839 full-time military personnel  
 
• 20,092 APS civilians (including 4,777 in DMO)  
 
• 20,500 Reservists 
In addition, there will be 432 Professional Service Providers or ‘contractors’, including 48 in 
DMO.  
Over the next four years, military numbers are planned to rise to 59,574, beginning with an 
additional 2,444 people next year. Reserve numbers are planned to grow to around 21,300 
over four years. Civilian APS personnel numbers will fall by around 419 in 2014-15 compared 
with 2013-14. Historical and planned workforce numbers are detail in Table 2.5.1
  
 
 
Table 2.5.1: Workforce summary for Defence plus DMO (average funded strength) 
 2001-02 
actual 
2002–03  
actual 
2003–04  
actual 
2004–05  
actual 
2005–06  
actual 
2006–07  
actual 
2007–08 
actual  
2008–09  
actual 
2009–10  
actual 
2010–11  
actual 
2011-12 
actual 
2012-13 
actual 
2013-14 
proj. 
2014-15 
budget 
2015-16 
est. 
2016-17 
est. 
2017-18 
est. 
Navy 12,598 12,847 13,133 13,089 12,767 12,690 12,935 13,182 13,828 14,207 14,054 13,760 13,839 14,318 14,385 14,374 14,422 
Army 25,012 25,587 25,446 25,356 25,241 25,525 26,611 27,833 29,339 30,253 29,697 28,928 28,580 30,383 30,464 30,768 31,027 
Air Force 13,322 13,646 13,455 13,368 13,143 13,289 13,621 14,066 14,530 14,624 14,243 13,919 13,976 14,138 14,216 14,235 14,125 
TOTAL 50,932 52,080 52,034 51,813 51,151 51,504 53,167 55,081 57,697 59,084 57,994 56,607 56,395 58,839 59,065 59,377 59,574 
Active 
Reserve 
18,868 19,620 20,488 19,275 19,464 19,562 20,340 20,277 21,248 21,339 22,072 20,708 19,650 19,950 20,185 20,430 20,605 
High 
Readiness 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 550 550 590 630 670 
Total Reserve 18,868 19,620 20,488 19,275 19,464 19,562 20,340 20,277 21,248 21,339 22,072 20,708 20,200 20,500 20,775 21,060 21,275 
Civilians                  
Defence 16,819 18,385 18,303 13,390 13,577 14,516 15,087 14,489 14,532 15,115 15,829 15,786 15,268 14,883 13,962 13,314 13,007 
DMO - - - 4,363 4,502 4,951 5,304 5,552 5,526  5,533 5,989 5,748 5,243 5,209 5,106 5,141 5,098 
Total Civilian 16,819 18,385 18,303 17,753 18,079 19,467 20,391 20,041 20,058  20,648 21,818 21,534 20,511 20,092 19,068 18,455 18,105 
PSP                  
Defence - 2,311 1,880 1,913 1,277 810 620 1,008 700 581 467 358 346 445 447 453 453 
DMO - - - - 374 298 181 176 120 24 45 33 22 48 46 46 44 
Total PSP -  2,311  1,880 1,913 1,651 1,099 801 1,184 820  605 512 391 368 493 493 499 497 
PSP & 
Civilian 
- 20,696 20,183 19,666 19,730 20,575 21,192 21,225 20,878 21,253 22,330 21,925 20,879 20,585 19,561 18,954 18,602 
SOURCE: DAR, 2014-15 PBS.   
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Historical background 
During the 1990s ADF numbers dropped from around 70,000 to 50,000 permanent 
personnel, as shown in Figure 2.5.1.  
Figure 2.5.1 Historical and Planned Defence Workforce  
 Source: Various DAR, 2001-02 Defence Budget Brief and 2014-15 PBS 
The bulk of these reductions were due to outsourcing under the Commercial Support and 
Defence Reform programs (although around 5,600 permanent ADF positions had already 
been transferred to the Reserves by the 1991 Force Structure Review). In fact, the initial goal 
of the Defence Reform Program (DRP) was to reduce the strength of the ADF to 43,500 but 
this was soon revised up to 50,000, thereby arresting the decline. This was done by 
re-directing DRP savings to buy-back the ADF positions, the goal being to redirect personnel 
from support areas to the combat force—though there is little evidence of this occurring.  
The 2000 White Paper then set permanent ADF numbers on a growth path towards 53,000 
to 54,000 personnel.  Subsequent budgets added additional personnel for a range of 
initiatives including, most especially, the expansion of the Army. By 2009 the target had 
grown to around 57,000. 
The 2009 Defence White Paper revised the full-time ADF target up to approximately 57,800 
and the civilian workforce up to 21,900 over the decade. Subsequent reductions in planned 
savings under the Strategic Reform Program saw the targets grow to around 59,000 and 
23,000 for the military and civilian workforces respectively. The 2013 Defence White Paper 
said that permanent ADF would be maintained at around 59,000 and that civilian number 
will fall by 1,000 to around 20,500, effectively the targets existing prior at that time. We now 
turn to examine the civilian and military workforces in more detail, including recent 
developments.  
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Permanent ADF Numbers 
The changing size of the permanent ADF is captured in Figure 2.5.2. In the initial years 
following the 2000 White Paper, permanent ADF numbers grew steadily until 2003-04 when 
poor recruiting outcomes saw numbers fall for three years in a row—notwithstanding 
budgeting for growth in each instance. Then, in 2006-07, numbers began to rise to the 
extent that budget estimates were exceeded three years in a row. All signs being that the 
revamp of recruiting and retention policy (and a lot of extra money) slowly but steadily 
turned around the personnel situation.  
Then, for two years commencing in 2009-10 military numbers grew much more quickly than 
planned as a result of better than expected recruitment and retention. In 2009-10 military 
personnel exceeded planned levels by 1,372. To redress this unplanned growth, the 
permanent ADF was supposed to decrease by around 400 people in 2010-11. Instead, the 
ADF grew by a further 1,387 positions, exceeding planned levels by 1,808. During 2011-12, 
action was taken to get military numbers back to planned levels with more success than 
planned so that actual numbers fell to around 1,000 below what was planned. The trend 
continued over the next two years with numbers falling 2,000 and 1,800 below target in 
2012-13 and 2013-14 respectively.  
According to the PBS, the unplanned shrinkage of the permanent force reflects several 
factors including reduced recruiting targets and higher than anticipated separations. In the 
case of Navy, recruiting targets were reduced due to training pipeline constraints. Defence 
says that it has developed a Defence Employment Offer framework to stem the separation 
rate and that Navy has addressed many of the training pipeline issues.  Recruiting targets 
have been increased for Navy and Army with the aim of a 59,600 strong permanent force.   
Figure 2.5.2 Permanent ADF personnel: 1996-97 to 2017-18 (average funded strength) 
Source: DAR, 2001-02 Defence Budget Brief, 2014-15 PBS  
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Recruitment and retention 
The annual change in ADF strength is the difference between the numbers of people 
recruited into and separated from the force (historically around 5,000 in each case). Since 
the planned change in strength is usually no more than 1,000, the outcome is finely 
balanced. With this in mind, we turn now to examine ADF recruitment and separations.  
Recruitment  
Table 2.5.2 shows the percentages of recruitment targets that have been met over the last 
fifteen years. Following solid improvements earlier this decade, which saw the rate grow 
from 76% to 93% in 2001-02, performance dropped back to the mid-80% in 2002-03 and 
2003-04 before deteriorating to 80% in 2004-05 and then recovering to 84% for the next two 
years. In 2007-08 and 2008-09 the result fell to around a 15-year low before recovering 
strongly in 2009-10 and 2010-11. The result for 2011-12 is good by historical precedents.  
Table 2.5.2: Percentage of recruitment targets met (per cent) 
 1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
2008-09 
2009-10 
2010-11 
2011-12 
2012-13 
Navy 98 92 98 76 57 74 85 84 86 73 72 78 73 72 91 87  88  
Army 99 98 94 78.5 83 79 100 79 84 81 98 86 76 76 90 90  87  
Air Force 86 93 101 90.5 83 88 87 94 90 91 88 86 85 86 92 93  86  
ADF 96 94 97 80 76 80 93 84 86 80 84 84 77 76 91 89  87  
Source: Various DAR and Defence submission to the FAD&T Committee inquiry into ADF recruitment and retention, May 2001 
It is important to note that recruitment results vary from Service to Service, and that within 
each Service skilled personnel (like technicians and tradespeople) are particularly hard to 
recruit. In recent times, this has no doubt reflected the buoyant labour market and the 
national skilled labour shortage that Australia has experienced. As the data shows, Navy has 
until recently tended to have the most trouble.  
Retention  
Table 2.5.3 shows the percentages of ADF personnel who separated from full-time military 
service over the last fifteen years. Some care must be taken with this data because figures 
for earlier years were impacted by the deliberate reduction in the size of the ADF between 
1997 and 2001 under the Defence Reform Program. Still, separation rates from 2001-02 to 
2004-05 were better than in 1995-96 before the cuts to personnel commenced. Note that 
the separation rates for 2009-10 and 2010-11 are the lowest of all the years examined by a 
fair margin. Unfortunately, this favourable trend did not continue into 2011-12. 
To put recent ADF separation rates in context, Figure 2.5.3 plots the separation rate over the 
past thirty years. The key point to notice is that recent separation rates are commensurate 
with or better than rates achieved over the past three decades—the last year being an 
exception. Given that a number of factors have arisen in that time to make long-term ADF 
service more difficult—growing numbers of employed spouses, greater geographical 
dispersal of the ADF and the trend in society to shorter-term employment—the fact that the 
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ADF had been able (at least until last year) to keep people on average for longer than in the 
1970s is a real achievement.  
Table 2.5.3: ADF separation rates % 
 1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
2008-09 
2009-10 
2010-11 
2011-12 
2012-13 
Navy 13.0 11.5 11.1 12.6 13.3 13.2 11.5 11.6 10.1 12.2 11.3 12.2 10.9 10.5 8.1 7.6 9.1  8.8  
Army 12.5 10.4 10.9 12.9 13.0 13.2 11.5 9.8 11.0 12.7 12.4 11.6 10.3 9.9 7.2 8.6 11.5  12.2  
Air Force 9.0 9.0 10.0 11.9 11.6 15.6 10.4 8.1 7.4 8.4 8.5 9.0 7.2 6.3 5.2 6.2 7.0  6.4  
ADF 11.6 10.3 10.7 12.6 12. 13.8 11.2 9.8 9.9 11.5 10.7 11.1 9.7 9.2 6.9 7.8 9.8  9.9  
Source: DAR and Defence submission to the FAD&T Committee inquiry into ADF recruitment and retention, May 2001  
Figure 2.5.3: Permanent ADF separation rate: 1974-75 to 2012-13
Source: DAR 1974-75 to 2012-13 
Figure 2.5.4: Employment and ADF separation rates: 1974-75 to 2012-13 
Source: DAR 1974-75 to 2012-13 
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As Figure 2.5.4 shows, the Global Financial Crisis pushed separation rates to historical lows in 
2009-10 and 2010-11. Since then, separations have increased but remain below long-term 
average levels. Note that the correlation between unemployment and separations has been 
less than clear in recent years.  
Questions remain about the recent fall in ADF numbers. Why were recruiting targets set so 
low in 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14 as to allow the force to fall below budgeted levels by 
1,059, 2,029 and 1,840 respectively? Looking at the changes to the separation rate over the 
period, the shortfalls cannot be readily explained by increased separations—especially given 
that the separation rate stabilised in 2011-12 and 2012-13.  Could it be that numbers were 
allowed to fall as a response to the tight budgetary constraints imposed on Defence? 
Civilian Numbers 
The situation with civilian numbers is captured in Figure 2.5.5 which plots budgeted and 
actual civilian numbers from 1996-07 onwards. Although civilian numbers fell quickly under 
the Defence Reform Program, they grew back very rapidly in the first two years of the 2000 
White Paper implementation—three times more quickly than military numbers grew. What 
is more, the growth was largely unplanned, with the size of the civilian workforce in 2001-02 
exceeding budget estimates by 5.8% and similarly in 2002-03 (6.1% in excess). However, in 
January 2003 a civilian hiring freeze was imposed within Defence after it became clear that 
the projected number of civilian personnel would exceed the revised estimate given less 
than two months earlier. In April 2003, the freeze was lifted but direction was given to 
maintain civilian numbers at current levels. In the 2003-04 Budget, a programmed reduction 
plan was set in place to reduce civilian numbers by 1,008, from 18,385 to 17,377.  
Figure 2.5.5: Civilian personnel: 1996-97 to 2017-18 
Source: Defence Annual Reports, 2001-02 Defence Budget Brief and 2013-14 PBS  
However, the actual result for 2003-04 (18,303) was only 82 positions below the previous 
year’s figure due, mainly, to a series of government initiatives but also because of an extra 
unplanned 349 new civilian positions. 
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For a while, in 2004-05 and 2005-06, civilian numbers were largely under control resulting in 
a close alignment of budgeted and actual figures. In 2006-07, civilian personnel numbers 
were set to rise by 950. Most, but not all, of these positions were related directly to either 
new government initiatives or the creation of a more efficient workforce. However, the 
actual result for 2006-07 was an increase of 1,388 personnel, more than 450 above the 
estimate. Then, in 2007-08, civilian numbers grew by another 1,468, fully 155 above the 
initial budget estimate. Clearly, whatever constraints were imposed in 2004-05 and 2005-06 
were no longer effective.  
The plan for 2008-09 was for civilian numbers to fall to around 20,000 and then remain 
largely static across the forward estimates. However, following the 2009 White Paper civilian 
personnel numbers were set a target of around 21,900 which was subsequently revised 
upwards to around 23,000 after Defence abandoned many of the efficiency savings originally 
planned from the civilian workforce.  
In 2009-10 and 2010-11 civilian numbers failed to grow to planned levels. Specifically, in 
2009-10 the number of civilians grew by only 17, fully 645 below the updated budget 
estimate. Attempts to regain lost progress in 2010-11 largely failed with civilian numbers 
falling 1,213 below target (though still 590 above the level for the previous year). 
Presumably, the shortfalls reflected an overestimate by the 2009 White Paper of the number 
of civilians needed. Accordingly, budgeted civilian workforce numbers were cut by 1,000 in 
the 2011-12 budget. In each of 2012 and 2013, civilian numbers were cut by a further 1,000. 
Despite a notional reduction of 3,000 positions, some of the cuts were against planned 
growth. This year, a further 1,200 position have been cut. As a result of the successive 
reductions, APS personnel in Defence will reduce from a peak of 21,818 in 2011-12 to 18,105 
in 2017-18 representing an actual reduction of 3,713. 
Reserve numbers  
Reserve numbers have fallen short for three years in a row, most especially in 2012-13. 
Consistent with this, and perhaps as a consequence, the long-term target for the size of the 
Reserve has been reduced from 23,000 to 21,300. 
Figure 2.5.6 Active Reserve personnel: 2000-01 to 2017-18 
Source: Defence Annual Reports and 2012-13 PBS 
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What are the long-term targets for the Defence workforce? 
The evolution of personnel targets is contained in Tables 2.5.4 and 2.5.5. We cannot account 
for this year’s increase of 600 to the military and decrease of 700 to the civilian targets. 
Table 2.5.4: Long-term target (circa 2018) for the Defence civilians & contractors  
 Civilian  Contractors Total 
Estimated pre-2009 White Paper Target  20,000 - - 
    Baseline (May 2009)   21,672 
Extra White Paper Positions     2,290 
SRP impact   -2,015 
2018-19 target strength  (May 2009)   21,937 
    Baseline (April 2010)   21,620 
Extra White Paper Positions     2,290 
SRP impact    -1,191 
2018-19 target strength  (April 2010)   22,719 
    Baseline (April 2011)*   22,397 
Reduction of 1,000 positions    -1,000 
2018-19 target strength (May 2011)   21,397 
    Baseline (July 2011)   21,397 
Reduction of 1,000 positions   -1,000 
2018-19 target strength (May 2012)   20,397 
    2013 Defence White Paper    
Baseline (April 2013)    21,700 
Reduction of ‘around 1,000 positions’    -700 
Target strength (May 2013)    20,000 
    Baseline (unknown)   - 
Reduction of 1,200   -1,200 
Target strength (May 2014)   18,100 
Source: Budget Papers and the May 2009 and April 2010 SRP Booklets, 2014-15 PBS. *Advice from Defence May 2011. 
Table 2.5.5: Long-term target (circa 2018) for the permanent ADF 
 Navy Army Air Force Total 
Post-Defence Reform Program Baseline  13,800 23,000 13,000 50,000 
East Timor Boost 1999  +3,000 +555 +3,555 
2000 White Paper Target 13,800 26,000 13,555 53,555 
     Changes made 2000 to 2009 -311 +4,538 +500 +4,721 
Estimated pre-2009 White Paper Target 13,689 30,538 14,055 58,282 
     Baseline (May 2009)    58,648 
Extra White Paper Positions      1,979 
SRP impact    -2,813 
2018-19 target strength  (May 2009)    57,812 
     Baseline (April 2010)    58,276 
Extra White Paper Positions      1,979 
SRP impact     -1,376 
2018-19 target strength  (April 2010)    58,879 
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Baseline (July 2011)    58,277 
Extra White Paper Positions      1,979 
SRP impact     -1,629 
2018-19 target strength (July 2011)    58,627 
     2013 Defence White Paper    59,000 
     New government target    59,570 
Source: 2010-11 DAR, Budget Papers and the May 2009 and April 2010 SRP Booklets, 2014-15 PBS 
How much do personnel cost? 
Personnel costs for Defence including DMO in 2014-15 will be around $11.0 billion rising to 
$11.9 billion in 2017-18. The recent per-capita cost of civilian and military personnel appears 
in Tables 2.5.6 to 2.5.8. Unfortunately, the PBS does not provide enough information to 
calculate budgeted per-capita costs.   
Table 2.5.6: Per-capita permanent ADF personnel expenses  
 
Military 
Numbers 
Expense 
$ 000’s 
Per Capita Nominal Growth 
00-01 50,355 4,151,801 $82,451  
01-02 50,932 4,377,827 $85,954 4.2% 
02-03 52,080 4,568,493 $87,721 2.1% 
03-04 52,034 4,890,100 $93,979 7.1% 
04-05 51,813 4,757,900 $91,828 -2.3% 
05-06 51,151 5,093,100 $99,570 8.4% 
06-07 51,504 5,515,651 $107,092 7.6% 
07-08 53,109 6,062,882 $114,159 6.6% 
08-09 54,748 6,751,456 $123,319 8.0% 
09-10 57,697 7,456,595 $129,237 4.8% 
10-11 59,084 7,834,680 $132,602 2.6% 
11-12 57,994 7,989,786 $137,769 3.9% 
12-13 56,607 8,054,390 $142,286 3.3% 
Average  4.7% 
Source: Defence Annual Reports, expenses adjusted to take account of Reserve component.  
Table 2.5.7: Per-capita DMO civilian personnel expenses  
 
DMO 
Civilians 
DMO Expenses 
‘000s 
DMO Per Capita Nominal Growth 
05-06 4,502 $353,892 $78,608  
06-07 4,951 $409,262 $82,662 5.2% 
07-08 5,304 $458,992 $86,537 4.7% 
08-09 5,552 $493,611 $88,908 2.7% 
09-10 5,526 $507,900 $91,914 3.4% 
10-11 5,533 $531,619 $98,216 4.5% 
11-12 5,989 $592,265 $98,892 2.9% 
12-13 5748 $591,070 $109,680 10.9% 
Average  4.9% 
Source: Defence Annual Reports.  
 
Note that figure for 2012-13 is overinflated due to redundancies paid and timing of DECA payments in 2012-13, DMO backfill 
positions are not counted because they result in a suppliers rather than personnel expense.  
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Table 2.5.8: Per-capita Defence civilian personnel expenses  
 
Civilian 
Numbers 
Expense 
$ 000’s 
Per Capita Nominal Growth 
00-01 16,292 $956,661 $58,720  
01-02 16,819 $1,086,116 $64,577 10.0% 
02-03 18,385 $1,235,752 $67,215 4.1% 
03-04 18,303 $1,363,205 $74,480 10.8% 
04-05 17,753 $1,293,100 $72,838 -2.2% 
05-06 13,577 $1,084,382 $79,869 9.7% 
06-07 14,516 $1,212,393 $83,521 4.6% 
07-08 15,087 $1,271,223 $84,259 0.9% 
08-09 14,815 $1,308,445 $88,319 4.8% 
09-10 14,532 $1,373,377 $94,507 7.0% 
10-11 15,115 $1,457,279 $96,413 2.0% 
11-12 15,829 $1,588,389 $100,347 4.1% 
12-13 15,786 $1,677,674 $106,276 5.1% 
Average 5.1% 
Source: Defence Annual Reports.  Note: excludes DMO past 2005-06.  
The per-capita expenses include salaries, allowances, superannuation, health, redundancies, 
housing and fringe benefits tax. We’ve done our best (on the basis of incomplete 
information) to account for the cost of Reserve personnel in the estimate for the permanent 
ADF. In addition, the transfer of military compensation to Veterans Affairs in 2004-05 has 
been adjusted for. Historical per capita costs are depicted graphically in Figure 2.5.7. 
Figure 2.5.7: Historical per-capita personnel costs 
 
Source: Defence Annual Reports.  
Personnel structures  
To facilitate understanding of the structure of the Defence workforce, it is useful to 
understand the nominal equivalence between different levels in the APS and ADF and 
between the three Services. For a comparison of relative ranks/levels, see Table 2.5.9. 
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Table 2.5.9: Rank/level comparison: 
Civilian Navy Army Air Force  
APS-4 Sub-Lieutenant Lieutenant  Flying Officer 
Officers APS-5 Lieutenant Captain Flight Lieutenant 
APS-6 Lt-Commander Major Squadron Leader 
EL-1 Commander Lt-Colonel Wing Commander 
Senior Officers 
EL-2 Captain Colonel Group Captain 
SES-1 Commodore Brigadier Air Commodore 
Star-ranked and 
Senior Executive 
Service 
SES-2 Rear Admiral Major General Air Vice-Marshal 
SES-3 Vice Admiral Lt General Air Marshal 
 
The breakdown of ADF personnel by rank, and civilians by level, appears in Table 11 on page 
25 of the PBS. As the ADF contracted during the 1990s, the number of officers remained 
more or less constant. Then, as the size as the ADF grew over the past few years, the 
number of officers grew more quickly (see Figure 2.5.8). As a result, the percentage of 
officers in the ADF has grown from 17.2% in 1989 to 23.9% in 2010. This means that there 
are now around three enlisted men for every officer. To a large extent, the rising proportion 
of officers probably reflects the outsourcing of activities during the 1990s which saw more 
enlisted personnel than officers discharged. However, the recent expansion of the army has 
marginally reversed the trend.  
Figure 2.5.8: Permanent ADF Numbers 1989 – 2013 as at 30 June 
 
Source: Defence Annual Reports. 
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Generals and Mandarins 
The trends in star rank, senior executive, and senior officer numbers are shown in Table 
2.5.10; the most recent data is taken from the 2014-15 PBS. Changes in reporting account 
for the gaps and lack of earlier data. As can be seen, over the past sixteen years the number 
of civilian senior executives has increased by 71% and military star-rank officers by 72%. At 
the same time, the civilian workforce grew by only 21% and the military workforce by only 
11%. Over a similar time frame, the numbers of civilian and military senior officers have 
grown by 96% and 56% respectively. Although the budget papers show a reduction in the 
number of civilian senior officers in Defence and DMO in 2012-13, such predictions have 
been made in the past and not occurred.  
Some care is needed looking at the apparent levelling off in the budget year in Table 2.5.10. 
In most years the plan is to slightly reduce the number of senior military and civilian 
managers in Defence, and in most years the opposite is found to have happened when the 
actual result is reported.   
At every senior level in the civilian and military workforce the number of managers and 
executives has increased at a rate well in excess of the growth in the size of the overall 
workforce. However, as might be expected, the fastest rate of increase has occurred at the 
level of Deputy Secretary and 3-star military officer (Table 2.5.11) where much of the growth 
is very recent, including as a result of the 2007 Defence Management Review.  
Table 2.5.10: Numbers of Senior Ranks and Executive Levels; average funded strength 
 Civilian Military 
 
Defence 
Executives 
DMO 
Executives 
Total 
Executives 
Defence 
Senior 
Officers 
DMO Senior 
Officers 
Total 
Senior 
Officers 
Star 
Rank 
Officers 
Senior 
Military 
Officers 
1998-99 100 
 
100 0 0 0 110 1,360 
1999-00 106 
 
106 0 0 0 0 0 
2000-01 103 
 
103 3,317 0 3,317 120 1,415 
2001-02 117 
 
117 3,844 0 3,844 119 1,467 
2002-03 130 
 
130 3,824 0 3,824 120 1,507 
2003-04 123 
 
123 3,889 0 3,889 119 1,528 
2004-05 96 30 126 3,081 995 4,076 125 1,551 
2005-06 102 29 131 3,385 1064 4,449 135 1,594 
2006-07 108 29 137 3,656 1225 4,881 149 1,684 
2007-08 121 32 153 3,911 1388 5,299 176 1,768 
2008-09 126 35 161 3,970 1502 5,472 169 1,852 
2009-10 128 36 164 4,192 1579 5,771 173 1,937 
2010-11 undisclosed undisclosed 172 undisclosed undisclosed 6,250 181 1,941 
2011-12  undisclosed  undisclosed 175 undisclosed  undisclosed  6,796 184 1,850 
2012-13 133  35  168 5,010  1,757  6,767  188  1,983 
2013-14 133  35  164 4,934 1,590  6,524 189 2,101 
2014-15 136 35 171 4,829 1,660 6,489 189 2,126 
Growth 36% 17% 71%  -  - 96%  72%  56%  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, 2012-13 and 2013-14 estimated actual. 
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Table 2.5.11: Band 3 and 3-Star officers (equiv. Chief of Service - Deputy Secretary) 
 
19
98
-9
9 
19
99
-0
0 
20
00
-0
1 
20
01
-0
2 
20
02
-0
3 
20
03
-0
4 
20
04
-0
5 
20
05
-0
6 
20
06
-0
7 
20
07
-0
8 
20
08
-0
9 
20
09
-1
0 
20
10
-1
1 
20
11
-1
2 
20
12
-1
3 
20
13
-1
4 
20
14
-1
5 
Pe
r c
en
t 
Assoc. Sec              1 1 1 1  
Band-3 
(Defence) 3 4 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 133 
Band 3 
(DMO) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 400 
Band-3 
(DSTO)  2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 50 
subtotal 6 8 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 14 15 16 16 17 17 16 16 183 
3-Star  4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 50 
Total 10 12 14 13 13 14 14 14 14 20 21 22 22 23 23 22 22 120 
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Professional Service Providers 
The Defence workforce includes a limited number of Professional Service Providers (PSP), 
sometimes called simply ‘contractors’ in line positions within the organisation. For most of 
the past decade, there was a concerted effort underway to reduce the number of PSP 
employed by Defence and DMO. In fact, Defence has claimed successive reductions in the 
number of PSP as an internal efficiency and are doing so again within the SRP. Note the 
temporary increase in 2008-09 against which savings were calculated in 2009.   
Figure 2.5.9: Professional Service Providers  
 
Source: Defence Annual Reports and 2014-15 PBS. 
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not available within their own workforce. Because of the contractual arrangements under 
which capability partnerships are managed, the personnel they supply are not technically 
counted as PSP or contractors under Defence’s definition. Nonetheless, people employed by 
the private sector are providing skills and capacity within Defence very much akin to that 
previously done by PSP/contractors. The Chief Financial Officer, Capability Development and 
Chief Information Officer Groups are believed to make extensive use of ‘capability partners’ 
and other external contractors to perform core roles.  
In an answer to a Question on Notice from the Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee 
on 17 October 2012 regarding the use of office space (Q86) Defence advise that 2,720 
contractors were resident and working on Defence property. The largest concentration of 
contractors is in Canberra, including 547 on Russell Hill, 310 at Campbell Park, 303 at Deakin, 
280 at Anzac Park West, 269 at Brindabella Park, and 264 at Fairbairn. And yet we are told 
that there are only 377 contractors employed across the organisation as a whole. 
No doubt most of the people reported as contractors in the Defence response are external 
providers employed by firms contracted by Defence to perform a service such as facility 
security, IT delivery or administrative functions that has been outsourced. However, it’s the 
taxpayer that’s ultimately paying the bill for everyone in the building (and some beyond). 
Clearly, greater transparency of the effective workforce capacity delivered by collocated 
service providers (including capability partners) should be disclosed. Otherwise, we cannot 
take seriously either the reported size of the Defence workforce or claims of savings due to 
the reduction in the size of the workforce.  
Defence Remuneration 
The PBS does not deal with Defence remuneration. But because the largest single slice of the 
Defence budget goes towards civilian and military salaries we have included a short 
summary of the key data. Figure 2.5.10 shows Defence military and civilian salaries circa late 
2010 benchmarked against the latest available Average Weekly Ordinary-Time Earnings for 
Full-Time Earning Adults (AWOFTEA) from December 2010. (SES civilian and military 
two/three-star data are for mid-2010.)  
Note that the military figures in Figure 2.5.10 include both salary and the service allowance 
of $12,121 per annum received by all service personnel below the rank of Colonel. No 
account has been taken of the ancillary benefits received by military personnel like housing, 
medical, rations and specific allowances for skill, hardships and deployments. Note that the 
three graphs do not use the same scale.  
The comparison of defence salaries with AWOFTE in Figure 2.5.10 represents only a 
snapshot in time. The relative dynamics of average earnings, defence salaries and the cost of 
living is quite another issue. Indeed, as Figure 2.5.11 shows, over the past decade and a half, 
defence salaries have consistently grown more slowly than average earnings but more 
quickly than the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Care is needed in interpreting the relative growth in average earnings, defence salaries and 
consumer prices. Structural changes to the Australian economy over the period will have 
altered the type and value of employment relative to that performed within the ADF. 
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Figure 2.5.10 Defence salaries, circa January 2014 
 
  
 
Source: ABS; Military pay rates as at January 2014, SES, Mag Gen, Lt Gen and Gen as at July 2013, other APS as at May 2014 
Figure 2.5.11: Defence civilian and military salaries – rate of increase 
 Source: ABS weekly earnings data and Defence pay rates. 
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Finally, it is important to note that Defence executive remuneration is not limited by the 
salary increases granted to the rank and file. Over the past six years, the Defence annual 
report disclosed salary ranges for various levels of employee. As Table 2.5.12 shows, it has 
been a particularly good time for senior executives and star-ranked officers. The range of 
increases corresponds to changes to the upper and lower levels of the salary range in each 
case.  
Table 2.5.12: Senior executive salary increases 2006 to 2013 
 
Increase in  
minimum salary 
Increase in  
maximum salary 
Civilian level   
Secretary undisclosed undisclosed 
Deputy Secretary (SES-3) 40.1% 116.0% 
First Assistant Secretary (SES-2) 39.5% 46.4% 
Assistant Secretary (SES-1) 40.1% 34.4% 
Non-executive APS salary increase  31.4% 
Military level   
General (CDF) 65.9% 137.0% 
Lieutenant General (3-star) 50.7% 108.7% 
Major General (2-star) 54.4% 62.7% 
Brigadier (1-star) 28.3% 54.8% 
Non star rank military salary increase 28.3% 
Source: 2005-06 and 2012-13 DAR. Non-executive figures are ADF pay rates and civilian DECA from June 2006 to June 2013.  
Demographics of the ADF 
The defence force is disproportionately drawn from the Anglo-Celtic part of the Australian 
population. The extent of over-representation is difficult to fully assess because the only 
available data concerns country of birth and not family background. Even so, as Table 2.5.13 
shows, there are significant differences between the defence force and the community. The 
essential results are reproduced graphically in Figure 2.5.12. The figures are similar for the 
part-time Reserve force. Note that the over-representation of Anglo-Celtic born individuals 
extends to the civilian workforce of the Department of Defence. 
Table 2.5.13: Ethnic composition of the Australian Defence Force  
Place of Birth 
Defence 
Force 
2011 
Defence 
Civilians 
2011 
Australian 
Workforce 
2011 
Australia 86% 78%  71.9% 
UK and Ireland 5% 7%  6.4% 
New Zealand 1.8% 1.1% 3.1%  
Europe 1.1% 3.3% 2.6%  
Asia 1.9% 6.2% 8.5%  
Other 4.2% 4.4% 7.5%  
Sources: Defence military and civilian figures from the 2011 Defence Census;  
all other figures from Census 2011 conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.  
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Figure 2.5.12: Composition of the ADF, Defence APS and Australian workforce by birth 
Sources: as per Table 2.5.13  
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It is regrettable that our defence force is unable to attract recruits equally from across the 
Australian community. Defence advises that programs are underway to redress the issue 
including the Multicultural Recruitment and Retention Strategy.  
The difference between the ADF/Defence and broader Australian society is not a new issue. 
As the results from the past four Defence census show in Figure 2.5.13 and Figure 2.5.14. 
And as Figure 2.5.15, the ADF and Defence APS have a smaller share of indigenous 
Australians than the population in general. 
Figure 2.5.13: Ethnic composition of the ADF by birth 1999-2011 
 
Sources: Defence Census 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 
Figure 2.5.14: Ethnic composition of the Defence APS by birth 2003-2011 
Sources: Defence Census 2003, 2007, 2011 
Figure 2.5.15: Percentage of indigenous persons in ADF, Defence APS and Australian population
Sources: Defence Census 199, 2003, 2007, 2011 
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Another area where the demographics of the Australian defence force and the society differ 
is gender. Table 2.5.14 shows the proportion of women and the share of jobs open to 
women across the permanent uniformed and civilian workforces. Similar results hold for the 
part-time Reserve force. In early 2011, the government announced that all positions will 
eventually be made open to women and a staged program has been set it train to make 
good on that goal. 
Table 2.5.14: Women in Defence (full time) 30 June 2013 
 Navy Army Air Force Total military 
Defence 
civilians 
% of positions open to 
women 
   93% 100% 
% of women in 
uniform 
18.4% 11.0% 17.5% 14.4% 40.7% 
Source: 2012-13 DAR  
It is not that the defence force has ignored the issue in the past. Over at least the past 
fifteen years a serious effort has been mounted to recruit and retain women in the force. A 
zero-tolerance policy towards sexual harassment is now in place across the entire force. 
Recruiting advertisements depict women as integral members of the defence force and 
highlight the opportunities available to them (and the same has more recently become true 
for persons from diverse ethnic backgrounds). The number of positions open to women has 
been expanded in all three Services and an increasing number of women are reaching the 
higher ranks. More flexible arrangements are now in place to help female members manage 
the dual demands of career and family, and childcare facilities have been established in and 
around most military bases.  
Yet, the proportion of women in the force has grown from only 12.8% to 14.4% over the 
decade, see Figures 2.5.16 and 2.5.17. Although the proportion of women in allied forces is 
similarly low that does not mean that the defence force should relax its effort to attract 
women to serve. The defence force needs the best people it can find and women represent 
the largest under-utilised pool of potential recruits in the community.  
Figure 2.5.16: Women in the defence force 
Source: 1982-82 to 2012-13 DAR 
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Figure 2.5.17: Women in Defence 
 Source: 1982-82 to 2012-13 DAR 
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2.6 Outcomes and planned performance  
The Cost of Outcomes and Programs 
Under the framework explained in Chapter 1.3 of this Brief, the government funds Defence 
to achieve designated outcomes via a series of programs. The core of the Defence Budget is 
a statement of the costs and planned performance of outcomes and programs on p.26–80 of 
the PBS. Unfortunately the 2009-10 transition from ‘output groups’ to ‘programs’ was 
accompanied by the abandonment of ‘outputs’ that contained a more granular explanation 
of capabilities held by the three Services. Specifically, twenty-two capability related outputs 
were coalesced into a mere three programs resulting in a seven-fold reduction. The 
departmental expense of outcomes and programs appear in Table 2.6.1. 
Table 2.6.1: Departmental outcome and program expenses ($m) 
Outcome 1: The protection and 
advancement of Australia’s national 
interests through the provision of 
military capabilities and the promotion of 
security and stability 
Net Cost 
2008-09 
(actual) 
Net Cost 
2009-10 
(actual) 
Net Cost 
2010-11 
(actual) 
Net Cost 
2011-12 
(actual) 
Net Cost 
2012-13 
(actual) 
Net Cost 
2013-14 
(project) 
Net Cost 
2014-15 
(project) 
Program 1.1:   Office of Sec/ CDF 207 196 146 180 150 164 160 
Program 1.2:    Navy Capabilities 3,979 3,745 4,045 3,991 4,187 4,586 4,797 
Program 1.3:    Army Capabilities 5,015 5,093 5,306 5,290 5,196 5,729 5,986 
Program 1.4:    Air Force Capabilities 3,906 3,699 3,908 4,223 4,278 4,565 4,762 
Program 1.5:    Intelligence Capabilities 501 562 572 544 539 518 538 
Program 1.6:    Defence Support 3,169 3,319 3,429 3,844 3,660 3,729 4,086 
Program 1.7:    Chief Information Officer 697 806 842 1,076 908 1,090 979 
Program 1.8:    People Strategies & Policy 257 286 269 305 351 461 483 
Program 1.9:    DSTO 375 403 418 450 434 421 408 
Program 1.10:   VCDF 1,318 1,012 1,103 1,383 1,337 1,197 1,231 
Program 1.11:   Joint Operations Comd. 95 103 37 38 32 48 52 
Program 1.12:   Capability Development 130 365 482 258 -50 345 1,423 
Program 1.13:   Chief Finance Officer 819 317 402 465 458 586 557 
Outcome 1 20,468 19,906 20,959 22,047 21,480  23,439  25,462 
Outcome 2:  The advancement of 
Australia’s strategic interests through the 
conduct of military operations and other 
tasks as directed  
       
Program 2.1:  Immediate neighbourhood  173 161 182 176 133  42 3 
Program 2.2:  Wider interests 557 892 889 783 798  981 350 
Outcome 3:  Support for the Australian 
community and civilian authorities as 
requested by Government 
       
Program 3.1:  Defence Contribution to 
National Support Tasks in Australia 
15 11 11 118 15  54 68 
Total net cost (non-administered)  21,211 20,970 22,041 23,124 22,426 24,516 25,883 
Source: 2014-15 PBS and various DAR (Note: Programs were re-enumerated in the 2013-14 PBS) 
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Note that, in order to capture the overall cost of delivering programs, non-cash expenses 
due to the depreciation of equipment are included in the net cost in Table 2.6.1. Also funds 
appropriated for administered programs (which are not controlled by Defence) for 
home-loan assistance and military superannuation and retirement benefits have been 
omitted.  
While one might expect that Outcome 2 would include the net additional cost of operations 
undertaken by the ADF, to the extent that operational supplementation does not have a 
large capital investment component this tends to be the case.  
The outcome and programs for the DMO are listed in the PBS in Table 82 [p. 145], as 
reproduced in Table 2.6.2.  
Table 2.6.2: Total outcome and program expenses ($m) 
Outcome 1:  Contributing to the 
preparedness of the Australian 
Defence Organisation through 
acquisition and through-life 
support of military equipment 
and supplies 
Expense 
2008-09 
(actual) 
Expense 
2009-10 
(actual) 
Expense 
2010-11 
(actual) 
Expense 
2011-12 
(actual) 
Expense 
2012-13 
(actual) 
Expense 
2013-14 
(estimate) 
Expense 
2014-15 
(budget) 
Program 1.1  
Management of Capability 
Acquisition 
4,842 5,963 5,794 4,584 3,964 4,344 6,309 
Program 1.2  
Capability Sustainment 
4,772 4,624 4,754 5,389 5,058 5,590 6,166 
Program 1.3  
Policy Advice and Management 
Services 
75 92 86 109 113 110 105 
Total DMO Outcome 1 9,690 10,679 10,633 10,083 9,135 10,044 12,580 
Source: various DAR, 2014-15 PBS 
There is considerable overlap between the funds listed under the Defence 
outcomes/programs and those for DMO. Around $6.2 billion worth of Defence’s program 
costs represent the purchase of sustainment services from DMO (Output 1.2). Put simply, 
around half of DMO’s programs are inputs to Defence’s programs. This is consistent with 
DMO being a separate financial entity. DMO’s other $6.3 billion program (Program 1.1) does 
not contribute to Defence’s outputs. Instead, it represents the purchase of new capital 
equipment that will be used to deliver Defence’s programs in the future.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the new outcomes and programs are much more closely aligned 
with the actual organisation of Defence than were those employed from 1999-00 to 
2007-08. Nonetheless, there are significant linkages between certain elements. We have 
tried to capture the situation in Figure 2.6.1. The essential points are as follows. The 
programs under Outcome 2 and 3 do not align with any single organisational entity. Instead 
they capture the net additional cost of operations that is apportioned to those groups that 
actually support and deliver the operations including DMO. At the same time, the DMO 
sustainment budget is reflected in the costs attributed to the various programs, principally 
Navy, Army and Air Force.  
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Program Statements 
For each of the programs, the PBS contains an entry detailing the key performance 
indicators and a cost summary. In many cases, the key performance indicators read like the 
entries in a corporate plan. For example, the Office of the Secretary and CDF has eleven 
deliverables including;  
Ensure Defence strategic policy objectives align with Government direction and priorities, 
including fiscal policy. 
and two performance indicators, including;  
Staff skills are developed and personnel management practices successfully balance 
competing priorities. 
Little would be gained by repeating the very large number of equally sensible (and largely 
anodyne) key performance indicators that appear in the PBS. The interested reader can 
pursue them at leisure. Of more interest are the concrete performance measures set out for 
the military capability outputs. 
Capability Performance  
There are three overarching key performance measures for the capability related programs; 
preparedness, core skills and quantity. These same performance measures have been 
employed in Defence Annual Reports and PBS in one way or another since 1999. We explore 
these three measures below. In doing so, it’s important to remember that many capability 
programs have additional specific performance measures.  
Preparedness refers to the readiness and sustainability of the ADF to undertake operations, 
be it national support tasks, peacekeeping or war. The process by which preparedness 
targets are set is worth recounting.    
To begin with, the government’s White Paper sets out the broad strategic tasks that the ADF 
needs to be prepared to undertake—for example ‘contributing to the security of our 
immediate neighbourhood’. Using this as a basis, Defence develops what is called Australia’s 
Military Strategy which includes for each strategic task a series of Military Response Options 
which define the broad operational objectives without specifying how they are to be 
accomplished—for example ‘maintain sea lines of communication to the north of Australia’. 
These Military Response Options then form the basis of the annual Chief of the Defence 
Force’s Preparedness Directive.  
The final result is a series of specific targets for each output. They are classified. But, for 
example, the Army might be required to ‘be prepared to deploy a battalion at 90 days’ 
notice to assist in a regional peacekeeping operation and to maintain the deployment for 12 
months’ (this example is purely illustrative). 
Core Skills: Preparedness targets are driven by Military Response Options with an 
anticipated warning time of less than 12 months. To take account of possible longer-term 
tasks and the requirement to retain broad expertise in the three Services, an enduring 
performance target for the capability programs is to ‘achieve a level of training that 
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maintains core skills and professional standards across all warfare areas’. The assessment of 
what is to be achieved, and whether it has been achieved, is ultimately based on the 
professional military judgement of the Service Chiefs.  
Quantity: All of the capability programs include one or more ‘quantity’ measures that try to 
capture some aspect of how much capability will be delivered.  Each of the three Services 
uses a different type of measure. 
Army: With the exception of Army Aviation, the quantity measure used by Army is the 
presence of adequate quantities of trained personnel and equipment within an Output. No 
quantified targets are released publicly.  
Navy: The basic measure of quantity used by Navy relates in some sense to the availability of 
ships and their crew to undertake a mission. Since 2005-06, the measure used has been the 
planned number of Unit Ready Days (URD), defined as follows: Unit Ready Days are the 
number of days that a force element is available for tasking, by the Maritime Commander, 
within planned readiness requirements. Unfortunately, over the past three years, Navy has 
aggregated its URD targets across fleets thereby obscuring the performance of troubled 
assets such as the submarines and amphibious vessels. 
Air Force: The quantity measure used by Air Force and Naval and Army Aviation is the 
number of flying hours undertaken by the Program. These measures have been applied 
consistently for over a decade and constitute a useful diagnostic tool given the established 
baseline. (It would be useful if Navy’s steaming-days and Army’s track-miles were disclosed 
as they were in the past). Short- and long-term trends in ADF flying hours can be found in 
Table 2.6.3 and Figure 2.6.2. 
Table 2.6.3:  Planned ADF flying hours 2013-14 and 2014-15 
Platform 2012-13 2013-14 Change Remarks 
F/A-18 fighter 13,000  13,000  0   
F/A-18 Super Hornet 4,800  5,050  +5%   
C-130 transport 7,350  7,350  0   
AP-3C Orion 7,900  7,900  0   
C-17 transport 5,200  5,200  0   
Hawk Lead-in fighter 7,500  7,500  0    
AEW&C 3,600  3,600  0 Fleet entering service 
Chinook helicopter 1,850  1,700 -8% Transitioning out of service  
Black Hawk helicopter 6,200  5,090  -18% Transitioning out of service 
Kiowa helicopter 6,000  6,150  +3%  Service life extended to 2019  
Armed recon helicopter 3,360  4,726  +41%  Fleet entering service 
MH-60 Romeo 600 2,400  Fleet entering service 
MRH-90 helicopter 4,000  5,400  +35%  Fleet entering service 
Seahawk helicopter 3,600  2,800  +22%  Transitioning out of service  
Source: 2013-14 and 2014-15 PBS 
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Figure 2.6.2: Long-term trends in ADF flying hours
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Recent Performance 
Table 2.6.4 summarises the non-quantity key performance indicators from the 2012-13 
Annual Report. Defence uses a four-point performance scale of ‘not met’, partially met’, 
‘substantially met’ and ‘met'. For simplicity of presentation, the scale is expressed as 0 to 3 
ticks in the table below. The ‘overall’ assessment in Table 2.6.4 is the percentage of ticks 
received out of those possible for all performance indicators and deliverables. The arrows 
indicate movement relative to previous year result. 
Table 2.6.4: Output Performance/Deliverables from the 2012-13 Defence Annual Report 
Output Advice Preparedness Core Skills Overall 
1.1 CDF Secretary     89% ↓ 
1.2 Navy    ↑  75% ↑ 
1.3 Army  ↑   ↑ 78% ↑ 
1.4 Air Force     81% ↓ 
1.5 Intelligence    87% 
COO -   100% 
1.6 Defence Support ↓   81% ↓ 
1.7 Science & Technology     83% ↓ 
1.8 Chief Information Officer    47% ↓ 
1.9 VCDF    82% ↓ 
1.10 Joint Operations Command    100% 
1.11 Capability Development    83% ↑ 
1.12 CFO    100% ↑ 
1.13 People    78% ↑ 
2.1 Operations - neighbourhood    100% 
2.2 Operations - wider interests    100% ↑ 
3.0 National Tasks    100% 
Source: 2012-13 DAR  
Table 2.6.5 shows the planned and actual key performance indicators for quantity (URD and 
flying hours) for the major platforms operated by the three services. The results have been 
rated on the four-level scheme as follows; above 95% =, 95% to 75% =, below 75% 
=. Note that Navy drastically reduced the information it discloses in 2009-10.  
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Table 2.6.5: Capability quantity planned (PBS) and delivered (Annual Report) 2012-13 
Output Planned Reported Percentage Assessment 
Navy fleets     
Frigates (FFG) 
4,304 days  3,693 days  86%  Frigates (FFH) 
Submarines 
Oil Tanker 
2,417 days  1,924 days 80%  
Replenishment Ship 
Amphibious Ships 
Heavy Landing Ship 
Landing Craft Heavy 
Coastal Mine Hunters 
 5,323 days 4,472 days 84%  Auxiliary Mine Sweepers 
Patrol Boats 
Clearance Diver Teams  
2,555 days  2,555 days 100%  Mobile Met Team 
Geospatial Team 
Hydrographic Ships 
2,967 days 2,257 days 76%  Survey Motor Launches 
Met Centre/Support 
Seahawks  4,200 hours 3,726 hours 89%  
Squirrels 4,000 hours 2,994 hours 75%  
LADS aircraft 980 hours 880 hours 90%  
Army fleets     
Black Hawk 7,500 hours 7,710 hours 103%  
Chinook  2,000 hours 1,777 hours 89%  
Kiowa 6,000 hours 5,722 hours 95%  
Armed Recon 7,147 hours 2,361 hours 33%  
MH-90  3,020 hours 2,464 hours 82%  
Air Force fleets     
F/A-18 Hornets 13,000 hours 12,251 hours 94%  
F/A-18 Super Hornet 4,800 hours 4,585 hours 96%  
Lead-in fighter 7,500 hours 5,307 hours 71%  
KC-30A (refuelling) 2,950 hours 2,121 hours  72%  
C-130 transports 7,350 hours 7,579 hours 103%  
AEW&C 2,800 hours  2,444 hours 87%  
C-17 Transports 4,800 hours 4,426 hours 92%  
AP-3C Maritime Patrol 7,900 hours 7,116 hours 90%  
B737 BJ VIP Transport 1,600 hours 1,376 hours 86%  
PC-9 aircraft 17,852 hours 15,928 hours 89%  
B300 King Air 350 11,400 hours 10,407 hours 91%  
Source: 2012-13 PBS and Annual Report 
  
80 
 
Figures 2.6.3 plots the delivery of Defence capability programs (previously outputs) as 
reported in the Defence annual reports between 2000-01 and 2010-11. Some care needs to 
be exercised in comparing the results from 2008-09 onwards with that from earlier years 
due to the substantial reduction in detail that arose in that year. The move from twenty-two 
capability sub-programs to a mere three (one for each Service) inevitably results in a 
reporting regime constrained to a smaller number of possible outcomes for preparedness 
and core skills. Nonetheless, note the recent erosion in the maintenance of core skills.  
Figure 2.6.3: Output performance  
Source: 2000-01 to 2012-13 DAR 
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Program Summaries 
To augment the information provided in the PBS, we have prepared short program 
summaries containing background and historical performance information. In doing so, we 
have not sought to reproduce the material in the PBS but to complement it. Given the acute 
paucity of information provided in the PBS on what is to be delivered at the sub-program 
level, only a limited picture is possible. Information has been drawn from a variety of 
sources, including the Defence website.  
Because the recently adopted program structure aligns closely with the actual organisational 
structure of Defence, we have taken the opportunity to sketch out the key elements in each 
of the programs. For those readers not familiar with the senior military and civilian levels, 
Table 2.6.6 details the correspondence of executive levels across the three services and 
civilian Senior Executive Service (SES).  
Table 2.6.6: Executive comparison 
Civilian Navy Army Air Force 
Star 
Rank 
Assistant Secretary  
(SES-1) 
Commodore Brigadier Air Commodore * 
First Assistant Secretary  
(SES-2) 
Rear 
Admiral 
Major 
General 
Air Vice-Marshal ** 
Deputy Secretary  
(SES-3) 
Vice 
Admiral 
Lt General Air Marshall *** 
Secretary Admiral General Chief Air 
Marshal 
**** 
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Program 1.1 – Office of the Secretary and CDF 
Department outputs 2014-15: $160 million 
The Office of the Secretary and CDF was created as a result of the 2007 Defence 
Management Review. It combines the Deputy Secretary Strategy Group and the personal 
offices of the Secretary and CDF, the Audit and Fraud Control Division and a number of 
Military Justice agencies. 
Within the Defence portfolio there are a number of independent military justice statutory 
offices. The offices the Judge Advocate General, the Chief Judge Advocate, the Director of 
Military Prosecutions and the Registrar of Military Justice are created by the Defence Force 
Discipline Act 1982.  The Judge Advocate General and Director of Military Prosecutions 
report annually on the functions of their offices to the Parliament through the Minister for 
Defence.  The Inspector General of the ADF is a statutory appointment created by the 
Defence Act 1903 which reports directly to the CDF outside of the military chain of 
command.    
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Deputy Secretary Strategy manages two divisions. International Policy Division provides 
policy advice on international issues (including current and prospective operations) and 
manages Defence’s day to day international relationships. Responsibilities include the 
oversight of Defence’s overseas representatives in 33 countries around the world (mostly 
within Australian diplomatic missions) with cross-accreditations to a further 31 countries. 
Strategic Policy Division’s role is to provide strategic policy guidance to support Government 
decision making. This guidance supports decisions in relation to Defence International 
Relationships and Defence’s strategic policy, posture and capability development. The 
Division also manages Australia’s arms and export controls.   
Audit and Fraud Control Division, Inspector General ADF, Office of the Judge Advocate 
General and the Office of the Director of Military Prosecutions sit in OSCDF Group. They 
report to the Chief Operating Officer for administrative purposes as the Administrative Head 
of OSCDF Group. 
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Program 1.2 – Navy Capabilities 
Department outputs 2014-15: $4,797 million 
The Navy’s organisational structure comprises Navy Strategic Command and the subordinate 
Fleet Command. To a good approximation, Strategic Command is responsible for capability 
plans, personnel, administration and technical regulation, while Fleet Command is 
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the fleet and ‘cradle to grave’ training for all RAN 
personnel.  
Structure and performance   
The structure and performance of the Navy is set out below and overleaf. Because of the 
reduction in disclosure, it has not been possible to provide as detailed information as in the 
past. 
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Major combatants 
Surface combatants 
Four 1980s Adelaide class (US Oliver Hazard Perry class) Guided missile frigates (FFG) plus 
eight newer German-designed and Australian-built Anzac class frigates (FFH). Both vessels 
carry Harpoon anti-shipping missiles, anti-submarine torpedoes and Evolved Sea Sparrow 
surface-to-air missiles. Only the FFG are equipped with the more capable Standard SM-2 
surface-to-air missile.  
The Anzac class have a 5” gun useful for shore bombardment (as seen in the Gulf in 2003) 
while the FFG has a less capable 3” gun. Both classes of vessel can embark a Seahawk 
anti-submarine helicopter, although the recent availability and current capability of these 
aircraft is less than desired.  
Upgrades are underway on both fleets. The FFG have effectively completed the long-delayed 
$1.4 billion FFG-upgrade project and the FFH are progressively being fitted with a range of 
new systems including an anti-ship missile defence (ASMD) suite. In addition, three new Air 
Warfare Destroyers are presently under construction.  Two FFG will be withdrawn from 
service in December 2014 and March 2017 respectively. 
Submarines 
The RAN has six Collins Class submarines. Their primary roles are to attack enemy shipping 
and to counter the threat of adversary submarines. In addition, they can collect intelligence 
and insert and extract Special Forces. The Collins Class is equipped with Harpoon anti-ship 
missiles and the US Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo. 
The delay in the introduction of the Collins Class into service as the Oberon Class left service 
disrupted both submariner training and the retention of skilled personnel. The resulting 
shortage of submariners reduced the delivery of capability. Longer than expected 
maintenance periods coupled with mechanical problems further compromised the 
availability of boats. Following the Coles review of Collins sustainment, steps have been 
taken to improve vessel availability with encouraging early success.  Moreover, Navy has 
been successful in growing the numbers of trained submariners.  
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Minor combatants  
Patrol boats 
All of Navy’s fleet of fifteen 1980s vintage Australian-built, UK-designed, Fremantle Class 
Patrol Boats (FCPB) have now been replaced by fourteen Armidale Class Patrol Boats (ACPB). 
These vessels are mainly tasked in support of the civil surveillance program through Border 
Protection Command. They can also be used for the insertion and extraction of army patrols 
on the coast, including Special Forces.  
Through an innovative program, the Navy multi-crews the Armidale Class vessels, thereby 
reducing the burden on sailors and their families while maintaining a high utilisation of the 
assets. At present there are 21 crews spread across 14 vessels. In recent times maintenance 
issues have challenged the fleet. 
Mine warfare vessels 
6 Huon Class Coastal Mine Hunters (MHC) – 720 tonnes displacement, glass-reinforced 
plastic hulled, Italian-designed and built in Australia in the late 1990’s. The ships employ 
sonar to search for mines, which can then be destroyed using a remote controlled mine 
disposal vehicle or otherwise. There are also two auxiliary minesweepers, but according to 
the 2010-11 DAR, they were ‘placed on short-term reactive notice for sea from October 2010 
until procurement of a replacement capability is undertaken.’ There are also two Clearance 
Diving Teams, one on each coast at Sydney and Perth, capable of clearing mines and other 
ordinance, clandestine survey and obstacle clearance, and battle damage repairs. 
The health of the RAN minesweeping capability is under question. Training has been 
interrupted by the use of two of the Huon class vessels for border patrol duties, and since 
2009 two of the Huon class have been placed in extended readiness. It’s been estimated that 
it will take five years to get the full fleet operational again.  
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Amphibious and afloat support  
Amphibious lift  
Until 2012, the fleet included two Kanimbla Class Landing Platforms Amphibious (LPA), 
HMAS Manoora and HMAS Kanimbla, refurbished in the mid-to-late 1990’s from two 
second-hand 1970’s US Newport Class Landing Ship Tank vessels, and one Heavy Landing 
Ship (HLS), HMAS Tobruk, a 1980’s UK-designed and Australian-built vessel. In February 2011 
the amphibious fleet suffered a critical and unexpected failure of availability and HMAS 
Manoora and HMAS Kanimbla were subsequently decommissioned. Amphibious heavy lift 
capability will be maintained through the recently acquired second-hand vessel from the 
United Kingdom, HMAS Choules. Tobruk is planned to be withdrawn from service in 
December 2014. 
Two new large amphibious (Landing Helicopter Dock) vessels are under construction and are 
due to enter service in the first half of the decade. These vessels will each displace around 
27,000 tonnes and carry 1,000 troops plus helicopters and vehicles. Navy also has three 
Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) due for decommissioning in late 2014.   
Afloat support  
The afloat support force refuels and re-supplies Navy vessels and embarked helicopters at 
sea and provides logistics support to land operations. The fleet comprises two vessels: HMAS 
Sirius: a South Korean-built 46,017 tonne full displacement commercial vessel which was 
refitted to Navy specifications as an Auxiliary Tanker (AO) and HMAS Success: a 1980s 
French-designed, Australian-built 17,900 tonnes full displacement Auxiliary Replenishment 
Tanker (AOR). Amada Ship Cantabria commenced a year-long deployment with the RAN in 
2013. 
Although HMAS Sirius has been touted as an example of how commercial-off-the-shelf 
equipment can meet ADF requirements quickly and at reduced cost, the ship does not have 
the full range of capabilities and operational flexibility of a purpose build ship.  
 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
Unit Ready Days: Amphibious and afloat support 
 
Target
Actual
  
88 
 
Naval aviation 
The RAN has sixteen 1980s US-designed Seahawk helicopters that can be embarked on the 
FFH and FFG class frigates. They are configured for anti-submarine and surface 
search/targeting. A project to deliver eleven Super-Seasprite helicopters for the Anzac 
frigates was cancelled in early 2008. New Seahawk MH-60R aircraft are replacing both the 
Seahawk and the capability sought from the Super-Seasprite from 2014. Six MRH-90 aircraft 
began transitioning into service in late 2011 as a replacement for the now-retired UK-built 
Sea King helicopters (reported under Army outputs). Thirteen Squirrel light helicopters are 
used for training and short-term operations at sea.  
Over the past decade, the performance of both the Sea King and Seahawk fleets was 
compromised by personnel shortages, maintenance issues and ongoing aircraft upgrades 
and modifications. A fleet of new MH-60R Seahawks will start to enter service beginning in 
2014.  Scheduled flying hours for the new MH-60R Seahawks are 600 hours in 2013-14 and 
2,400 hours in 2014-15. 
 
Hydrographic, meteorological & oceanographic fleet 
The Navy produces maritime military geospatial information for the ADF and undertakes 
hydrographic surveying and charting for civil use. The hydrographic component is supported 
by the Australian Hydrographic Office in Wollongong, NSW, and also comprises the 
Hydrographic Office deployable survey unit. The fleet includes:  
2 Leeuwin Class Hydrographic Ships (AGHS): 2,250 tonne Australian-built hydrographic ships.  
4 Paluma Class Survey Motor Launches (SML): 320 tonne Australian-built survey launches.  
1 Laser Airborne Depth Sounder (LADS) aircraft: an airborne depth sounder capability used 
in shallow water. 
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Program 1.3 – Army Capabilities 
Department outputs 2014-15: $5,986 million   
In 2009, the Australian Army was restructured to ensure it is more effective and efficient in 
its conduct of force generation and force preparation—for current operations and potential 
operations of the future. The Army was structured around three functional commands. The 
three functional commands and their roles are as follows:  
Special Operations Command commanding Army’s Special Forces units.  
Forces Command is responsible for the force generation of Army individual and collective 
conventional capabilities based on Foundation Warfighting skills.  
1st Division focuses on the force preparation of conventional Army force elements for 
specified operations and contingencies. It also forms the basis of the Deployable Joint Force 
Headquarters, capable of providing Command and Control to Australian and coalition forces 
at short notice.  
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Headquarters 1st Division 
Headquarters 1st Division is based in Brisbane, and prepares and certifies Army conventional 
force elements, as assigned by Chief of Army, in order to meet the specific operational and 
contingency requirements directed by Chief Joint Operations.  
Headquarters 1st Division also commands a number of specialist units which support its role 
and prepare and certify forces for operations.  These include the 1st Signals Regiment 
(Brisbane), the Combat Training Centre (Townsville), the 39th Operational Support Battalion 
(Randwick, Sydney) and the 2nd/30th Training Group (Butterworth, Malaysia). 
Special Operations Command 
The Special Air Services Regiment (SASR) in Western Australia provides special recovery 
(including domestic and overseas counter terrorism by the west coast Tactical Assault Group 
(TAG)), long-range reconnaissance and offensive operations. The 2nd Commando Regiment 
(2 Cdo Regt) in Sydney (including east coast TAG) and the 1st Commando Regiment (a 
reserve unit split between Sydney and Melbourne) are the Army’s two commando 
regiments. Commando roles include special recovery and land, sea- and air-borne offensive 
raids. The 126 Signals Squadron in Sydney provides a Special Forces signals capability to 
2 Cdo Regt and 152 Signals Squadron in Perth provides a signals capability to the SASR. There 
is also a Special Operations Engineer Regiment based in Sydney, a Special Forces Logistics 
Squadron in Sydney, a Special Forces Training Centre in Sydney and Parachute Training 
School in Nowra. 
Forces Command 
1st, 3rd and 7th Brigades  
Forces Command includes three combat brigades.  Each Brigade contains two Infantry 
Battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment, and Armoured Cavalry Regiment equipped with 
M113AS4 armoured personnel carriers and Australian modified ASLAV light armoured 
vehicles.  Each Brigade also contains an Artillery Regiment equipped with towed M777 
155mm Lightweight Towed Howitzers.  Additionally, each Brigade includes command and 
control, combat support and combat service support elements based in a Brigade 
Headquarters, Signals Regiment, Combat Engineer Regiment and Combat Service Support 
Battalion. 
1st Brigade  The 1st Brigade is headquartered in Darwin and has units located in both 
Darwin and Adelaide. The 1st Armoured Regiment is the Brigades Armoured Cavalry 
Regiment and also currently contains Army’s armoured capability, equipped with 
reconditioned US-made M1A1 Abrams tanks.   The 7th Battalion, The Royal Austrlian 
Regiment is based in Adelaide. 
3rd Brigade  The 3rd Brigade headquartered in Townsville. In addition to its two standard 
Infantry Battalions, 3rd Brigade also commands the 2nd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, 
which is Army’s dedicated unit supporting the ADF Amphibious Capability. 
7th Brigade  The 7th Brigade is headquartered in Brisbane.  
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6th Brigade  
Headquartered at Victoria Barracks in Sydney, the 6th Brigade commands a diverse 
collection of units including:  
• 1st Intelligence Battalion (Brisbane)  
• 16th Air Land Regiment (Woodside SA) equipped with the Swedish RBS 70 shoulder 
launched, optically guided, surface-to-air missiles, as well as Giraffe sense and warn 
Agile Multi-Beam (GAMB) radars. 
• 20th Surveillance and Target Acquisition Regiment (Brisbane)  
• 7th Signals Regiment - Electronic Warfare (Carbalah, Queensland)  
• 19th Chief Engineer Works (Sydney)  
• 6th Engineer Support Regiment (Brisbane) comprising: 
o 17th Construction Squadron (Sydney)  
o 21st Construction Squadron (Brisbane)  
o 20th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron (Enoggera, Queensland).   
17th Brigade  
The 17th Brigade, headquartered at Randwick Barracks in Sydney, is a brigade-sized 
grouping of reserve, integrated and permanent Army units which can sustain a brigade on 
operations for extended periods while concurrently maintaining a battalion group 
elsewhere. The Brigade provides supply, fuel, communications, transport (surface vehicle 
and small watercraft), repair, and health and psychology capabilities. The Brigade is 
headquartered in Sydney and comprises of the following units: 
• 2nd Force Support Battalion (Glenorchy, Tasmania)  
• 9th Force Support Battalion (Amberley, Queensland) 
• 10th Force Support Battalion (Townsville)  
• 1st Close Health Battalion (headquartered in Sydney) 
• 2nd General Health Battalion (Brisbane) 
• 3rd Health Support Battalion (headquartered in Adelaide)   
• 1st Psychology Unit (Sydney). 
• 146th Signals Squadron (Sydney) 
• 1st Military Police Battalion (Brisbane)  
2nd Division  
The 2nd Division commands all those Reserve units not integrated into other formations.  It 
is structured around six infantry brigades, each of which has a HQ, two/three infantry 
battalions, a cavalry unit in some cases, and combat and combat service support units. These 
brigades are: 
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• 4th Brigade (Melbourne and Victoria)  
• 5th Brigades (Sydney and southern New South Wales) 
• 8th Brigade (Sydney and northern New South Wales)  
• 9th Brigade (South Australia and Tasmania)  
• 11th Brigade (Townsville and Queensland)  
• 13th Brigade (southern Western Australia and Perth). 
The Division also includes three regional surveillance units predominately manned by 
reserve personnel. These are:  
• 51st Battalion Far North Queensland Regiment responsible for conducting 
reconnaissance and surveillance over 640,000 square km in Far North Queensland 
and the Gulf country. 
• The Pilbara Regiment (Karratha, WA) with 1.3 million square km to cover from the 
Kimberley boundary in the north, to Shark Bay in the south, then east to the 
NT/SA/WA border. 
• North West Mobile Force (NORFORCE) which covers the Northern Territory and the 
Kimberly region of northern Western Australia, an area of operations covering 
nearly one quarter of Australia’s land mass—1.8 million square kilometres.   
16th Brigade  
Army aviation support is generated by 16th Aviation Brigade, headquartered in Brisbane. 
The Brigade commands the 1st Aviation Regiment (Tiger) in Darwin, the 5th Aviation 
Regiment (Black Hawk, MRH-90 Taipan and CH-47 Chinook) in Townsville, and the 6th 
Aviation Regiment (Black Hawk) in Sydney, 16th Aviation Brigade provides the following 
capability in support of Joint Land Combat and Amphibious Operations: Reconnaissance, 
Escort, Attack, Airmobile Operations, Aero Medical Evacuation, Combat Service Support, and 
support to Special Operations. 
22 Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters, and 40 MRH-90 Taipan Troop Lift Helicopters, 
are being introduced into service with Full Operational Capability expected in 2016 and 2019 
respectively, while the Black Hawk fleet will be retired commensurate with MRH-90 
introduction. The CH-47D Medium Lift Helicopter fleet is due to be replaced by seven CH-47F 
Chinooks in the period 2015-2016 under project AIR 9000 Phase 5C. 
Assets include: 34 Black Hawk troop-lift helicopters, 41 Kiowa light observation & training 
helicopters, 6 Chinook medium lift helicopters. All these helicopters are of US design. There 
are also 22 of an eventual fleet of 24 European-designed Tiger Armed Reconnaissance 
Helicopters (ARH) and 47 MRH-90 troop-lift helicopters are being progressively brought into 
service. 
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Royal Military College of Australia (RMC-A) 
The Royal Military College of Australia is headquartered in Canberra and is responsible for 
the delivery of individual foundation training for Officers and Soldiers, including the first 
Appointment Course, Recruit Training and Promotion courses. RMC-A consists of the 
following units: 
• Royal Military College – Duntroon (Canberra) 
• Army Recruit Training Centre (Wagga Wagga) 
• Land Warfare Centre (Headquartered at Canungra, Queensland with presence in all 
states and territories). 
Army Logistic Training Centre (ALTC) 
The Army Logistic Training Centre (ALTC) is principally centred in Albury-Wodonga, however 
conducts training in Darwin, Townsville, Brisbane, Sydney and Puckapunyal through two 
training wings and four On-the-Job Training cells. ALTC delivers training in logistics, 
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ordnance, road and maritime transport, medical, health and electrical and mechanical 
engineering. ALTC consists of the following schools: 
• Army School of Logistics Operations (Albury-Wodonga)  
• Army School of Ordnance (Albury-Wodonga) 
• Army School of Transport (Albury-Wodonga, Townsville and Puckapunyal) 
• Army School of Health (Albury-Wodonga) 
• Army School of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (Albury-Wodonga). 
Combined Arms Training Centre (CATC) 
The Combined Arms Training Centre is headquartered at Puckapunyal and is the Australian 
Army's centre of excellence for individual combined arms training. The force structure 
includes: 
• School of Armour (Puckapunyal) 
• School of Artillery (Puckapunyal) 
• School of Infantry (Singleton) 
• School of Military Engineering (Sydney). 
Army Aviation Training Centre (AAVNTC) 
The Army Aviation Training Centre is located in Oakey and is responsible for the effective 
instruction of Pilot, Aircrewmen and Groundcrewmen courses as well as the training of 
Aircraft Technicians for employment within Army Aviation. AAVNTC also contributes to the 
development of doctrine and materiel plans for Army Aviation. The training centre includes:  
• The Army Helicopter School 
• The RAEME Aircraft Maintenance School 
• The School of Army Aviation. 
Defence Command Support Training Centre (DCSTC) 
The Defence Command Support Training Centre is headquartered at Simpson Barracks in 
Melbourne and it is a training formation within Army responsible for the conduct of 
Intelligence, Signals, Police and Music training, training design and trade management for 
members of the Australian Defence Force. The training centre also provides training for 
selected members of the Australian Public Service and nominated students from Defence 
forces of other nations. DCSTC comprises the following Units: 
• Defence Intelligence Training Centre (Canungra)  
• Defence Force School of Music (Melbourne) 
• Defence Force School of Signals (Melbourne)  
• Defence Police Training Centre (Sydney).  
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Program 1.4 – Air Force Capabilities 
Department outputs 2014-15: $4,762 million 
Of the three military services, the Air Force has the leanest and most streamlined 
organisational structure. The organisation is split into two parts. Corporate planning and 
administration occurs under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Air Force within Air Force 
Headquarters while Air Commander Australia takes care of Headquarters Air Command, the 
Air and Space Operations Centre and the six training, support and flying groups.   
Air Force has recently introduced, or is preparing to introduce, several new fleets of aircraft 
into service. These include the 6 new Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft 
(AEW&C), 5 replacement Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) aircraft, 24 F/A-18F Super Hornet, 10 C-
27J Spartan battlefield airlifters, 8 P-8A Poseidon maritime intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance and response aircraft and 12 E/A-18G Growler electronic warfare and attack 
aircraft. By the end of the decade, the Air Force plans to be operating F-35A Lightning II Joint 
Strike Fighter aircraft. 
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Air Combat Group 
Air Combat Group comprises 71 F/A-18 A/B Hornet fighter aircraft and 24 F/A-18F Super 
Hornets with the remaining 9 Super Hornets expected to be delivered by October 2011. In 
addition, 33 Hawk Lead-in Fighters (LIF) provide a training capability while 4 PC-9(F) forward 
air control aircraft are used to designate ground targets and train Joint Terminal Attack 
Controllers. Air Combat Group also supports and operates the leased Heron Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft which is deployed to Afghanistan.  
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Air Mobility Group 
The Air Force has 12 C-130J Hercules and twelve (4 in preservation) C-130H Hercules 
transport aircraft which are capable of a wide range of strategic and tactical airborne roles. 
The recent acquisition of 6 Boeing C-17 Globemaster IIIs provides the capability to transport 
large and heavy loads over long ranges whilst retaining tactical capabilities. Two Boeing 737 
BBJ and 3 CL604 Challenger aircraft provide VIP transport for the government. Sixteen B-350 
King Air aircraft, provide a light air transport role as an interim capability prior to the 
introduction of the C-27J Spartan aircraft. Five KC-30A  Multi-Role Tanker Transport aircraft 
perform a duel tanker and transport role.     
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Surveillance and Response Group 
The Surveillance and Response Group comprises a diverse range of capabilities including:  
Eighteen 1970s vintage AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft which undertake maritime 
patrol, maritime surveillance, reconnaissance, offensive air support, surface & sub-surface 
strike, and search and survivor supply. All 18 aircraft have been upgraded to AP-3C standard 
through an Australian-unique upgrade program.  
Ten Air Traffic Radars, including 9 fixed radar and 1 mobile for the control of ADF air traffic. 
Four Tactical Air Defence Radars: ground based radar to detect hostile and own aircraft. The 
JORN Over-the-Horizon-Radar network, including radar sites in Laverton WA and Longreach 
Qld, and 17 coastal beacons in the north of Australia and Christmas Island. The network is 
run from the Jindalee Operational Radar Network Coordination Centre in Edinburgh, SA, and 
can detect both sea and air-borne moving objects. The Jindalee facility Alice Springs serves a 
research and development function. JORN is operated by No. 1 Radar Surveillance Unit. Six 
Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft based on Boeing 737-700 platform whose entry into service was 
delayed by more than four years are now flying more regularly with a mature rate of effort 
planned for 2014-15. 
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Aerospace Operational Support Group 
The Aerospace Operational Support Group provides a broad range of operational and 
technical support services to Defence in general and Air Force in particular. Key components 
of the Group include: 
Information Warfare Wing which provides electronic warfare, aeronautical information, 
intelligence and information operation products and services for Air Force air operations and 
the other Services.  
Development and Test Wing which provides flight test, system engineering and aviation 
medicine products and services for extant and emerging ADF aviation capability.  
Woomera Test Range which provides an instrumented weapons test and evaluation range 
for Defence.  
Combat Support Group 
The Combat Support Group is the largest of the Air Forces force element groups. The role of 
Combat Support Group (CSG) is to provide combat support services to all Air Force 
operational formations and when applicable ADF and Coalition Aviation formations. CSG 
must be able to deploy a Main Operating Base and two Forward Operating Bases.  
The capability for combat support of air operations provides for deployable tactical air base 
support. It encompasses Bare Base activation including the provision of engineering 
infrastructure (facilities, water, power and sewerage systems), aircraft arrestor barriers and 
airfield services, navigation aid and tactical communications, air movement, airfield defence, 
health support including AME, combat logistics and personnel support capabilities. 
CSG provides deployed combat support, excluding aircraft technical maintenance, to ADF 
contingency air operations at main operating bases, forward operating bases and point of 
entry airfields in Areas of Operations (AO) either in Australia or overseas. It also provides 
command and cadre staff for RAAF fixed bases in northern Australia and management of the 
prepared Bare Bases at RAAF Learmonth (LMO), Curtin (CIN), and Scherger (SGR). The 
provision of secure airfields and combat support arrangements for the deployment of air 
assets will continue to be critical to the support of ADF operations. 
CSG comprises of a HQ, a Combat Support Coordination Centre, 95 and 96 Wings and a 
Health Services Wing.   
Air Force Training Group 
The Air Force Training Group is made up of a headquarters and Air Training Wing, Ground 
Training Wing, RAAF College and Reserve Training Wing. The headquarters of the Air 
Training Group is located at RAAF Base Williams – Laverton, Victoria.  
Air Training Wing conducts basic and instructor air training for ADF personnel including 
pilots, air combat officers and air traffic controllers. Basic pilot training employs PC-9/A 
aircraft while aircraft and navigator training occurs on B350 aircraft. Air Training Wing also 
includes the RAAF Roulettes, who provide fly pasts and displays, the RAAF Museum and the 
RAAF Balloon. The Air Training Wing is also responsible for air crew combat survival training.  
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The RAAF College provides induction and professional military training for the Air Force. The 
RAAF College also maintains the RAAF Band.  
Ground Training Wing provides initial and ongoing training for non-aircrew personnel, 
including security, fire and ground defence, administration and logistics, technical trades, 
and explosive ordnance.  
Reserve Training Wing provides ground training to Air Force Reserve members at a number 
of locations around Australia.  
Program 1.5 – Intelligence Capabilities  
Department outputs 2014-15: $538 million  
Overview 
The Intelligence and Security (I&S) Group comprises the Defence Intelligence Organisation, 
the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO), the Australian Signals Directorate 
(ASD) and the Defence Security Authority. The I&S Group is responsible for the management 
and oversight of the collection and assessment of intelligence in support of Australia’s 
strategic and national interests, including support to ADF operations. The I&S Group also 
provides policy and security advice to Government, including security vetting functions for 
the whole-of-government. 
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sets technical standards for imagery and geospatial products, and provides Commonwealth 
and state authorities, and other bodies approved by the Minister, with non-intelligence 
products, technical assistance and support to carry out their emergency response functions.  
Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) at Russell Offices in Canberra provides all-source 
intelligence assessments focusing on global security trends, foreign military capabilities, 
transnational terrorism, defence economics, and science and technologies with military 
applications. DIO produces timely assessments and advice on current and emerging threats 
to Australia’s security and strategic environment in support of Defence and whole-of-
government decision-making—including the planning and conduct of ADF operations. 
The Defence Security Authority (DSA) is responsible for the developing and promulgating 
security policy, providing security threat advice, conducting complex security investigations, 
monitoring Defence’s security performance and assisting the Secretary, Chief of Defence 
Force, Group Heads and Service Chiefs to manage security risks. The Australian Government 
Security Vetting Agency (AGSVA) is also located within DSA and is responsible for security 
vetting of personnel across government, except for a small number of exempt agencies, for 
access to classified information. DSA also manages the Defence Industry Security Program. 
Chief Operating Officer – Overview 
The Chief Operating Officer (COO) organisation was created as a result of the Black Review 
of the Defence Accountability Framework. The organisation came into effect on 17 February 
2012 and comprises Programs 1.6 Defence Support and Reform, 1.7 Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) and 1.8 People Strategies and Policy (PSP). The Strategic Reform Management 
Office (SRMO) and the Ministerial and Executive Coordination and Communication (MECC) 
Division have also transferred into COO from Program 1.1 Office of the Secretary and CDF, 
although they are still captured under Program 1.1 in the PBS. Defence Legal now reports 
directly to the COO rather than through Program 1.6 Defence Support and Reform.   
The SRMO is responsible for oversighting strategic reform in Defence.   
MECC is responsible for providing support to Ministers and senior Defence leaders in the 
areas of communication and media, strategic issues management, freedom of Information 
related matters and the full range of Ministerial support services.  
Defence Legal provides legal services and advice to Defence and Ministers in the Defence 
portfolio. 
The responsibilities for Defence Support and Reform, Chief Information Officer, and the 
People Group are outlined below. 
Better integration of these Group outputs will ensure that the development and delivery of 
corporate services best support Defence’s ability to affect the necessary reforms under the 
Strategic Reform Program. The COO will also be responsible for implementing key parts of 
the Shared Services Review and achieving cost efficiencies and cultural change that the 
Government is seeking. 
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Within the new COO structure, the Defence Support Group will continue to operate and 
perform its role as a key enabler of Defence’s mission and vision. The linkages within the 
COO organisation will develop the Defence Support Group as part of a single integrated 
support organisation, providing the backbone of Defence’s capability. This will emphasise 
accountability and responsibility while ensuring services are delivered to clients efficiently 
and cost effectively. 
Work to integrate the programs of the new COO organisation is continuing.  
Program 1.6 – Defence Support and Reform  
Department outputs 2014-15: $4,086 million 
The Defence Support Group provides a range of administrative, garrison, personnel and 
estate services to Defence. The Group is divided into three divisions. Infrastructure Division 
plans, builds and upgrades the Defence estate. Defence Support Operations Division 
provides on-the-ground services and support to Defence personnel throughout Australia 
including facilities maintenance and garrison support, including grounds maintenance, 
hospitality, training area management, base security, transport, air support and fire-fighting 
and rescue services. The Reform and Corporate Services Division is responsible for managing 
a range of whole-of-Defence shared services including payroll, simple procurement, 
accounts processing and debt management along with business management, strategic 
planning and policy support services to the Group.  
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Program 1.7 – Chief Information Officer  
Department outputs 2014-15: $979 million  
The Chief Information Officer Group is responsible for providing Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) to Defence. The bulk of the Group resides in four 
divisions.  
Chief Technology Officer Division develops and documents Defence’s ICT architecture, 
identifies relevant systems and defines ICT standards for Defence.   
Information and Communications Technology Development Division designs and develops 
Software Systems for the Defence information environment.  
Information and Communications Technology Operations Division delivers and supports the 
Defence Information and Communication infrastructure.  
Information and Communications Technology Reform Division delivers ICT reform and 
associated savings across the Defence Portfolio. 
Chief Information Officer 
*** 
Chief 
Technology 
Officer 
Division 
** 
Information and 
Communications 
Technology 
Development 
Division  
** 
Information and 
Communications 
Technology 
Operations 
Division 
** 
Scientific 
Advisor 
Intelligence 
and 
Information 
* 
JP 2080 
* 
Corporate Stakeholder 
Engagement team 
* 
Logistics Management 
* 
Defence Strategic 
Communications 
* 
Operational 
Infrastructure  
* 
Enterprise Architecture  
* 
Infrastructure Architecture 
* 
ICT Reform 
Division 
** 
 
 
Software Contracts 
Compliance 
* 
Information Assurance 
* 
Defence Information 
Services 
* 
Operations Reform 
* 
Communications 
Systems  
* 
Defence Computing 
Bureau  
 Applications Sustainment 
Branch 
* 
ICT Reform  
* 
Sourcing Reform  
* 
Government 
and Security 
Applications 
Branch 
* 
ICY Policy and Plans 
* 
Defence Capability 
and Military Project 
Delivery 
 
Intelligence 
Stakeholder 
Engagement 
Team 
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Program 1.8– Defence People  
Department outputs 2014-15: $483 million  
A new Defence People Group has been in operation since 2012-13 within the Chief 
Operating Officer Group structure to ensure the effective integration of People functions 
across the Defence organisation. The new structure is designed to better respond to key 
People priorities and service the needs of key stakeholders more effectively. The new 
Defence People Group brings together the former People Strategies & Policy Group and 
elements of the Defence Support Group, including the Defence Community Organisation, 
People Services Division, Defence People Solutions and the Directorate of Honours & 
Awards. 
The Defence People Group's key role is the formulation of personnel policy for Defence's 
workforce. Key priorities for the Group include the provision of a compelling employment 
offer to assist in attraction and retention, the implementation of Pathway to Change—
Defence's response to the culture reviews conducted during 2011-12—through the 
establishment of an Organisational Development Unit, continuation of the human resources 
reforms identified as part of Defence's strategic reform and the development of tools to 
enable better decision-making through a better understanding of the Defence workforce 
and the implications of changes to key drivers of workforce cost.   
 
  
Deputy Secretary People  
*** 
Head People Policy & 
Culture 
** 
Head People Capability 
** 
Policy & Employment Conditions  
* 
Strategy and Culture 
* 
Work Health 
and Safety 
* 
Workforce 
Planning  
* 
Head People 
Solutions  
** 
Head People Reform  
** 
Defence 
Community 
Organisation 
 
Defence Force 
Recruiting 
* 
Human 
Resources 
Shared Services  
* 
Values, 
Behaviours & 
Resolutions  
* 
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Program 1.9 – Defence Science & Technology  
Department outputs 2014-15: $408 million 
The Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) provides scientific advice and 
innovative technology solutions to the Government, Defence and Australia’s national 
security agencies. This includes supporting operations, sustaining and enhancing current 
capability, supporting the development and acquisition of future capability and investigating 
client-focussed future proofing concepts, contexts and capabilities. DSTO also has whole-of-
government responsibility for coordinating scientific and technical support to national 
security.  
The organisation is led by the Chief Defence Scientist, who answers to the Secretary and is 
supported by three deputies. DSTO was restructured in July 2013 in accordance with its 
Strategic Plan 2013-18 and is reshaping its science and technology capabilities to meet 
future challenges. The headquarters and one research division are located in Canberra, while 
remaining research divisions are concentrated in Adelaide and Melbourne. Below the level 
of Chief of Division, branch level entities in DSTO are led by Research Leaders. Scientific 
Advisers from the Program Office are outposted to Navy, Army, Air Force, Vice Chief of the 
Defence Force, Joint Operations Command, Capability Development Group, Defence 
Materiel Organisation, Intelligence & Security Group and Chief Information Officer Group.  
 
Chief Defence Scientist 
*** 
Deputy CDS 
(Strategy and 
Programs 
COD-3 
Deputy CDS 
(Partnerships and 
Outreach) 
COD-3 
Chief Land Division 
COD-2 
Deputy CDS 
(Corporate) Division 
COD-3 
Chief Maritime Division 
COD-2 
 
Chief Joint and Operations 
Analysis Division 
COD-2 
Chief Aerospace Division 
COD-2 
 
Chief Cyber and Electronic 
Warfare Division 
COD-2 
 
Chief National 
Security and 
Intelligence, 
Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance 
Division 
COD-2 
Chief Weapons 
and 
Countermeasures 
Division 
COD-2 
 
Partnerships &  
Engagement 
COD-2 
Program Office 
COD-2 
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Program 1.10 – Vice Chief of the Defence Force  
Department outputs 2014-15: $1,231 million 
The Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) is the military deputy to the CDF. In addition, the 
VCDF is the Joint Capability Authority as well as being responsible for the following:  
Military Strategic Commitments Division provides the strategic level advice and support in 
the planning and execution of ADF’s current operations and future commitments that 
enables the government to continuously review its national strategic interests. These 
responsibilities encompass; the strategic coordination of current and future ADF 
commitments, development and synchronization of strategic communication, the 
development and review of the nature of service for ADF commitments, and the provision of 
an investigative service to support the CDF and Service Chiefs. 
Joint Logistics Command provides logistics support to the Australian Defence Force 
including, management of warehouses, maintenance, and distribution facilities.  
Joint Health Command is responsible for the delivery of all garrison health care to the ADF 
and exercises technical control through the Surgeon General Australian Defence Force. 
Australian Defence College was established to develop the skills and knowledge of 
Defence’s future leaders with an emphasis on joint professional military education and the 
delivery of joint training programs. Learning is offered through several learning centres 
providing an education continuum from the Australian Defence Force Academy, to the 
Australian Command and Staff College and the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies. 
Through the Defence Learning Branch, the Australian Defence College also provides strategic 
direction and coordination for Defence’s joint, common and APS training and education.  
Joint Capability Coordination supports VCDF as the Joint Capability Authority responsible for 
ensuring that new and extant capabilities are developed in accordance with joint concepts 
and doctrine. Core functions of JCCD are to develop and provide the conceptual basis for the 
future joint force, advise on the state of ADF preparedness to meet Defence output of a 
prepared Joint Force in Being, and establish interoperability/integration requirements. 
Cadet, Reserve and Employer Support Division works to enhance the capacity of Reserves 
to support ADF capability and provides a governance and accountability framework for the 
ADF Cadet Scheme. 
Australian Civil-Military Centre is a whole-of-government initiative to improve Australia’s 
effectiveness in civil-military collaboration for conflict and disaster management overseas. 
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Defence Logistics 
Transformation 
Program 
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* 
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Commandant 
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Commandant 
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Program 1.11 – Joint Operations Command  
Department outputs 2014-15: $52 million 
Joint Operations Command (JOC) is responsible for the command of all ADF operations and 
joint exercises on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Force. Located in a purpose built 
command facility in Bungendore NSW, JOC is assigned forces for operations from the three 
Services. The total ADF command arrangement is outlined below. At present, there are 
approximately 3,300 ADF personnel deployed on operations and somewhere around 750 
personnel involved in planning, advising and commanding operations, of which around 750 
(including contractors) reside in JOC and SOCOMD.   
 
Headquarters Joint     
Operations Command 
Minister for Defence 
Chief Joint Operations 
*** 
Support  
 
Intelligence  
 
Operations 
 
Plans 
 
Communication Training 
 
HQ Special Operations  
** 
Air & Space Operations 
* 
HQ Northern Command 
* 
Border Protection 
Command 
** 
East Timor 
 
Afghanistan 
 
Assigned Forces 
 
Public Affairs, Coordination, 
Legal, Business and 
Information Management  
 
Iraq 
 
Solomon 
Islands 
Commander 
Middle East 
Task Force HQ 
** 
Deputy 
Commander 
* 
 
Chief Defence Force 
*** 
Vice Chief Defence Force 
*** 
Military Strategic Commitments Branch 
* 
Military Strategic 
Commitments Division 
** 
Maritime/Submarine 
Operations  
* 
Deputy Chief of Operations  
** 
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Program 1.12 – Capability Development  
Department outputs 2014-15: $1,423 million  
The Capability Development Group develops and manages the Defence Capability Plan (DCP) 
and prepares Defence capability investment approval proposals for Government 
consideration. Two divisions, Capability Systems and Capability Investment and Resources, 
constitute the core of the Group. 
Capability Systems Division is largely staffed by military personnel and manages the 
development of future capability options for Government consideration. It is divided into 
four branches; three environmentally-based (land, sea and air), and one dealing with 
integrated capabilities that cross environmental lines. Another element is the Rapid 
Prototyping Development and Evaluation organisation, which works collaboratively with 
Australia’s defence industry to develop innovative solutions to complex issues affecting 
capability and current operations. 
Capability Investment and Resources Division is largely staffed by civilian personnel and 
provides independent analysis and contestability of capability proposals as their core 
function. The Division is responsible for management of the DCP, including conducting the 
regular review of the capital and Net Personnel and Operating Costs (NPOC) estimates of 
DCP projects and gaining Government approval for updates to the DCP. It is divided into two 
core branches; Investment Analysis and Cost Analysis.  
Four other elements within the Group are: the Capability and Plans Branch provides policy 
services on the capability process, portfolio management office functions and coordinates 
CDG links to industry and international partners.; the Australian Defence Test and Evaluation 
Office that provides independent T&E support, trials and demonstrations to Defence 
throughout the capability systems life cycle; Group Support Branch that provides a range of 
corporate services across the Group; and an embedded DSTO support cell that links CDG to 
DSTO services. 
 
Chief of Capability 
Development 
*** 
Capability 
Systems  
Division 
** 
Capability, 
Investment and 
Resources 
Division  
** 
Capability and 
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* 
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Program 1.13 – Chief Finance Officer  
Department outputs 2014-15: $557 million   
The Chief Finance Officer Group is responsible for Defence’s financial planning, budgeting 
and reporting.  
 
 
 
  
Chief Finance 
Officer 
*** 
Financial Services  
Division 
** 
Resource & Assurance 
Division  
** 
Resource Assurance and 
Analysis Branch  
* 
Financial Coordination 
Branch 
* 
Financial Professionalization, 
Controls and Skilling Branch  
* 
Financial Business Information 
Branch  
* 
Financial Services Branch  
* 
Budget Management, 
Financial Reporting and 
Accounting Policy Branch 
* 
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Program 2.1 – Ops in the immediate neighbourhood   
Department outputs 2014-15: $3 million 
• Op Gateway: Indian Ocean and South China Sea maritime patrols (since 1981) 
• Op Solania: Conduct South West Pacific maritime surveillance patrols (since 1988) 
• Op Render Safe: Provide enduring explosive ordnance disposal support to the nations of 
the South West Pacific. (since 2011)  
Program 2.2 – Ops supporting wider interests   
Department outputs 2014-15: $350 million 
• Op Paladin: Contribute to the UN Truce Supervisory Mission in the Middle East (since 
1956) 
• Op Mazurka: Contribute to Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (since 1982) 
• Op Slipper: Contribute to ISAF in Afghanistan (since 2001) 
• Op Palate II: Liaison Officer to UN Mission in Afghanistan (since 2005) 
• Op Aslan: Contribute to the United Nations mission to the South Sudan (since 2011) 
• Op Accordion: Provide support to Operations SLIPPER and MANITOU from within the 
Gulf States. (since 2014) 
• Op Manitou: Contribute to international maritime security operations in the 
Middle East Area of Operations (since 2014) 
Program 3.1 – National support tasks  
Department outputs 2014-15: $68 million 
• Op Resolute: Contribute to whole-of-government maritime enforcement effort (since 
2006) 
• Op G20: Contribute security assistance to the whole-of-government effort as host of the 
G20 Summit in 2014. 
Defence’s contribution to national support tasks ranges from the ongoing routine allocation 
of Patrol Boat and AP-3C Maritime Patrol Aircraft time, to the allocation of specific 
capabilities at short notice in a national support emergency. National support tasks include 
security, ceremonial, civil maritime surveillance, search and rescue, bush fire response and 
support to the Army / ATSIC community assistance program.  
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2.7: Budgeted Financial Statements  
[PBS Section 3: pp. 81 – 112] 
The budgeted financial statements for Defence appear in Section 3 of the PBS. Once again 
consolidated financial statements for Defence and DMO have been included. 
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2.8: Defence Materiel Organisation PBS  
[Defence Materiel Organisation PBS: pp. 134 – 222] 
On 1 July 2005 DMO became a prescribed agency under the Financial Management and 
Accountability Act 1997. Since then it has had its own independent part in the Defence 
portfolio PBS.  
Overview  
DMO acquires and supports equipment for Defence on a quasi-commercial basis. It is an 
independent entity from a financial perspective, but administratively is something of an 
agency within an agency (hence the PBS within a PBS).  
Organisational structure 
DMO contains fourteen divisions (or similar), each headed by a band-2 SES civilian or 2-star 
military officer, as shown in Figure 2.8.1. Four deputy-secretary level General Managers 
oversee the clusters of divisions. The divisions fall into three categories: 
Systems divisions are set up on the traditional environmental domains of land, sea, and air, 
plus divisions dealing with helicopters and electronics. They manage and deliver the vast 
bulk of the 180 major equipment acquisition projects (and more than 70 minor acquisition 
projects) that DMO is responsible for, and take care of the materiel support of existing 
capabilities—some 110 major fleet groupings—across all domains.  
Programs divisions acquire high profile capabilities of strategic significance. That is, if a 
project is big, important (and politically sensitive) enough it gets its own dedicated division. 
At the moment there are four such programs: Air Warfare Destroyer, Collins, New Air 
Combat Capability (Joint Strike Fighter) and Future Submarine project. There was an 
Australian Shipbuilding Industry Planning division but it no longer appears to be in operation. 
Three ‘Commercial’ divisions provide enabling services and take care of specific areas. These 
are: Business Operations, General Counsel (legal) and Defence Industry. There is also a DMO 
Reform division. One final division reports directly to the CEO; that of the Chief Finance 
Officer—DMO. 
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Figure 2.8.1 DMO organisational structure 
 
 
Source: 2014-15 PBS  
A prescribed agency 
The September 2003 report from the Defence Procurement Review (known usually as the 
Kinnaird Review) recommended a number of changes to Defence and DMO. Key among 
them was to establish DMO as a separate executive agency. After consideration, the 
government decided to take the lesser step of making DMO a ‘prescribed agency’, which 
delivers a high degree of financial autonomy but does not provide the level of accountability 
or transparency intended by the Kinnaird or subsequent Mortimer reviews.   
 
As a prescribed agency, the CEO of DMO is accountable directly to the Minister for Defence 
for financial matters, hence the need for separate financial statements and budgets. On 
other matters, DMO still remains close to Defence from an administrative perspective; the 
Deputy CEO & 
General Manager 
Commercial 
*** 
 
General Manager  
Joint Systems and 
Air 
*** 
Aerospace 
Systems 
** 
Helicopter Systems &  
Explosive Ordnance  
** 
General Land 
and Maritime  
*** 
 
Manager Future 
Submarines 
** 
Joint Strike 
Fighter  
** 
Air Warfare Destroyer 
** 
*
*
Maritime Systems 
** 
 
*
 
*
 
*
 
 
 
  
*
 
Defence Industry Division 
** 
 
*
 
*
 
 
 
General Counsel 
** 
General Manager 
Submarines 
*** 
 
Business Operations  
** 
 
* 
* 
* 
*
 
*
 
*
 
Land Systems 
** 
* * * **
Collins Program Manager 
** 
Acquisition and Sustainment 
Reform 
** 
* 
* * * 
Electronic Systems 
** 
CFO 
** 
* 
* * * * * 
* 
CEO 
**** 
 
  
116 
 
CEO being accountable to the Chief of the Defence Force through the Defence Act 1903 and 
to the Secretary through the Public Service Act 1999. In practice, DMO does not enjoy the 
level of independence accorded some other prescribed agencies, such as the Office of 
National Assessments in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
Resources for 2014-15  
DMO will incur expenses of $12.6 billion in 2014-15. Sources of funding to cover these 
expenses include: 
Departmental Appropriation from government to pay for policy advice and management 
services. In 2014-15, this will be $881 million. 
Revenues from Defence in payment for acquisition and sustainment services from Defence. 
In 2014-15 this totals $11,664 million.  
Accumulation in special account: $4 million of funds will accumulate in the DMO special 
account as a result of the increase in employee provisions and payables. 
Non-appropriation receipts including things such as payments from foreign forces for 
materiel services provided. In 2014-15 this will amount to $60 million, and this would be 
called own-source revenues in Defence. 
DMO presents its resourcing in accord with Department of Finance guidelines, but 
differently to Defence. Table 77 on page 137 of the PBS contains the essential information of 
the sources of funds used by DMO. Table 2.8.1 summarises the situation taking account of 
movements in the DMO special account. The difference between funding and expenses 
comes from comparing cash funding with accrual expenses. 
Table 2.8.1: DMO funding 2014-15  
Funding available to be spent ($ ‘000s)    
Receipts from Department of Defence 11,644,460 Table 77, p. 137 
Departmental Appropriation 881,031 Table 77, p. 137 
Accumulation in special account  -4,088 Table 92, p. 195 
Non-appropriation receipts 60,525 Table 77, p. 137 
Total 12,581,928  
Total Price of DMO Outcome 12,580,096 Figure 5, p. 141 
Difference 1,832  
Expenses not requiring funding 33,717 Table 82, p. 145 
Funding surplus 35,543  
Source: 2014-15 PBS 
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DMO Special Account 
Unspent funds have both accumulated and have been paid out in subsequent years in the 
DMO Special Account. Table 2.8.2 calculates the net money deposited and withdrawn from 
the account since 2005-06. Note that on two occasions the closing balance for one year does 
not equal the opening balance for the subsequent year as a result of restatement of 
balances. Where possible, explanations are provided for the difference in the accompanying 
notes.  
With total cash flow anywhere in the order of $10 billion from year to year, an element of 
working capital would be expected to be seen in closing balances. Indeed a quick estimate of 
rule of thumb working capital in the order of 30 days cash flow could potentially see 
balances in the order of $830 million. Of course this level of working capital is not required 
as Defence prepay DMO up front at the start of each financial year for work to be delivered 
in that financial year. 
Any underspends in DMO activity for Defence may result in accumulated funding within the 
Special Account, along with the accumulation of prior year surpluses for workforce or 
Industry initiatives. An element of the Special Account balance will also represent cash 
required to meet invoices received by 30 June but not yet paid until the following financial 
year. Given that the DMO spends, on average around $51 million on any given working day, 
the scale of Special Account is unsurprising. The balance of the DMO Special Account 
remains with the overall Commonwealth Official Public Account. 
Table 2.8.2: DMO Special Account movements ($ ’000s)  
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20
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20
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20
14
-1
5 
Opening 
balance 
0 190,785 564,819 987,862 320,135 288,091 436,932 326,647 247,136 250,203 
Closing 
Balance 
190,785 564,819 987,862 269,296 501,559 436,932 326,647 247,136 250,203 254,291 
Represented by: 
Cash in 
OPA 
167,205 542,852 955,743 223,484 409,120 507,424 301,925 111,331 120,203  124,291  
Cash held 
by DMO 
23,580 21,967 32,119 45,812 92,439 -70,492 24,722 135,805 130,000  130,000  
Total 
Closing 
Balance 
190,785 564,819 987,862 269,296 501,559 436,932 326,647 247,136 250,203 254,291 
Change 190,785 374,034 423,043 -718,566 181,424 148,841 -110,285 -79,511 3,067  4,088 
Source: Financial Years 2005-06 to 2009-10 Annual Report, 2010-11 onwards PBS and advice from DMO 
(1) In 2009-10 DMO recognised overseas bank accounts as part of cash and cash equivalents. This increased the opening 
balance by $50.839m 
(2) In the 2011-12 DMO Financial Statements, the 2010-11 Special Account balances have been restated. This is due to the 
following adjustments: (a) an adjustment to remove GST that is recoverable from/payable to the ATO; and (b) a reclassification 
of payment clearing accounts from Suppliers Payable to Cash and payments made to suppliers, which reduced the closing 
balance of the Special Account Cash by $213m. 
(3) Closing balance reduction in 2011-12 primarily relates to a non-current receivable from the Department of Defence $105m 
to be paid in later years. 
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Purchaser-provider arrangements 
Central to the resourcing framework for DMO are purchaser-provider arrangements with 
Defence for acquisition and sustainment services. In 2014-15, DMO will receive an estimated 
$6,016 million through Materiel Acquisition Agreements with Defence, and another 
estimated $5,649 million through Materiel Sustainment Agreements. In addition, there are 
several Shared Services Agreements (for which no payment is made) that cover such services 
as payroll, accommodation, and banking services provided by Defence, and contracting 
policy and advice provided by the DMO.  
In 2014-15, DMO will make use of 1,347 permanent and an unknown number of Reserve 
military personnel whose salaries and other personnel expenses are counted in Defence’s 
financial statements. DMO pays Defence for the services provided by these personnel, as a 
suppliers expense (rather like payments made to companies for contractor staff). In 2014-15 
DMO will pay $273 million to Defence for military personnel and other costs covered by the 
Defence-DMO Service Level Agreement.  
Outcomes and programs  
As a prescribed agency DMO has its own outcome/program structure as detailed in 
Figure 2.8.2.  
The first two programs are predominantly funded through the Materiel Acquisition and 
Sustainment Agreements with Defence, while the third is mainly funded through direct 
Departmental Appropriation from government.  
Figure 2.8.2 Contributions to DMO Outcomes and Programs 2014-15 
  Outcome 1:  
Contributing to the preparedness of 
Australian Defence Organisation 
through acquisition and through-life 
support of military equipment and 
supplies.  
 
Appropriation:                     $88m 
 
Total Price:                   $12,580m 
  
      
        
Program 1.1: Management of 
Capability Acquisition 
 
Appropriation:            $286m 
 
Price:                     $6,309 m 
 Program 1.2: Capability 
Sustainment 
 
Appropriation:                      $502m 
 
Price:                                  $6,166m 
 Program 1.3: Policy Advice 
and Management Service 
 
Appropriation:               $93m 
 
Price:                          $105m 
 
Source: 2014-15 PBS 
 
Outcome and planned performance  
The PBS sets the strategy for achieving its outcome on page 142 of the PBS, including actions 
to be taken within each of its three programmes. The broad purpose and composition of the 
three programmes are as follows 
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Management of Capability Acquisition – Program 1.1 
Each of the major acquisition projects undertaken by DMO has a Materiel Acquisition 
Agreement with Defence that specifies scope, schedule and budget. The PBS summarises the 
top 30 acquisition projects by expenditure in 2014-15 (see top 30 projects below). 
Agreements also exist to cover the minor acquisition projects DMO manages.  
Capability Sustainment – Program 1.2 
The PBS details the goals and challenges for 2014-15 in the area of capability sustainment. 
Such detail, which was first provided in the 2005-06 PBS, gives a useful insight into the range 
of activities undertaken. In general, capability sustainment includes repair and maintenance, 
engineering, supply, configuration management and disposal, as well as the provision of 
spares, technical data, support and test equipment, training equipment and explosive 
ordnance. The top 30 sustainment products by weapons system appear in the PBS, see 
below. 
Policy Advice and Management Service – Program 1.3 
This includes contracting and procurement policy advice for Defence and the DMO, industry 
policy and advice to Defence and the government, and corporate reporting requirements. 
Key performance targets for this output are given on page 193 to 194 of the PBS and relate 
primarily to advice to government and effective corporate governance and reporting.   
Table 2.8.3: DMO programme objectives performance indicators 
Program 
 
Objective 
 
Performance Indicators  
Program 1.1 
Management of Capability 
Acquisition 
 
Acquisition projects will be delivered in 
accordance with approved parameters 
and in a transparent and accountable 
manner. 
Broadly, to deliver major and minor 
capital equipment within the agreed 
parameters for schedule, scope and 
budget. The indicators vary with each 
project and are specified in the Materiel 
Acquisition Agreements. The DMO 
reports to its customers against these. 
Program 1.2 
Capability Sustainment 
 
Defence capabilities will be sustained to 
meet operational requirements as 
identified in the specific Materiel 
Sustainment Agreement.  
Indicators are included in individual 
Materiel Sustainment Agreements. The 
DMO reports to its customers against 
these.   
Program 1.3 
Policy Advice and Management 
Services 
The DMO will meet Government, 
Ministerial and departmental 
expectations and timeframes for the 
provision of policy, advice and support 
and delivery of industry programmes. 
The DMO meets Ministerial, 
government, Defence and DMO 
expectations and timeframes for 
provision of policy, advice and support 
and delivery of industry programmes.  
 
The DMO Strategic Framework 2013-15 is discussed on page 144 of the PBS. As a result of 
the new Framework there are four change priorities for 2014-15: 
• Deliver acquisition and sustainment more efficiently 
• Interact with reviews 
• Streamline internal processes 
• Reform the DMO. 
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The ‘Top Thirty’ sustainment products 
The top 30 sustainment activities for DMO by forecast expenditure from Table 90 in the PBS 
are listed in Table 2.8.4, 2.8.5, 2.8.6 and 2.8.7 along with derived figures based on planned 
rates of effort. These include per-platform and per-flying-hour costs.  
Table 2.8.4: Top 30 sustainment products – aerospace and helicopters 
 
Number Cost ($m) Hours flown 
Annual cost per platform 
($ million) 
Cost per flying hour  
($ ‘000) 
Super Hornet 24 162 5,050 6.75 32.08 
AP-3C Orion   18 125 7,900 6.94 15.82 
F/A-18 Hornet   71 158 13,000 2.23 12.15 
Hawk LIF 127 33 91 7,500 2.76 12.13 
C-130J   12 98 7,350 8.17 13.33 
C-17 6 61 5,200 10.17 11.73 
MRH-90   47 157 5,400 3.34 29.07 
Seahawk   16 56 4,200 3.50 13.33 
Seahawk MH-60R 13 62 2,400 4.77 25.83 
Black Hawk   34 71 5,090 2.09 13.95 
ARH Tiger 22 114 4,726 5.18 24.12 
AEW&C 6 163 3,600 27.17 45.28 
SP Aircraft* 5 48 3,800 9.60 12.63 
KC-30A AAR 5 63 3,100 6.75 32.08 
Source 2014-15 PBS *mixed fleet of BBJ and CL604 
 
  
  
121 
 
Table 2.8.5: Recent budgeted sustainment costs per unit – aerospace and helicopters 
 Cost per aircraft ($ million) 
 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 
Super Hornet -  -  0.67 2.58 4.58 4.63 5.13 6.75 
AP-3C Orion   6.37 6.90 6.16 6.32 5.84 5.53 6.11 6.94 
F/A-18 Hornet   1.68 1.61 1.70 1.75 2.63 2.15 2.23 2.23 
Hawk LIF 127 2.88 2.70 2.64 2.70 2.70 2.21 2.36 2.76 
C-130J   5.42 9.42 9.25 6.17 6.50 6.75 7.92 8.17 
C-130 H   -  6.25 - 4.50 4.75 - - - 
C-17   13.75 9.75 10.75 -  14.25 - - 10.17 
MRH-90   -  47.50 4.27 5.20 6.93 2.09 2.63 3.34 
Seahawk   4.94 -  4.94 4.56 3.94 3.88 4.06 3.50 
Black Hawk   1.97 2.15 3.03 2.91 2.82 2.53 2.53 2.09 
ARM Tiger - -  3.77 3.91 4.36 4.36 4.73 5.18 
AEW&C - - - 23.5 28.5 26.83 27.17 27.17  
 Cost per flying hour ($ ‘000) 
 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 13-14 
Super Hornet     39.3 29.5 22.9 23.13 25.63 32.08 
AP-3C Orion   16.1 16.4 15.2 15.2 14.1 13.29 13.92 15.82 
F/A-18 Hornet   10.5 10.2 10.1 9.5 14.4 11.77 12.15 12.15 
Hawk LIF 127 15.2 13.6 13.5 11.1 11.9 9.73 10.40 12.13 
C-130J   14.1 15.7 16.2 10.1 10.6 11.02 12.93 13.33 
C-130 H   -  22.2 - 16.9 17.8 - - - 
C-17   26.2 11.6 12.7 -  12.7 - - 11.73 
MRH-90   -  780.1 146.8 52.0 34.7 31.79 30.25 29.07 
Seahawk   31.1   23.2 20.3 15.0 14.76 15.48 13.33 
Black Hawk   10.6 10.2 12.7 11.5 11.9 11.47 13.87 13.95 
ARM Tiger - - 46.2 20.7 14.5 13.43 30.95 24.12 
AEW&C - - - 70.5 65.8 57.50 45.28 45.28 
Source: PBS 
The above figures need to be treated with caution. Various fleets enjoy different amounts of 
contracted support (the cost of which is included) and manpower support from Defence’s 
own workforce (which is not included). More generally, there are usually other costs (like 
fuel) that are not included separately for each platform. Also, one-off costs can heavily 
influence the results, including when platforms are first being brought into service. It will be 
some years before useful trends emerge.  
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Table 2.8.6: Top 30 sustainment products – maritime 
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Collins submarines 6 322 324 325 416 479 507 580 560 
Anzac frigate 8 219 301 206 151 189 227 250 280 
FFG frigate 4 103 115 113 111 127 126 121 125 
LHD         71 
Mine Hunter Coastal 6 61 61     60 80 65 
Armidale PB 14       44  
Auxiliary Oiler 1      68  48 
Source: DAR, 2013-14 PAES, 2014-15 PBS  
 
Table 2.8.7: Top 30 sustainment products – miscellaneous 
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ADF Clothing and Equipment 117 89 84 70  37 45 50 
ADO Commercial Fleet 73 75 59  54  52 71 
B Vehicles 117 127 115 83 84 66 71 56 
Explosive ordnance 357 360 324 251 291 296 334 362 
Wide Area Surveillance 77 79 76 88 87 84 99 98 
Battlespace Communications  32 51     37 46 
Tactical Electronic Warfare        52 
Fuels and Lubricants 422 419 318 378 419 388 493 576 
Guided Munitions        146 
Protected Mobility Fleet    22     
Command and Intelligence       49 52 
Air Traffic Control       41  
Health Systems       42  
Naval Communications       39  
Source: DAR, 2013-14 PAES, 2014-15 PBS  
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People  
The DMO workforce is a mixture of military personnel, civilians and contractors as shown in 
in Table 2.8.8. 
The civilian and military personnel in DMO are held under slightly different arrangements. 
Civilians in DMO are Defence employees and the CEO of DMO has delegations from the 
Secretary of the Department that he exercises in this regard. The expenses associated with 
DMO’s civilian workforce appear in their financial statements as employee expenses. 
In contrast, the military personnel in DMO are provided through a purchaser-provider 
arrangement with Defence. This does not cover the full per-capita cost of the military 
personnel, but rather represents a payment for their services roughly corresponding to their 
costs exclusive of allowances and overheads specific to their military role (and this is broadly 
commensurate with what would be needed to secure similar skills in the labour market). 
Thus, if the military fail to deliver sufficient personnel (due, for example, to operational 
demands or shortages) DMO has the money to hire people from outside. Note that the 
budgeted and estimated personnel figures for DMO represent a maximum ceiling and that 
DMO will only engage the staff necessary to perform acquisition and sustainment tasks that 
arise in future years.  
Table 2.8.8: Workforce summary for DMO (average funded strength) 
 04–05 
actual 
05–06 
actual 
06–07 
actual 
07–08 
actual 
08–09 
actual 
09–10 
actual 
10-11 
actual 
11-12 
actual 
12-13 
actual  
13-14 
est.   
14-15 
budget  
15-16 
est. 
16-17 
est. 
17-18 
est. 
RAN 306 277 281 277 296 303 303 303 311 310 314 364 368 368 
Army 461 411 389 386 404 412 418 389 384 361 364 492 497 494 
RAAF 770 762 763 794 808 802 803 718 709 669 669 944 957 957 
Total 1,537  1,450 1,433 1,457 1,508 1,794 1,525 1,410  1,404 1,341 1,347 1,800 1,822 1,818 
APS 4,363 4,502 4,951 5,304 5,552 5,526 5,510 5,993 5,786 4,815 4,777 5,106 5,141 5,098 
APS 
backfill^ 
        359 428 432    
APS 
Total 
4,363 4,502 4,951 5,304 5,552 5,526 5,510 5,993 6,135 5,243 5,209 5,106 5,141 5,098 
Reserve 125 191 249 311 ? ? 82        
PSP 388 393 298 181 176 120 24 31 33 22 48 46 46 44 
Total* 6,288 6,345 6,682 6,942 7,236 7,735 7,141 7,434 7,181 6,606 6,604 6,952 7,009 6,960 
Source: DAR, 2012-13 PAES and 2013-14 PBS. *Total excludes reservist. ^APS replacements for absent military personnel 
2012-13 figures for DMO military are taken from 2012-13 PAES 
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The ‘Top Thirty’ projects 
The PBS lists the top 30 major capital investment projects by 2014–15 expenditure [PBS 
Table 84 page 149] and provides a description of each. We reproduce the top 30 projects in 
Table 2.8.9 below. The PBS also includes a listing of previously approved top 30 projects that 
is useful [Table 86, p. 162]. The estimated slippage in the gross program is 8%— fully 10 
percentage points less than last year. But last year’s figure was anomalously high as 
reflected in the need to inject an additional $500 million during the year. Presumably, the 
reduction reflects the pressures which emerged in the Capital Investment Program during 
2013-14. Note that the reliance on a relatively small number of large projects makes the 
outcome sensitive to how each of these large projects performs.  
Table 2.8.9: Top 30 Defence Major Capital Investment Projects (million $)  
Project Project Number 
Approved 
Project 
Expenditure 
Spend to 
30 June 
2014 
2014-15 
Budget 
Estimate 
Aerospace Systems     
Growler Airborne Electronic Attack Capability 
AIR 5349  
Phase 3 
3,037 335 797 
Maritime Patrol and Response Aircraft System 
AIR 7000 
Phase 2 
3,505 122 324 
Battlefield Airlift - Caribou Replacement 
AIR 8000  
Phase 2 
1,289 446 314 
Air to Air Refuelling Capability 
AIR 5402 
 
1,821 1,587 142 
Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft 
AIR 5077  
Phase 3 
3,873 3,513 64 
C-17 Globemaster III 
AIR 8000 
Phase 3 
1,697 1,364 57 
Lead-In Fighter Capability Assurance Program 
AIR 5438 
Phase 1A 
264 69 49 
Electronic Systems     
Battlefield Command Systems 
LAND 75 
Phase 4 
327 17 158 
Battlespace Communications System (Land) 
JP 2072  
Phase 3 
176 15 126 
Battlespace Communications System (Land) 
JP 2072  
Phase 2A 
460 274 73 
Anzac Electronic Support System Improvements 
SEA 1448 
Phase 4A 
269 33 58 
Battle Management System 
LAND 75  
Phase 3.4 
315 213 38 
Joint Command Support Environment 
JP 2030 
 Phase 8 
256 168 33 
C-130J Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures 
(LAIRCM) 
AIR 5416 
Phase 4B2 
203 26 31 
Replenish Nulka Warstock 
SEA 1397 
Phase 5A 
85 36 27 
High Frequency Modernisation 
JP 2043 
Phase 3A 
580 453 25 
Helicopter Systems     
Future Naval Aviation Combat System Helicopter  AIR 9000  3,237 902 505 
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Phase 8 
Multi Role Helicopter  
AIR 9000  
Phase 2 
3,785 2,430 286 
Medium Lift Helicopter 
AIR 9000 
Phase 5C 
617 249 166 
New Air Combat     
Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft 
AIR 6000 
Phase 2A/B 
2,940 446 238 
Bridging Air Combat Capability 
AIR 5349 
Phase 2 
288 145 32 
Air Warfare Destroyer      
Air Warfare Destroyer Build 
SEA 4000 
Phase 3 
7,848 5,192 616 
Land Systems     
Field Vehicles and Trailers - Overlander Program  
LAND 121 
Phase 3A/5A 
1,021 595 171 
Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles  
LAND 116 
Phase 3 
1,252 918 68 
Overlander - Medium Heavy Capability, Field 
Vehicles, Modules and Trailers  
LAND 121 
Phase 3B 
3,469 53 119 
Maritime Systems     
Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment 
JP 2048  
Phase 4A/B 
3,089 2,621 143 
Anzac Ship Anti-Ship Missile Defence 
SEA 1448 
Phase 2B 
678 468 77 
Amphibious Watercraft Replacement 
JP 2048 
Phase 3 
240 90 55 
Anzac Ship Anti-Ship Missile Defence 
SEA 1448 
Phase 2A 
387 300 28 
Future Submarine - Acquisition 
SEA 1000 
Phase 1A 
235 65 98 
TOTAL TOP 30 APPROVED PROJECTS  47,245 23,147 4,919 
Other Approved Project Estimate      621 
Total Program      5,540 
Management Margin  (8% slippage)    -432 
Net from existing projects    5,109 
Projects Planned for Government Approval    771 
Total Funds Available    5,879 
Source: 2014-15 PBS  
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Chapter 3 – Defence Funding 
This chapter deals with defence funding in four parts: (1) a brief survey of Australian defence 
funding from the mid-1980s through to 2009; (2) an analysis of defence funding from 2009 
until 2013; (3) an examination of the funding outlook in the 2014 defence budget; (4) a 
survey of the risks and challenges facing the government’s commitment to spend 2% of GDP 
on defence within the decade commencing 2013-14. 
For ease of reference, we’ll refer to the 2000, 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers as 
Defence 2000, Defence 2009 and Defence 2013 respectively. Readers interested in a more 
detailed historical survey should consult the obituary for Defence 2000 in Chapter 3 of the 
2009-10 ASPI Budget Brief. 
Defence funding from the 1980s to 2009 
The late 1980s and 1990s were lean years for Defence. Apart from fluctuations due to 
foreign exchange movements and operational supplementation, defence spending was kept 
more-or-less constant in real terms across the period. In fact, the Defence budget was higher 
in 1985-86 ($14.5 billion) than it was eleven years later in 1996-97 ($13.7 billion), as 
measured in real 2008-09 dollars.  
Because the cost of maintaining military capability exceeds inflation by 2–3%, the Defence 
budget came under growing pressure as the years went by. To try to close the gap between 
means and ends, successive governments pursued ‘efficiency’ programs of one sort or 
another through the 1990s (see Chapter 4 of the 2009-10 ASPI Budget Brief for further 
details).  
Nonetheless, by the end of the decade Defence was in a sad state: the permanent force had 
shrunk by more than 20,000 positions compared with the mid-1980s; a ‘train wreck’ of block 
obsolescence was looming with no money in sight for modernisation; the preparedness of 
the force was poor with many ‘fitted-for-but-not-with’ platforms and others badly in need of 
upgrade; and logistics was hollow and underfunded. It was against this background that the 
then government decided in 1999 to develop a White Paper with the aim of putting Defence 
planning and funding on a sustainable footing.  
The tumultuous events in East Timor in 1999 delayed the White Paper until the end of 2000. 
But it was perhaps a delay worth having. East Timor was the largest Australian operation 
since Vietnam and it stretched parts of the defence force severely. In the process, serious 
shortcomings in equipment, logistics and preparedness were exposed. It’s unlikely that the 
government would have been as generous in 2000 without the experience of the East Timor 
operation.  
The 2000 White Paper  
The only Defence White Paper produced by the Howard government, Defence 2000, sought 
to achieve a coherent package of strategy, capability and funding for Australia’s defence for 
the decade 2001-02 to 2010-11. On the capability side, a Defence Capability Plan (DCP) was 
published that detailed 165 separate phases of 88 capability proposals, valued at around $50 
billion, planned for the forthcoming decade.  
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The entire package, including new and pre-existing capability, was funded through a 
decade-long funding envelope that roughly equated to 3% average annual real growth. 
Although earlier White Papers had suggested near-term funding levels, never before had a 
decade-long funding commitment been made—let alone one with a talisman-like goal of ‘3% 
real growth’.  
Defence 2000 provided more than $30 billion spread across four categories, including: 
$21 billion for the purchase of major capital equipment; $3.2 billion to cover the through-life 
support costs of new capabilities planned to enter service as a result of the DCP; $5 billion to 
cover an expected annual 2% growth (above inflation) in personnel costs and $1 billion to 
augment the operating cost baseline in the Defence budget. In addition, Defence was 
allowed to retain within its annual funding base around $450 million of unspent operational 
supplementation from East Timor.  
The 3% funding commitment was extended out to 2017-18 in the 2006 and 2008 budgets. 
Before turning to these and other funding measures from the last decade, it’s worth pausing 
to look back at Defence 2000 and ask how far Defence has got in delivering the goals set for 
it. 
At the risk of oversimplification, Defence 2000 sought to achieve four things: (1) modernise 
the ADF by replacing or upgrading ageing assets and introducing new capabilities in select 
areas; (2) improve the preparedness of the ADF so that it was made up of ‘fully developed 
capability’ rather than hollow units and fitted-for-but-not-with platforms; (3) boost the 
capability of the ADF to undertake expeditionary operations in the immediate region; and (4) 
sustainably align Defence plans and funding.  
Of the four goals, the modernisation of the ADF was the least successful. Persistent and 
widespread delays in the approval and execution of defence acquisitions delayed the 
delivery of many capabilities, with delays of 4-5 years not uncommon. In part, this reflected 
a systematic underestimation of costs that ensured there was never going to be enough 
money to deliver all that was planned. Further delays arose due to insufficient industry 
capacity, tardy approval of new acquisitions and all too frequent technical problems with 
equipment under development. In fact, the combination of delayed approvals and delayed 
projects saw Defence unable to spend all the money it had been given to buy new 
equipment. Over the period covered by Defence 2000, we estimate at least $4.4 billion of 
planned investment was deferred. The actual figures are probably higher but we can’t be 
sure because the full extent of the deferrals wasn’t disclosed in the 2009-10 Budget.  
One area where Defence can claim success is in improving the preparedness of the defence 
force. While problems remain in some areas such as the submarine and amphibious forces, 
the trend over the past decade has been favourable. The ADF is now more ready and able to 
mount and sustain deployments—as evidenced by its current high operational tempo. 
Moreover, the capacity of the ADF to conduct expeditionary operations in our immediate 
region is better now than at any time since the Vietnam conflict. Or at least it will be once 
the Navy’s amphibious lift capacity is fixed. The unexpected collapse of the amphibious fleet 
in 2011 showed that the management and internal reporting of preparedness remained 
poor at least until that point. Of course, we don’t know what we don’t know; there may be 
problems lurking in areas that haven’t been tested of late.  
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As for putting Defence finances on a sustainable footing, it wasn’t long before Defence was 
struggling to deliver the outcomes sought by Defence 2000 within the funding provided. In 
2003, an internal Defence Capability Review recommended cuts to the force structure to 
contain costs, including the decommissioning of two FFG frigates, the early retirement of the 
F-111 fleet and the laying up of two mine-hunting vessels. But these cuts failed to bring the 
books into balance and from 2005 onwards additional funds (amounting ultimately to 
around a $1 billion a year) were made available to Defence to manage the baseline cost of 
personnel, estate and logistics. At the same time, savings measures of $200 million a year 
were imposed on Defence to redirect money towards combat capability.  
Boom times: 2002-2008 
Bridging the gap between the means and ends of Defence 2000 was only the start of the 
government’s generosity to Defence. From around 2006, the previous government provided 
additional money for a range of new capability initiatives, including four C-17 transport 
aircraft ($3.2 billion), 24 F/A-18F Super Hornet strike fighters ($6 billion), and the Enhanced 
Land Force initiative, which included adding two infantry battalions to the Army at a cost of 
$10 billion over a decade. This additional funding came on top of that provided for new and 
expanded capabilities in the aftermath of 9/11 and the deployments that followed.   
Because official budget figures are invariably given in ‘out-turn’ format that anticipates 
future inflation and foreign exchange rates, it’s difficult to give a definitive figure for the 
value of additional funds provided post-2000. The best we can do is to capture the scale of 
funding using the historical values that appeared in the budget papers at the time, 
converted to 2010-11 dollars. The result appears in Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1: Additional funding 2000 to 2008 
 Source: ASPI analysis of budget papers and DAR, CPI inflation used 
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Despite all the money flowing into Defence, it remained unclear whether adequate funds 
were available pre-Defence 2009 to deliver the capabilities sought at that time. On one 
hand, it looked like not enough money had been set aside to crew and operate the raft of 
new capabilities under development—hence the $10 billion savings program announced in 
early 2008. On the other hand, Defence was unable to spend the money it had for both 
investment and recurrent spending. So much so, that it was directed to absorb $1.1 billion of 
measures in 2008-09 following an abnormally large windfall from price supplementation 
(and the embarrassing hand back of $830 million of unspent funds from 2007-08). This was 
the confusing state of Defence funding prior to the release of Defence 2009.  
From Defence 2009 to Defence 2013 
On 3 May 2009, the Prime Minister released the long-awaited 2009 Defence White Paper. 
Entitled Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 the 138-page document 
included one and half pages—585 words to be precise—on how the government planned to 
fund Defence over the next 21 years. The plan had two parts.  
First, a funding model with the following elements: 
• 3 per cent real growth in the Defence budget to 2017-18 
• 2.2 per cent real growth in the Defence budget from 2018-19 to 2030 
• 2.5 per cent fixed indexation to the Defence budget from 2009-10 to 2030 
• that Defence will reinvest savings from its [$20 billion decade-long] Strategic Reform 
Program back into priority Defence capabilities as agreed by the Government 
• shortfalls against the White Paper funding plan will be offset by Defence.  
Second, ‘Defence [will] undertake a substantial program of reform, efficiencies and savings 
to underpin the achievement of White Paper objectives... [and] correct long-term 
hollowness and remediate the enabling functions of the Australian Defence Force’. This is, of 
course, the aforementioned $20 billion Strategic Reform Program. 
Further detail was provided eight days later in the 2009-10 Budget. And, while the wording 
of the funding commitment in Defence 2009 was retained, the government stopped short of 
handing over the money. Instead, a substantial wedge of promised funding was deferred 
into the future. As best we can work out (the 2009-10 budget was less clear than it could’ve 
been) the net result was an $8.8 billion reduction in funding across the forthcoming decade. 
In addition, Defence was directed to ‘absorb’ additional new budget measures amounting to 
$585 million over four years and $1.7 billion over the decade in the 2009-10 Budget.  
The initial deferral of funds in 2009 was only the start of the steady erosion of the money 
available to Defence to deliver Force 2030. Table 3.1 collects together the key measures. 
Each of the categories has a different impact on the availability of funds.  
The $10.6 billion of deferrals didn’t necessarily represent lost money, but rather money that 
was shifted (reprogrammed) to mostly unknown points in time in the second half of the 
2010s or beyond.  
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Table 3.1: Key budget actions impacting the Defence budget 2009-2012 
Year Initiative Cost 
Deferrals   
2009 Budget Deferral of funding to beyond 2015-16 $8,810 million 
2010 Budget Deferral of investment funding to beyond 2015-16 $521 million 
2011 Budget Deferral of investment funding to beyond 2014-15 $1,281 million 
 Total $10,612 million 
Savings   
2011 Budget Increased efficiencies and savings (over 10 years) $3,837 million 
2011 mid-year Efficiency dividend (over 10 years) $670 million 
2012 Budget Expenditure reduction measures (over 10 years) $5,455 million 
 Total $9,962 million 
Absorbed costs   
2009 Budget Costs absorbed 2009-10 to 2018-19  $1,680 million 
2010 Budget Cost of force protection ($912 m) – Cost of existing projects ($402 m)*  $510 million 
2012 Budget Cost of Moorebank-Holsworthy relocation $332 million 
 Total $2,522 million 
Hand backs   
2009-10** $131 million unspecified   $131 million 
2010-11 $1.1 billion in capital investment $1,100 million 
2010-11 $400 million in recurrent expenses $400 million 
 Total $1,631 million 
Source: DAR and PBS. *Senate question on notice #140, September 2010. **SLC Hansard 30 May 2011. 
The $10 billion dollars of savings represented cuts to defence funding for which there was 
no suggestion of the money ever being returned at some point in the future. Around 
$4.5 billion of the savings were supposedly the result of efficiencies, the remainder were 
outright cuts. Defence has no one to blame but itself for most of the former, having handed 
back money in 2010-11 and advised the government of additional savings available from 
shared services reform (an area that subsequently had to be supplemented with additional 
funds in the 2012-13 budget). 
Absorbed costs are an additional impost put on Defence to deliver something extra without 
additional funding. The figure we’ve used is actually only a subset of the measures that have 
technically been absorbed for reasons explained in Chapter 3 of last year’s Brief. Similarly, 
the hand back of money in 2010-11 is complicated by the inter-year shift we also explained 
last year. 
In summary, over the life of the 2009 Defence White paper (May 2009 to April 2013) 
Defence handed back $1.6 billion, of which $780 million it was unable to spend. $10.6 billion 
of planned investment was deferred and $10 billion of promised funding was returned to 
Treasury, including from areas that were supposed to be delivering efficiencies but which 
subsequently encountered cost pressures that were exacerbated by the need to absorb $2.5 
billion worth of unfunded measures.  
Setting aside the hand backs, Defence’s financial bottom line was impacted by two 
categories of government decision; deferrals and savings cuts. The aggregate effect of these 
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measures is plotted in Figure 3.2 atop the underlying cash balance for the Commonwealth as 
estimated at the time of the 2012-13 Budget. Note that if Defence spending had been held 
at the levels promised in Defence 2009, in May 2012 the Commonwealth would have been 
projected to remain in deficit for two additional years until 2014-15. 
Figure 3.2: Reduced Defence funding and the underlying cash balance 
 
Source: DAR, PBS and the 2012-13 Budget Overview. 
The clear correlation between reduced defence expenditure and the return to surplus isn’t a 
surprise. Back in 2007-08, the ASPI Budget Brief (p. 135) included a precautionary risk 
analysis of factors that could impede the progress of Defence 2000, including the risk posed 
by a recession. The conclusion at that time, based upon the experience of the recessions in 
the early 1980s and 1990s, was that the threat to defence funding occurred not at the outset 
of an economic downturn, but around the time when the government was striving to return 
to surplus. Events between 2009 and 2012 confirmed that analysis.  
Figure 3.3 is our best attempt to isolate the underlying real trends in personnel costs, capital 
investment and operating costs at the time of the 2012-13 budget, resulting from the cuts 
and deferrals in the preceding three years. (Supplementation for deployments has been 
accounted for via a methodology explained in Chapter 3 of last year’s budget brief.) As is 
apparent, and as might be expected, capital investment bore the brunt of the cuts.  
It’s a matter of opinion whether the potential political gains of delivering a surplus in 2012-
13 justified the cuts to defence funding. As it happened, the effort was for naught and the 
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Commonwealth fell into deficit by $19.5 billion that year due to a collapse in revenues 
resulting from deterioration in the terms of trade.  
Figure 3.3: Underlying trends in defence costs circa May 2012 
Source: ASPI analysis of 2012-13 PBS and earlier Annual Reports. 
On 3 May 2013, the Prime Minister and Defence Minister released the 2013 Defence White 
Paper—four years to the day after its predecessor and one year earlier than planned. 
Entitled simply Defence White Paper 2013, the 132-page document includes one and a half 
pages—675 words to be precise—on how the government plans to fund Defence. Although 
it devoted 90 more words to the topic than its predecessor, it actually managed to say 
somewhat less. Key points include: 
• The government ‘remains committed to maintaining an ADF workforce of 
approximately 59,000 permanent members’. 
 
• In addition to the annually updated four-year Forward Estimates funding model 
there’ll also be a ‘subsequent six-year general guidance [i.e. a single aggregate 
figure] for Defence planning purposes’. The 2013-14 PBS gave that figure as $220 
billion.  
 
• The ‘Government is committed to increasing Defence funding towards a target of 2 
per cent of GDP. This is a long-term objective that will be implemented in an 
economically responsible manner as and when fiscal circumstances allow’. 
More importantly, by May 2013 the prospects of achieving a surplus were long gone and the 
way was open for the government to alleviate Defence’s budget dilemma by providing 
additional funding. And it did. As best we could estimate using the fragmentary information 
available in May 2013, around $3 billion was brought forward from the then fourth year of 
the Forward Estimates and the years beyond, and around $10.7 billion of funding was cut 
from those same years. So while short-term pressures were partially addressed, the longer-
term picture was made even less favourable. (Note that the estimate of $10.7 billion being 
removed is based on the inadvertent disclosure of long-term funding in the 2010 
Intergenerational Report.) 
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Critically, the $10.7 billion taken away in 2013 was in addition to the roughly $10 billion 
taken away (as opposed to deferred) in 2011 and 2012. Moreover, it doesn’t capture any 
funds deferred to beyond 2022 or the erosion of buying power due to absorbed costs. All up, 
this puts a lower limit of around $21 billion for the accumulated shortfall relative to 2009 
promises. 
An alternative estimate of the shortfall can be found by comparing explicit Defence 2013 
funding with the growth promises made in Defence 2009. In Figure 3.4, post-Defence 2013 
funding is explicitly compared with the Defence 2009 promise of 3% real growth to 2017-18 
and 2.2% subsequently. To avoid overestimating the difference between current and past 
plans, 3% real growth has been projected relative to the underlying defence spending in 
2008-09, exclusive of operational costs. That’s notwithstanding that Defence absorbed just 
over a billion dollars of operational costs in that year, which would make it reasonable to use 
the full figure. A much larger difference would have resulted from using the figure inclusive 
of the cost of operations, or even more so by commencing the projection from 2009-10 
when spending was significantly higher.  
Even with these conservative steps taken, the difference in funding between the promises of 
2009 and those of 2013 come out to be $32.9 billion as measured in real 2013-14 dollars for 
the period 2009-10 to 2022-23.  
Figure 3.4: Defence 2013 funding compared with the promises of Defence 2009 
 
Source: Annual reports and various PBS and PAES (2012 = 2012-13 etc.) 
 
The difference between the number derived from reconstructing Defence’s year-by-year 
funding guidance ($21 billion) and the figure from explicitly applying the 3%/2.2% real 
growth promise ($33 billion) is easily understood. From the very start, Defence wasn’t given 
a future-funding envelope consistent with what was said in Defence 2009. In effect, the 
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commitment to 3%/2.2% real growth was taken to mean (within the corridors of 
government) that Defence’s pre-existing funding envelope out to 2017-18 would be 
maintained. And while that funding envelope may have originally been based on 3%/2.2% 
real growth, by the time 2009 came around the funding envelope had been reshaped by 
reprogramming adjustments, foreign exchange movements, and additional funded initiatives 
such as the Super Hornet purchase. As an aside, this explains why it was necessary to 
smooth out the future-funding envelope in this year’s budget to remove impractical chunks 
of funding that had accumulated in the 2017-18 FY as a result of reprogramming that 
occurred all the way back in the 2000s.  
Regrettably, the difference between the funding that was promised in plain English in 
Defence 2009 and what was actually made available to Defence was never explained—hardly 
surprising given that there was around $10 billion less available than was ostensibly 
committed to.  
Confused yet? To be honest it’s taken me a while to work out what’s been going on. Of 
course, all of this could be avoided if the government simply published its explicit ten-year 
defence-funding envelope each year with the budget.  
Perhaps the best way to describe the funding situation immediately after Defence 2013 was 
that for the period 2009-10 to 2022-23 funding was $33 billion less than promised in Defence 
2009 and $21 billion less than Defence was planning on—not counting the substantial 
reduction in spending capacity due to absorbed measures. In a media release (16 May 2014), 
the current Defence Minister confirmed funding shortfalls commensurate in scale with the 
foregoing discussion.  
When looking at the shortfall in funding—be it $20 or $30 billion—it’s important to 
remember that the capability goals of Defence 2009 largely survived through into the 2013 
document. With capability targets static and funding at least $2 billion a year less, the result 
was a yawning gap between means and ends.  
It was hardly surprising therefore, that budget pressures emerged early. And in one of its last 
acts prior to the 2013 election, the outgoing Gillard government was forced to bring forward 
$750 billion from 2016-17 into the period 2013-14 to 2015-16 to address near-term funding 
shortfalls (see 2013-14 PAES).   
Defence funding and the 2014-15 budget  
Near-term budget pressures continued to emerge during 2013-14 and the incoming Abbott 
government used the Supplementary Estimates process in early 2014 to bring forward an 
additional $1.5 billion into the period 2013-14 to 2015-16. The funds came from $2 billion 
removed from 2017-18, with the remaining $520 million pushed back into 2019-20 and 
2020-21. In doing so, immediate funding pressures were alleviated—especially in the capital 
investment program—and an impractical hump in funding for 2017-18 was removed. The 
shifting of funding into the 2020s is entirely notional, if the government wants to hit its 2% 
of GDP target in 2023-24 a lot more money is going to be needed around that time than is 
presently programed with or without the deferred funds. 
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Deterioration in the value of the Australian dollar from its highs in 2011 and 2012 led to still 
further funding being provided in the near-term and beyond. The cumulative impact of the 
various funding shifts and forex adjustments is summarised in Table 3.2 below. The only 
other major shifts over the period were $191 million of operational supplementation and 
$192 million to reinstate the ADF Gap-Year program in the 2014-15 budget.  
Table 3.2: Key funding changes 2013-14 
 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 
Forex adjustment (2013-14 PAES) 381.7 428.3 480.8 528.3 
Funding brought forward (2013-14 PAES) 359.4 304.0 -89 -1,000.4 
Forex adjustment (2014-15 PBS) 91.1 223.9 125.7 117.4 
Funding brough forward (2014-15 PBS) 300.0 300.0 550.0 150.0 
Total 1,132.2 1,256.2 1,067.5 -204.7 
Source: 2013-14 PAES, 2014-15 PBS 
Although news that defence spending will reach 1.8% of GDP in 2014-15 elicited favourable 
commentary in the media, care is needed in intepreting the result. Table 3.3 lists the various 
factors contributing to the GDP share for 2014-15, building on the anticipated figure of 
1.66% estimated last May. Due to the peculiaries of accrual budgeting, the dollar figures 
don’t precisely reconcile.  
Table 3.3: Less than meets the eye—contributions to 1.8% of GDP 
Contribution Funds Percent of GDP 
Planned funding May 2013 27,874 1.66% 
Government initiatives (Gillard/Rudd) 295 0.02% 
Government initiatives (Abbott) 376 0.02% 
Operational supplementation 191 0.01% 
Foreign exchange adjustments 652 0.04% 
Slower than anticipated nominal GDP growth  0.05% 
Total 29,388  
Planned funding May 2014 29,320 1.80% 
Source: 2013-14 PAES, 2014-15 PBS, 2013-14 and 2040-15 Budget Overviews 
Note that the largest contributors to the increase in GDP share were external factors that 
will add absolutely nothing to the purchasing power of the defence budget; slow nominal 
GDP growth (0.05%) and foreign exchange (0.04%). Setting aside operational 
supplementation, which is automatic, the remaining contribution of 0.04% is shared jointly 
by the previous and current governments. If nothing else, this exercise demonstrates that if 
GDP share becomes the determinant of Australia’s defence spending, the ADF will carry the 
risk of fluctuations in both foreign exchange and nominal GDP growth.  
With a White Paper in preparation and the fiscal situation in flux, it’s perhaps not surprising 
that the government has chosen not to disclose its plans for defence funding beyond the 
Forward Estimates. But if we assume, not unreasonably, that defence spending will rise 
steadily beyond the last year of the Forward Estimates (2017-18) to reach 2% of GDP in 
2023-24, we can project defence funding a decade out. This is done in Figure 3.5 where we 
have assumed that GDP grows at the annual rates assumed in the National Commission of 
Audit’s 2014 calculations beyond 2017-18. Note the six-year period of 5.3% annual real 
growth commencing 2017-18 needed to reach the target. In theory, it is possible to delay the 
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increase until later in the decade but only by creating an unrealistic ‘ski jump’ in defence 
funding in the final few years of the decade.  
Figure 3.5: Defence funding projected to 2023-24  
Source: DAR, 2013-14 PAES, 2014-15 PBS 
Also noteworthy is the plateau in defence spending that’s been created from 2014-15 to 
2016-17 by bringing money forward from latter years. Of course, it’s entirely open to the 
government to commence growth towards its 2% of GDP target earlier; the earlier growth 
begins the less rapidly it has to occur. But as we’ll see later, the broader fiscal situation is 
likely to shape defence spending, especially in the medium term. 
The prospects of achieving 2% of GDP by 2013-14 
This section examines the risks and challenges to the government’s promise of spending 2% 
of GDP on defence by 2023-24 from both the supply (the government) and demand 
(Defence) sides.   
The most pressing risk to defence funding over the next few years comes from the 
government’s commitment to return the federal budget to surplus. The relatively generous 
near-term treatment of defence funding in the last two budgets (don’t forget the previous 
government provided around $3 billion extra in near-term funding last year) owes much to 
the deficit being so large as to preclude a near-term return to surplus. Had a surplus been 
within reach, the story would likely have been very different. Past experience with the 
recessions of the early 80s and 90s confirms that Defence can’t count on being spared when 
the time comes. If any proof is needed, the cuts in anticipation of ‘the surplus that never 
was’ in 2012-13 should settle the matter (see Figure 3.3). 
In fairness, it should be recognised that the current government showed an uncommon 
degree of resolve in the 2014 Budget by boosting near-term defence spending at the same 
time as imposing unpopular spending cuts and tax increases on other sectors. Perhaps it’ll 
have the resolve to maintain its commitment to defence spending concurrent with the steps 
necessary to deliver a surplus. I suspect that it’ll be a question of timing. Delaying a surplus 
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by one year to preserve defence spending might be possible in the first year of a 
government’s term, but it’s unlikely to happen in the third year with an election in the 
offing.  
On current fiscal projections, the federal balance will be close to surplus around 2017-18 or 
2018-19. On the standard electoral cycle, that corresponds to the first or second year of the 
next term of government and the start of the projected ramp-up to 2% of GDP. There’s little 
point going into the myriad permutations of economic and electoral possibilities. Suffice to 
say that even though the government has so far demonstrated a strong commitment to 
defence, it has also shown a willingness to break promises (or more politely, to reframe 
commitment) in pursuit of so-called ‘budget repair’. Thus, we have no assurance that 
medium-term defence funding will be immune from cuts if that’s what it takes to get into 
surplus. Nor is that necessarily undesirable, if the gains from a (somewhat) speedier return 
to surplus outweigh the losses from a (somewhat) slower increase in defence spending.  
On the demand side, it’s useful to separately examine defence spending in the short to 
medium term (1 to 3 years) and the long term (4 to 10 years). In the short to medium term, 
the planned rapid growth in capital investment over the next two years introduces the risk 
that money will be handed back—especially given the planned rapid surge in capital 
investment over the next several years. However, and as explained in Chapter 8, the 
presence of several large off-the-shelf purchases gives cause for a degree of optimism. 
Anyway, the risk of money being handed back isn’t a good reason to scale back plans at this 
stage. Given the disruption and delay to the investment program in recent years (see Figure 
3.3) it’s more than worth the risk to regain the momentum towards re-equipping the ADF.  
In the longer term, the question is whether Defence (and defence industry) can absorb the 
six years of budget growth necessary to achieve 2% of GDP by 2023-24. In terms of raw 
spending, there’s no reason why they couldn’t. As Figure 3.5 shows, we have 3-4 years to 
plan and prepare for a ramp-up requiring 5.3% real growth each year. It would be learned 
helplessness in the extreme to throw up our hands and say we can’t manage a boost in 
defence spending from 1.75% of GDP in 2017-18 to 2% of GDP in 2023-24. After all, we 
managed to mobilise, fight and win WWII in a shorter period of time.  
Looking beyond the question of raw spending, things get more interesting. Figure 3.6 shows 
the budgeted (2014-15 to 2017-18) and projected (2018-19 to 2023-14) shares of the 
defence budget going to personnel, capital investment and operating costs. For the period 
beyond 2017-18, personnel and operating costs have been projected out as explained 
below, while capital investment is estimated as the simple residual (= budget – personnel 
costs –operating costs). This makes sense because personnel and operating costs are 
effectively a consequence of the size and shape of the ADF, whereas the level of capital 
investment is discretionary on a year-to-year basis. 
Consistent with established per-capita trends in personnel expenses (see Chapter 2 of this 
Brief) and given that current plans have the ADF reaching its 59,600 end state in 2017-18, 
personnel costs have been assumed to grow at 2.4% p.a. real beyond the Forward Estimates. 
Similarly, operating costs are assumed to grow at 3.0% p.a. real over the same period 
consistent with budgeted growth over the Forward Estimates. 
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Figure 3.6: Budgeted, estimated and projected costs 2014-15 to 2023-24
Source: 2014-15 PBS and ASPI analysis 
The resulting rapid growth in capital investment is extraordinary. If achieved, it would mean 
that capital investment over the next decade would amount to $112 billion compared with a 
mere $66 billion over the preceding decade measured in 2014-15 dollars. What about the 
years beyond 2023-24? Presumably the government doesn’t plan to increase defence 
spending to 2% of GDP and then let it fall? Figure 3.7 plots the historical and projected share 
of the defence budget out to 2033-34 assuming that the labour component of the ADF 
remains static post 2017-18. 
Figure 3.7: A mountain of equipment 
Source: DAR, 2013-14 PAES, 2014-15 PBS and ASPI analysis 
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Beyond 2023-24, the capital component of the budget goes into slow decline as growth in 
personnel and operating costs outpaces GDP growth. Nevertheless, the subsequent decade 
would see an eye watering further $183 billion in 2014-15 dollars go to capital investment 
(assuming long-term real GDP growth of 2.5%). Given that we’ve managed to recapitalise a 
good share of the ADF during the fifteen years immediately past, it’s pretty clear that such 
high levels of capital investment are unnecessary for a defence force of the size presently 
planned.  
One way to make sense of the situation outlined above would be if there was a plan to 
expand the size of the defence force. By doing so, personnel and operating costs would rise 
and less money would be left for capital investment. In theory at least, there exists a larger 
ADF for which 2% of GDP in 2023-24 and beyond would bring personnel, operating and 
investment spending into something like a sustainable balance. (In practice, there’ll never be 
a ‘steady state’ apportionment of capital, personnel and operating costs because they each 
have slightly different intrinsic growth rates). 
However, to date, the government hasn’t discussed any plans for expanding the size of the 
force. To the contrary, it has been hedging previous promises—most especially regarding 12 
submarines—and more generally expressing concern about the parlous state of the DCP. At 
least in its public disclosures, the government has been worrying about Defence having too 
little money rather than too much. It may be that the government is not yet aware of the full 
consequences of its 2% promise—it’s only early days in the white paper process. 
The situation shouldn’t come as a surprise. The promise of raising defence spending to 2% of 
GDP within ten years wasn’t the result of detailed financial analysis. Rather, it was an 
artefact of our decimal counting system (hence the decade) and the unofficial NATO 
benchmark of 2% of GDP. A benchmark that is much more often honoured in the breach 
than in observance—in 2013 only three of 25 European NATO countries reached that level. 
More importantly, the promise of 2% in a decade was a signal to the electorate, and to 
Australia’s allies, of the soon to be government’s commitment to Australia’s defence. 
It would have been an extraordinary coincidence if spending 2% of GDP in 2023-24 and 
beyond was consistent with an ADF of the size and shape currently planned. It was always 
overwhelmingly likely there would be either too little or too much money.  
We do not know how Defence assesses the situation. The publicly released version of the 
Incoming Government Brief redacted every single word of their advice on the matter. 
Perhaps it doesn’t believe it’s going to happen, but it’s happy to get what it can in the 
meantime. As noted in Chapter 2, Defence already quietly increased the target size of the 
ADF from 59,000 to 59,600 in the transition from the Gillard to Abbott government.  
So how much larger would the ADF need to be in order to re-establish a credible balance 
between capital, personnel and operating costs in 2023-24? If capital investment as a share 
of the budget was limited to its 16-year average (2002-03 to 2017-18) of 26.3%, and the 
ratio of operating costs to personnel costs is assumed to remain at its 2023-24 level (0.98), 
and if all of the additional personnel are uniformed, the ADF would have a strength of 
75,200 personnel, fully 15,600 higher than today. Alternatively, if we assume that the ADF is 
becoming more capital intensive and the investment share rises to 30%, the size of the ADF 
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would need to be 70,700 in 2023-24 or 11,100 more than presently planned. Given trends in 
equipment costs and the several looming mega projects on the horizon (submarines and 
frigates), the latter is probably a better estimate. 
No doubt the situation will become obvious in the development of the 2015 Defence White 
Paper. When it does, we should expect to see two things. First, the size of the force will 
grow. An extra battalion or two to crew the new LHD amphibious vessels would help bring 
things into balance, as would a squadron of jump jet variants of the F-35 to reinstate the 
fleet air arm aboard the LHD. Such possibilities aren’t to be discounted. Back in 2008 Andrew 
Davies and I modelled the sorts of defence forces we could have if we spent around 2% of 
GDP in the 2020s (see the ASPI paper Strategic Choices: Defending Australia in the 21st 
Century) and we were surprised by just how much capability could be afforded. 
Second, with so much money available, we should expect to see proposals of diminishing 
marginal worth brought forward (see preceding paragraph for examples). Even if 
prioritisation is done properly, every new initiative enabled by extra funding will be of less 
value than existing ones. But 2% of GDP will enable some especially marginal propositions to 
be seriously considered. The most recent candidate is the proposal to retire the Anzac class 
frigates early so as to allow the AWD programme to roll on into building their replacements.  
By so greatly loosening the fiscal disciplines on Defence, the challenge for the government 
will be to contain the potential for far-reaching waste. 
So what’s the bottom line? I’ll resist the temptation to reiterate, yet again, the argument for 
why the GDP share is a poor basis for deciding upon defence spending. I’m tired of making 
the argument and I expect others are tired of hearing it. Instead, let me observe that we’re 
firmly into the ‘tail wagging the dog territory’ wherein an arbitrary number is set to unleash 
a previously unplanned expansion of the ADF at enormous cost and absent a consideration 
of what it will add to Australia’s security beyond sending a message to allies and friends.  
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Chapter 4 –Defence Reform  
The new government brought with it a renewed focus 
on defence reform. With the dust only just settled on 
the 2009 Strategic Reform Program (SRP), it must seem 
a bit like groundhog day at Defence. But until the 
government and public have confidence that Defence is 
efficient, the cycle of reviews, reports and reform will 
continue.   
Central to the emerging reform agenda is the 
government’s commitment to an independent ‘first 
principles’ review of how Defence is structured and 
operates. At the same time, the National Commission of 
Audit has made substantial recommendations in a 
number of areas.  
This chapter sets the scene for what’s likely to come. There are five sections. The first 
surveys defence reform over the past 35 years. The second summarises the SRP. The third 
explores post-SRP reform in Defence. The fourth examines the National Commission of 
Audit. The fifth opines on the challenges and opportunities for the future. 
Much of the material in this chapter is taken from (1) a presentation by the author to an 
Atlantic Council workshop on comparative defence reform held in Ottawa in June 2013 and 
(2) the ASPI submission to the National Commission of Audit from November 2013. Both 
documents can be accessed in full at the ASPI website. For even more detail, see previous 
editions of the Budget Brief and Ergas (Agenda, Volume 19, #1, 2012) and Ergas and 
Thomson (Agenda, Volume 18, #3, 2011).  
Consistent with the financial focus of the Budget Brief, the emphasis in what follows is on 
efficiency rather than on behavioural or cultural reforms. 
Background 
The Australian Department of Defence was created in 1976 by the amalgamation of the 
previously separate three services and civilian department. As with similar consolidations in 
the United States and United Kingdom, the goal was to achieve greater inter-service 
cooperation and, to an extent, impose closer civilian oversight. The resulting organisation 
was largely a federated structure with central execution of policy development, financial 
management, force structure planning, science and technology, and capital acquisition. 
Then, as now, a diarchy of the Secretary and Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) lead Defence 
with separate and overlapping responsibilities.  
In the late 1980s, Defence commenced a long-term program of systematically market testing 
non-core functions. Under the auspices of the Commercial Support Program (see Figure 4.1) 
civilian and military activities were compared with private sector alternatives. By the end of 
the turn of the century around 16,000 positions had been market-tested with around 66% of 
activities examined transferred to the private sector. Activities included printing, repair and 
maintenance of equipment and facilities, medical services, technical training, corporate 
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services, catering and information technology. Around the same time, the government 
divested itself of its shipyards, munitions plants and aircraft factories. By 2000 the civilian 
workforce had fallen from 40,000 to 16,300 positions and the military 70,000 to 50,300. 
These reductions were largely the result of outsourcing of non-core activities previously 
performed by uniformed personnel and privatisation, notwithstanding that several thousand 
military positions were also lost as a result of the 1991 Force Structure Review.  
Figure 4.1 Defence reform: 1985 to 2014 
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• geographically consolidated some activities and disposed of the resulting surplus 
property  
• accelerated the outsourcing of activities, including many that had been recently 
consolidated.  
The promised savings from the DRP were around $1 billion from a then budget of $10 billion. 
Although the DRP fundamentally restructured the organisation by embracing a shared 
services model, the long-term financial impact of the changes is difficult to discern. Most of 
the savings were used to ‘buy-back’ 7,000 military positions. But because there were no 
additional ships, planes or battalions raised as a consequence, the ‘buy-back’ was as much a 
‘roll-back’ of reform.  
In 1999, the Australian-led mission to East Timor heralded a decade of high operational 
tempo and rising defence funding. With money flowing and attention focused on 
operational matters, efficiency reforms were put on the back burner and the shared services 
model eroded by the migration (and in some cases the duplication) of many activities back 
into the individual services.  
In one area, however, reform continued during the 2000s. Beginning in 2000, materiel 
sustainment and acquisitions were consolidated by the creation of the Defence Materiel 
Organisation. There followed a series of reforms to capability planning and acquisition 
precipitated by several embarrassing multi-billion dollar acquisition debacles. Key 
developments included:  
• re-establishment of DMO as a quasi-independent ‘prescribed agency’ with 
separate financial accounts from Defence  
• the introduction of a two-pass process of project approval that saw the National 
Security Committee of Cabinet directly involved in the approval of large defence 
acquisitions  
• revamped project governance and professionalisation of the DMO workforce.  
The merits of the reformed DMO are difficult to judge given the extended duration of major 
defence projects, but preliminary data shows some improvement in the delivery of projects 
on schedule and within budget. On the other side of the ledger, it now takes much longer to 
conceive and approve projects, and alignment between strategic policy and capability 
development remains elusive. 
Towards the end of the last decade, there emerged two (almost contradictory) propositions 
about Defence funding. First, there wasn’t enough money in projected Defence funding to 
afford all that was planned in terms of new equipment and attendant personnel and 
operating costs. Second, Defence wasn’t as efficient as it could be, having grown less than 
optimally efficient after close to a decade of escalating funding. Faced with this situation, in 
early 2008 the then government directed Defence to find $10 billion of savings over the next 
decade. 
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Then in May 2008, the government appointed George Pappas to audit the Defence budget. 
His report was delivered to the Minister in April 2009. The Budget Audit identified 
prospective savings of $1.3 billion to $1.8 billion a year based on 2007-08 spending, plus 
one-off savings of between $218 million and $398 million. On an out-turned basis (taking 
anticipated inflation into account), the prospective recurrent savings over the decade 
commencing 2009-10 were between $15 billion and $20.7 billion.   
To the work of the Budget Audit were added: (1) the initial work done by Defence to save 
$10 billion; (2) the results of the 2008 Defence Procurement and Sustainment Review; and 
(3) the results of a series of internal ‘companion reviews’ conducted in parallel to the 
development of the 2009 Defence White Paper. The result was the SRP; a package of 
reforms and efficiency initiatives to improve Defence’s performance and deliver $20.6 billion 
of savings over the following decade.  
The Strategic Reform Program 
There were three key elements to the SRP; improved accountability, improved planning, and 
enhanced productivity. Planned reforms to accountability and planning were examined in 
detail in the 2009-10 Budget Brief.  
Reporting against the $20 billion savings program central to the SRP was abandoned only 
three years into its planned 10-year life. Although it wasn’t said directly, it’s likely the savings 
program became unviable because of deep cuts to Defence funding in the 2012-13 budget 
coupled with mounting budget pressures in areas that had supposedly been delivering 
savings.  
This is no great loss. As previous editions of the Budget Brief showed in detail, the much 
lauded $20 billion savings program was implausible and exaggerated, with savings reported 
against inflated hypothetical business-as-usual baselines. In reality, there was no transferring 
of savings from one part of Defence to another. The notional savings were built into group 
budgets back in 2009. Key aspects of the SRP savings are recounted below. To be clear; 
savings are being achieved and real worthwhile reform is underway, but not on the dollar 
scale claimed.  
Where were the savings supposed to come from? 
Table 4.1 summarises the results of our analysis of the initial SRP savings targets as they 
were announced in 2009-10. Savings were only counted as having been as explained if a 
moderately complete explanation had been published. In some cases, the explanations 
offered were either implausible or inconsistent.  
Defence reporting of annual targets and achieved savings appears in Table 4.2. As explained 
in the 2010-11 and 2011-12 editions of the Budget Brief, the quanta of savings reported 
shouldn’t be accepted at face value. For example, the 2011-12 Defence Annual Report says 
the reported savings were exclusive of $323 million in expenses ‘outside the control of SRP 
management’, which seems to imply that Defence was claiming savings while nonetheless 
spending beyond planned levels. As before, the question of counterfactual baselines clouds 
the issue of how large savings actually were. As a rule, savings initiatives were reported 
against SRP baselines without reference to subsequent movements in expenditure.  
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Table 4.1: What was known and unknown about SRP savings? 
 Planned 
Savings 
Explained 
Savings 
Unexplained 
Savings 
SRP savings streams    
ICT -1,948 -650 -1,298 
Inventory  -700 -700 0 
Smart Maintenance -4,827 -4,286 -541 
Logistics  -350 -331 -19 
Non-Equipment Procurement -3,767 -3,172 -595 
Reserves -359 -179 -162 
Shared Services -1,864 -706 -1,158 
Workforce Reforms (civilianisation of ADF & 
PSP) 
-925 -781 -144 
subtotal -14,740 -10,805 -3,917 
Other savings    
Zero-Based Budget -3,922 -3,922  
Cuts to Minor Capital Program -238 -238  
Cuts to Facilities Program -510 -510  
Administrative Savings -70 -70  
Productivity Savings -357 -357  
Reduced NPOC -586 -586  
Cuts to Personnel Initiatives -238 -238  
subtotal -5,920 -5,920 -3,917 
TOTAL -20,640 -16,725 -3,917 
Source: ASPI Budget Brief 2009-10. 
In 2011 and 2012, further savings efficiencies were announced in addition to the original SRP 
program. Unlike their predecessors, the new efficiencies represented cuts to defence 
funding rather than the freeing up of funds for redirection within Defence. As such, there’s 
no question of whether the savings were delivered or not; the money was removed from the 
Defence budget and returned to the Treasury. Further cuts occurred in late 2013. 
Table 4.3 lists the cuts made in 2011, 2012 and 2014. The tranches of savings made in the 
2012 Budget and 2014 Additional Estimates are distinguished from their predecessors by the 
absence of any pretence of efficiencies or productivity gains. They’re outright cuts to the 
Defence budget. The key savings under the SRP and subsequent initiatives are captured 
schematically in Figure 4.2.  
With defence funding being cut repeatedly and deeply, the notion of pursuing efficiency 
savings under the SRP became fanciful. So it was that in 2012, the government abandoned 
the reporting of SRP savings. 
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Table 4.2: Reported gross SRP savings for 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12  
 
Source: SLC Question 6, February 2012 and recent Defence Annual Reports 
Table 4.3: Further ‘efficiencies’ and cuts announced in 2011, 2012 and 2014 
Initiative 
Savings 
(over 10 years) 
Comment 
‘second phase of SRP-related savings’ 
(announced May 2011) 
$2,948 million  
Additional efficiencies in Defence’s corporate 
and support functions, including constraining 
forecast APS workforce growth by 1,000 
positions (i.e. not employing extra people). 
‘increased efficiency dividend’  
(announced May 2011) 
$406 million  
No details have been provided on how this 
efficiency dividend will be delivered. 
‘buy C-17 instead of two C-130 aircraft’ 
(announced May 2011) 
$520 million  
Rather than purchase two C-130 aircraft, a 
single (much larger) C-17 aircraft has been 
purchased. Inexplicably, Defence lost the 
funding for the C-130 option and absorbed the 
cost of the C-17 option.  
‘one-off 2.5% efficiency dividend’ 
(announced February 2012) 
$670 million 
No details have been provided on how this 
efficiency dividend will be delivered. 
‘expenditure reduction measures’ 
(announced May 2012) 
$5,454 million 
These are cuts pure and simple, with no 
suggestion of efficiency gains or dividends.   
‘Efficiency Dividend’ 
(announced January 2014) 
$203 million 
No details have been provided on how this 
efficiency dividend will be delivered. 
‘Efficiency Dividend’ 
(announced May 2014) 
$76 million  
No details have been provided on how this 
efficiency dividend will be delivered. 
Total $10,277 million  
Source: Defence Annual Reports and Budget Papers. 
Funding rephrasing in 2014 transferred funds to beyond the Forward Estimates. But because 
substantial funds were also brought forward, it would be wrong to count the shifts as cuts. 
As explained in Chapter 2, a further $1.2 billion of ‘saving and efficiencies’ were announced 
in the 2014-15 budget, including 1,200 fewer civilians and delays to a range on planned 
initiatives. The money saved will be redirected within Defence for capability.  
 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 
Reform stream 
Target  
($m) 
Claimed  
($m) 
Target  
($m) 
Claimed  
($m) 
Target  
($m) 
Claimed  
($m) 
ITC 49 94  128 27  148 216 
Smart Sustainment1 263 461  288 326  370 389 
Non-equipment Procurement 172  343  177 318  207 148 
Workforce & Shared Services 58 -131 171  103  238 156 
Reserves   5 -4  28 47 
Logistics   6 53 8 0.3 
Other Savings  255  255  242 242  286 285 
Total 797  1,022  1,016 1,064  1,284 1,241 
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Figure 4.2: Planned SRP and other savings 2009 to 2014 
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Reform after the Strategic Reform Program 
In early 2011, the entire Royal Australian Navy (RAN) amphibious fleet (1 x Landing Ship 
Heavy and 2 x Landing Platform Amphibious) were unexpectedly unavailable on the eve of a 
cyclone hitting the northeast coast of Australia, much to the alarm of the government and 
public. A subsequent review identified systemic failing in the oversight of ship readiness and 
the relationship between the RAN and DMO. Confused accountabilities and blurred lines of 
communication meant the state of the vessels had been allowed to deteriorate to an 
unacceptable level without senior parts of the RAN, Defence or DMO being aware. Several 
other factors were at play, including an absence of technical oversight and a low priority 
accorded to both sustainment and non-combatant vessels. At least as important was the 
failure to establish a robust customer-supplier relationship between the operators of the 
vessels (RAN) and the maintainers of the vessels (DMO). Subsequent reforms have seen the 
oversight of vessel seaworthiness improved and the relationship between DMO and the RAN 
put on a clearer and less ambiguous standing.  
Also in early 2011, an unfortunate incident of personal misbehaviour at the Australian 
Defence Force Academy morphed into a scandal that stressed civil-military relations at the 
highest level and raised serious questions about misconduct and sexual harassment in the 
defence force. There followed a series of ‘cultural reviews’ that examined everything from 
the roles of social media and alcohol in the military to the treatment and career 
management of female service-members. The end result was a package of reforms designed 
to prevent misconduct and ensure a safe and respectful environment for all personnel. 
Notwithstanding the demise of the SRP, reform continues on multiple fronts in Defence. 
Those two areas stand out as being important from the perspective of achieving efficiency 
and assuring capability. Specifically, reforms to shared services under the Chief Operating 
Officer (COO) and materiel sustainment under DMO are ongoing. Although the reforms now 
underway in both areas first arose under the 2009 SRP, they’re effectively bedding down the 
organisational structure created back in 1997 by the DRP. In each case, the latest reforms 
are correcting problems that developed at the interface between the designated internal 
suppliers and their customers elsewhere in Defence and in particular with the military (in 
economic jargon, the problems reflect principal-agent issues between internal Defence 
suppliers and customers).  
In the case of non-materiel shared services (personnel, IT, non-materiel purchasing, finance) 
the problem was that many areas either refused to fully surrender responsibility to central 
providers or else duplicated activities that were supposed to be done centrally. This 
phenomenon was most acute in the case of personnel. The root cause was a lack of trust in 
the central service providers.  
The opposite malady emerged in the case of materiel sustainment. Because of the scale and 
expense of repair and maintenance activities, the military had no choice but to transfer the 
activities in full to DMO. Having done so, it initially took insufficient interest in the cost of 
what it consumed and instead focused on service standards—but then only in part because 
responsibility for failure could always be put back onto DMO, as the failure of the 
amphibious fleet in 2011 demonstrated. 
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Shared Services  
The 2009 SRP anticipated substantial savings (around $140 million a year) from reforms to 
the delivery of non-materiel shared services, including; personnel policy and administration, 
base support, non-materiel procurement and finance. A further $190 million was anticipated 
from reforms to information technology and communications. In 2011, McKinsey and 
Company reviewed the delivery of shared services in Defence and identified possible 
efficiency measures. Impetus for reform grew in 2012 when the government imposed a cut 
of 1,000 civilian positions (from a workforce of around 21,000). This came on top of a 2011 
decision to cancel planned growth of 1,000 additional civilian positions. The creation of the 
powerful COO position in 2011-12 was probably an important enabling step on the path to 
subsequent shared services reform. In any case, reforms begun under the SRP have 
accelerated significantly over the past two years.  
Although reforms vary from sector to sector, the basic underlying approach has been to 
consolidate activities and then streamline processes and systems. The benefits are twofold. 
First, consolidation reduces duplication and generates economies of scale and scope—in 
some cases explicitly involving the creation of centres of expertise. There are also benefits 
for the individuals involved, including opportunities for greater specialisation and more 
promising career paths. Second, consolidated service delivery provides higher levels of 
transparency (for senior management) and the opportunity to maintain consistent policies 
and service standards across Defence. Consolidated services also facilitates Defence-wide 
system rationalisation and the introduction of web-based business interfaces.  
An important step in the consolidation of shared services has been finding ways to assure 
service delivery to customers. This has been achieved by having some staff pooled within the 
delivery agency, some situated within the delivery agency but assigned to specific parts of 
Defence, and some embedded within the part of Defence they serve. The approach adopted 
varies from activity to activity, depending on the needs of the customer. To support the 
move to greater reliance on shared services, considerable effort was put into change 
management, including wide consultation and a deliberate communications strategy 
involving newsletters, speaking points and web-based resources.  
Reform in the personnel and finance areas is advancing with the introduction of continuous 
improvement programs. In the finance sector, a system of Group Chief Finance Officers 
(GCFO) has been established, with GCFO reporting to both their respective group head and 
the Chief Finance Officer (CFO). (Unlike most shared services reform where the COO has the 
lead, the CFO has taken the lead in the finance sector.) Financial services that have been 
consolidated include; general transactions and accounting, budgeting and financial 
reporting, financial policy, governance and audit coordination, treasury, banking and tax, 
and project finance. In the personnel sector, a large number of functions have been 
consolidated (though some aspects of military personnel management remain within the 
individual military services). Key developments include; establishing a ‘business partner’ 
capability to provide strategic HR advice to executives in groups, implementing a regional 
people service model to support supervisors and individuals across Defence, creating a new 
personnel website on the Defence intranet and commencing a web-form redesign program 
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with electronic signature and work-flow capability, and eliminating duplication in case 
management, establishment management, graduate recruitment and workforce planning. 
Smart Sustainment Reform  
The military Services rely on DMO to repair and maintain their equipment and platforms and 
provide munitions and other consumables such as petrol, oils and lubricants. In recent years, 
materiel sustainment has accounted for around $5.6 billion of the $25 billion annual Defence 
budget. When arrangements were originally put in place, the three Services effectively 
received sustainment as a ‘free good’, with the sustainment budget going directly to DMO. 
Arrangements between the Services and DMO are set out in Materiel Sustainment 
Agreements. In the latter half of the last decade, the sustainment budget began to be 
reported against the individual Service budgets. At first this was a nominal accounting 
change, but over time the Services have become much more involved in decisions about 
performance levels and cost-capability trade-offs.  
At the heart of recent and ongoing reforms to materiel sustainment is the shift to a situation 
where the military Services are exposed to the opportunity cost of the decisions they make 
regarding sustainment of their capabilities. Or to put it another way, the Services now have 
the ability to reallocate savings achieved in sustainment to other ends, eg prevent reduction 
in capability. Naturally, the move from receiving ‘free goods’ to being exposed to 
‘opportunity costs’ has driven cost-conscious behaviour.  
There’s now a six-year campaign to drive efficiencies across the 100 or more fleets of assets 
under management. When ‘smart sustainment’ was first rolled out in Defence in 2009, the 
focus was on astute contracting and process improvement, but as the military Services have 
become more involved, the emphasis has shifted to demand management and process 
simplification. At the same time, DMO has sharpened its contracting and business analysis 
skills (including simulation and modelling) to become a centre of expertise for sustainment 
services. As with non-materiel shared services, the consolidation of skills allows for greater 
specialisation and more viable career paths.  
Engagement between DMO and its customers in the Services is ongoing and maturing. 
There’s a six-month senior level performance management (fleet screening) schedule that 
reviews how business is being done in separate sustainment areas. This process is 
underpinned by more frequent performance reviews at lower levels between DMO and the 
Services. One of the key factors has been greater precision in the definition of demand. By 
being clearer about what’s required, DMO can plan better and suppliers can optimise their 
capacity and not charge a risk premium to cover unanticipated demands. Of course, 
contracts include surge provisions that can be activated in the event of foreseeable demand 
range and military contingency. 
Specific measures to cut the cost of sustainment include; contracting for outcomes such as 
platform availability rather than sustainment activities, progressive adoption of e-business 
for purchasing, streamlined simple procurement for routine goods and services, greater use 
of panel arrangements for procurement, consolidated purchasing of common items and 
transferring inventory management to suppliers in the context of performance-based 
contracts.  
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The next step in sustainment reform will be to move more towards a whole-of-life asset 
management perspective that ensures the cost-effective delivery of capability across both 
acquisition and sustainment. 
Defence and the National Commission of Audit 
As already mentioned, the encouraging progress underway on shared services and smart 
sustainment in Defence reflects bedding down of the business model created by the 1997 
DRP. For the moment, the new government’s plans for defence reform remain unclear, and 
early suggestions of radical changes to DMO (i.e. outsourcing) appear to be on the back-
burner pending the promised ‘first principles’ review. In the meantime, the government’s 
National Commission of Audit (NCoA) has made a series of far-reaching recommendations 
about what to do with Defence.  
The NCoA was established in October 2013 by the incoming Abbott government, and its 
reports were made public in April 2014. ASPI made a written submission to the NCoA in late 
2013, and in a number of key areas the Commission’s report reflects ASPI’s analysis and 
recommendations. In what follows, the Commission’s formal recommendations and 
suggested actions made regarding Defence are explored. We begin with the Commission’s 
Recommendation 24, which deals directly with Defence. 
Recommendation 24: Defence  
Ensuring the nation’s defence and security is a core function of the Commonwealth 
Government. The Commission recommends a number of steps be taken to improve the 
efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and transparency of Defence spending through:  
a. ensuring preparation of the new Defence White Paper identifies capability options and 
associated costs for different sets of strategic risks. As part of this process, the Government 
should also assess the balance of strategic and fiscal priorities and how this compares with 
the commitment to increase Defence expenditure of 2 per cent of GDP within a decade;  
Without doubt, and in two ways, this is the most important recommendation made by the 
Commission regarding Defence.   
First, from a budget perspective, it politely makes the point that the government’s 
commitment to increase defence funding to 2% of GDP is suboptimal policy. As in any area 
of public spending, expenditure can only be justified by comparing costs (including 
opportunity costs) and benefits. For defence, this requires a careful examination of the 
strategic risks Australia faces, the cost of developing military capabilities to counter those 
risks and the best means to realise the attendant outcomes. Absent such an analysis, there’s 
no way to tell whether 2% of GDP is overly generous or vastly inadequate. Indeed, the 2% 
figure focuses on the resources consumed by Defence rather than the outcome sought. It 
may be that Australia needs to spend 2.6% of GDP to be safe, or that 1.7% of GDP would be 
more than adequate. 
Second, from a strategic perspective, it rightly points out that the ADF should be built to 
counter strategic risks. Though this sounds like telling defence’s planners to suck eggs, it’s 
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anything but. A clear and logical link between strategic policy and the priorities for equipping 
and developing the ADF is yet to emerge.    
b. as a pre-condition for setting any new funding profile for Defence under the White Paper, 
the Government should ensure that Defence improves the effectiveness and transparency of 
expenditure by improving Defence budget arrangements and governance, capability 
development and delivery;  
In each of the areas cited—budget arrangements, governance, capability development and 
delivery—there’s plenty of room for improvement, but experience shows that gains in these 
areas are difficult and time consuming to achieve. So while withholding additional funding 
would incentivise progress, it would also risk damaging a defence force struggling with large 
funding cuts made over the past few years. As a practical matter, therefore, reform and 
development of the ADF should proceed in parallel. Incentives to achieve effective reform 
within Defence can and should be created by the government holding senior executives and 
military officers to account for results.     
c. transparency and control for government should be significantly improved by stronger 
budget processes including through the Expenditure Review Committee. For new capital, in 
particular new equipment projects, this would include holding funds in separate budget 
allocations and releasing them as projects are approved. Such expenditure should be treated 
as administered funding rather than departmental funding, so that there is greater financial 
control and scrutiny of this expenditure through established budget processes;  
This particular recommendation roughly translates into ‘give the Department of Finance 
more control over how Defence spends money’ (remember that the secretariat for the 
Commission was drawn largely from Finance). On the plus side, this would provide a higher 
level of scrutiny over Defence expenditure than is presently the case. On the minus side, it 
would impose additional processes and paperwork. It’s not a priori clear that the benefits of 
the former would outweigh the costs of the latter. If this recommendation is accepted, the 
government will have to ensure the Department of Finance and the other central agencies 
are adequately resourced to add value rather than just impose delays.  
d. a new ministerial directive to the Secretary of the Department of Defence and the Chief of 
the Defence Force specifying their separate and shared responsibilities and holding them 
individually accountable for Defence performance;  
The Commission provides an example of what the directive might contain. Ministerial 
directives along these lines have come and gone in the past. To the extent they resist 
designating separate responsibilities to the Secretary and CDF (apart from the exclusive 
command role of the CDF) they’re probably harmless. In the view of this author, however, 
the 1903 Defence Act says all that needs to be said. When all is said and done, the Minister’s 
ability to hold the Secretary and CDF to account is ultimately only limited by his/her 
willingness to do so rather than by the absence of a formal directive.  
e. reintegrating the Defence Materiel Organisation into the Department of Defence, with the 
size of the Defence Materiel Organisation being significantly reduced and with a renewed 
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focus on contract management as opposed to project management;  
This recommendation has several parts, which need to be dealt with separately:  
Reincorporating DMO into Defence. Few reform issues raise sensitivities greater than those 
to do with institutional boundaries. It is as natural for DMO to fiercely protect its quasi 
independence, as it is for Defence to want to extinguish that independence—irrespective of 
the merits. Some care is therefore needed to disentangle the substantive arguments for and 
against.  
An overarching point needs to be acknowledged from the start; the bringing together of 
acquisition and sustainment in DMO has been a success. Although the transition from 
acquisition to sustainment remains less than perfect (e.g. there is still no sustainment 
arrangement for the Air Warfare Destroyer presently under construction) things are much 
better than in the past. Moreover, there are natural benefits from pooling allied commercial 
and technical skills across acquisition and sustainment. Of course, none of this was a result 
of DMO being a prescribed agency. DMO was formed in the early 2000 but only became a 
prescribed agency mid-decade. So what is it that has been achieved by prescription? 
Several worthwhile things have occurred since DMO became a prescribed agency. 
Transparency and reporting have improved substantially, sustainment efficiency has been 
boosted, the workforce has been professionalised, and gateway reviews have been 
introduced for major projects. There changes and other reforms have helped improve the 
performance of project outcomes as assessed by the Australian National Audit Office 
(ANAO).  
But while the independence brought by prescription has certainly helped drive these 
reforms, none of them were contingent upon it. Perhaps the only change which can be 
confidently (but not entirely) attributed to prescription is the development of business-like 
acquisition and sustainment agreements between the Services and DMO. That said; it’s 
unlikely that DMO’s independent voice in advising the government about projects risks 
would have emerged if DMO had remained within Defence.  
Conversely, prescription has failed to deliver the workforce flexibility sought by both the 
Kinnaird and Mortimer reports. That is not meant as a criticism of either DMO or 
prescription. For better or worse, DMO was never permitted to manage its workforce along 
the lines envisaged—perhaps for good reason given the disruption it would bring to the 
insulated labour market of defence-savvy people in Canberra. In any case, the core 
imperative behind prescription was never allowed to arise. In this sense, the prescription 
experiment was half-baked. At the same time, prescription has added transaction costs and 
duplicated some overheads—though the extent should not be exaggerated.  
The future of DMO and its relationship with Defence will be a core issue for the promised 
first-principles review. Unless the government wants to give DMO the power to manage its 
own workforce (which would bring both benefits and risks), reincorporation back into 
Defence is probably on the cards. The challenge will be to retain recent gains in the process.   
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Significantly reduce the size of DMO. It’s certainly possible, and likely worthwhile, to reduce 
the size of DMO. There are several ways this can be achieved. First, activities can be 
transferred to the private sector—for example by moving to productivity and performance-
based sustainment contracts. Second, the workload can be lessened by reducing the number 
of Australia-unique acquisitions. Third, labour productivity can be improved through 
reduction in bureaucracy, increased skilling and incentivising more commercial practices—
not simply through salary but in ways that actively encourage individuals to drive 
performance. Fourth, processes and structures can be refined. In each case, the reduction in 
staff numbers is a consequence rather than a reform in and of itself. No doubt the 
Commission had these sorts of action in mind. 
Renewed focus on contract management as opposed to project management. To the 
extent that future acquisitions are limited to off-the-shelf options, a shift from project to 
contract management is certainly possible. But so long as acquisitions are imperfectly 
specified at the time of contract it’ll be necessary for DMO to work closely with suppliers 
throughout the acquisition process—i.e. something more akin to project management than 
contract management. Perhaps it’s a question of semantics. But there’s no reason to believe 
the taxpayers’ interests would be well served by adopting a minimalist approach to DMO’s 
role in oversighting multi-decade, multi-billion dollar acquisition programs in every instance. 
A crucial consideration is whether DMO is best skilled to perform its oversight role and not 
duplicate the suppliers’ roles. From another perspective, a capable DMO is needed to ensure 
the smooth transition from procurement to efficient capability sustainment.  
f. establishing a more professional Capability Development Group (CDG) within Defence with 
an increased use of project development professionals skilled in cost and risk assessment;  
Agreed. Many of the problems with defence projects begin at conception when newly 
posted ‘desk officers’ are given the task of developing capability requirements and 
acquisition strategies with inadequate background. The proportion of long-term civilians in 
CDG should be increased and career development strategies in place to ensure the 
development of individual and organisational expertise. Alternatively, military personnel 
could be given longer tenure, but this would beg the question of why they need to remain in 
uniform and receive all the benefits involved if their long-term trajectory is an office on 
Russell Hill.   
g. reducing the staffing size of Defence headquarters in Canberra, including senior staff, to 
1998 levels;  
Agreed. The number of senior and middle management positions (civilian and military) in 
Defence has exploded over the past 15 years in tandem with similar growth across the APS 
(see Chapter 2.3). But because the many military headquarters outside of Canberra have 
been subject to the same phenomenon, they should be subject to the same stringency.  
h. Defence publishing performance indicators that reveal progress with reform, including the 
‘teeth to tail’ ratio and the additional cost of unique and Australian built procurement 
decisions. 
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Transparency is the surest route to ensuring Defence is efficient. Unfortunately, disclosure is 
uneven across the range of activities Defence undertakes. In some areas there have been 
improvements recently—for example access under Freedom of Information—in others, 
Defence continues to hide behind a veil of secrecy that obscures its actual performance and 
impedes accountability. Without strong Ministerial direction, it’s unlikely Defence will 
become more transparent of its own accord. At a minimum; current outcome reporting 
could be augmented with performance efficiency measures of sufficient granularity to allow 
benchmarking against the broader economy. 
Elsewhere in the Commission’s report, a number of other recommendations relevant to 
Defence have been made. These are explored below.  
The privatisation of both ASC Pty Ltd and Defence Housing Australia.  
As a practical matter, the sale of ASC can’t proceed until the government decides how it will 
deal with the vexed problem of naval shipbuilding in general, and the future submarine in 
particular. There’s no in principle impediment to the sale of Defence Housing Australia.  
However, unlike the sale of Qantas, Telstra or the Commonwealth Bank where an effective 
private market already existed, the government is the sole customer for submarines and 
defence housing. As such, care needs to be taken to put in place the necessary arrangements 
to allow it to properly regulate the resulting privately owned monopolies it’ll have to deal 
with. In the case of DHA, this might best be done through continued ownership. 
Close the Military Superannuation and Benefits Scheme (MSBS) to new entrants, with a new 
scheme established based on an accumulation plan opened for new Australian Defence 
Force members; 
This recommendation was implemented in the 2014 Budget and is reasonable. Defined 
benefit schemes for Commonwealth public servants were closed almost a decade ago (July 
2005). Apart from politicians, everyone else takes their chances with accumulation schemes 
subject to market volatility and erosion by inflation. For ADF members serving for shorter 
durations, the new accumulation scheme will offer advantages over the now closed 
schemes. 
Since 2005 the Skilling Australia Defence Industry Program has provided funding to improve 
the quality and quantity of skills training in businesses that could seek defence contracts. 
The continued funding of this grants programme should cease, consistent with the 
Commission's recommendation in its Phase One Report to limit industry assistance to areas 
of genuine market failure. 
and 
The Commission recommends the Defence Services Homes Insurance Scheme and its 
advisory board be abolished. There is an established and competitive insurance market. 
There is no compelling rationale for continued government involvement in this area.  
The merit of these recommendations is self-explanatory. 
  158 
The Defence Science and Technology Organisation should be assessed for its outsourcing 
potential. 
The issues surrounding the outsourcing of DSTO are many and contested. With the caveat 
that at least some functions would need to be kept in-house, there’s no reason not to assess 
the potential for transferring some DSTO tasks to the private sector. The UK has done so 
successfully and the private sector has long played a central role in US defence science and 
technology. 
Recommendation 7: Public sector efficiency – improved spans of control 
Average management structures in the Australian Public Service are top heavy, particularly 
at the Executive Level 1 and Executive Level 2 classifications. The Commission recommends 
that spans of management control be improved by requiring: 
a. eight major departments* and agencies to prepare plans that report on current 
management structures and spans of control, and opportunities for improvement, 
immediately for Cabinet consideration; and 
b. all portfolio secretaries and agency heads to prepare plans to improve management 
structures and spans of control for ministers within 12 months. 
*Department of Defence, Department of Human Services, Australian Taxation Office, 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Department of Health, Department of 
Social Services, Australian Bureau of Statistics, and the Department of Agriculture. 
Recommendation 12: Performance evaluation – rolling ‘audits’ of agencies  
The performance of individual government agencies is central to delivering effective and 
efficient government. The Commission recommends:  
a. a small number of rolling Portfolio Agency Audits be undertaken each year, led by an 
independent person or panel, or the Department of Finance, to comprehensively assess 
efficiency and effectiveness across all aspects of an agency’s operations, programmes 
and administration, with:  
i. results and any recommendations to be presented to the portfolio minister and the 
Minister for Finance, and considered as part of the annual Budget process; and  
ii. agency heads to be responsible for implementing recommendations agreed by 
government; and  
b. that the Department of Defence be the subject of the first Portfolio Agency Audit, led 
by an independent person or panel.  
and 
The Commission supports the Government’s commitment to undertake a first-principles 
review of Defence’s departmental structure and major processes. Opportunities for further 
rationalisation of 25 Defence non-principal bodies should be considered in this context.  
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All up, there are three separate reviews of Defence proposed in the near term; an 
independent ‘first principles’ review, a Portfolio Agency Audit and an examination by the 
Secretary of departmental management structures and spans of control. Unless 
rationalisation occurs, the halls of Russell Offices will have clipboard wielding consultants 
bumping into each other and getting in the way of the natural inhabitants trying to do their 
job.  
The various recommendations about staff numbers and spans of control point towards a 
fundamental downgrading of positions across Defence—a rollback to the sorts of 
management structures that prevailed prior to the level/rank inflation of the 2000s when 
money was easy. The impact would be profound. Deputy Secretaries would become First 
Assistant Secretaries, EL2 would become EL1, Major Generals would become Brigadiers, and 
Group Captains would become Wing Commanders. Achieving such a fundamental 
realignment of levels to tasks would be difficult and disruptive. On the civilian side, it would 
require positions to be spilled and readvertised. In doing so, a reassessment of individual 
positions based on the standards set by the Australian Public Service Commission would 
ensure consistency across Defence and the APS more broadly. 
Next steps—challenges and opportunities 
Like any good team of consultants, the Commission has recommended further reviews. The 
first question for the government is whether to take action now on some of the 
Commission’s recommendations or to wait until after the planned reviews(s) of Defence.  
In many instances there’s no reason to wait. Many of the recommendations are effectively 
discrete stand-alone initiatives. Other recommendations are so closely interdependent as to 
have to wait until the promised review(s) of Defence are complete. These include the role 
and attendant size of DMO, the structure and size of Service headquarters, and Defence’s 
overall management structures, spans of control and accountability.   
With the Commission’s report now delivered and public, there’s no reason to delay action 
any further. Other agencies will be reorganising and downsizing following the budget. If the 
government is serious about defence reform, it needs to get the ball rolling as soon as 
possible. Here are some suggestions for what to do. 
1. Commence the promised review/audit of Defence as soon as possible. There’s no point 
running multiple reviews; consolidate what needs to be done into a single exercise. Publish 
the terms of reference, set a deadline, invite public submissions, and get on with it. Key 
issues for the Review include: 
• Defence’s structure, processes and staffing, including all aspects of the civilian and 
military workforce. While it might be politically expedient to quarantine military 
positions from scrutiny, they represent more than three-quarters of the Defence 
workforce and they’re the most expensive on a per capita basis. The multiple 
military headquarters maintained by the ADF are likely to be every bit as overstaffed 
as those on Russell Hill.  
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• The future of Defence’s shared services business model and the role of the Service 
Chiefs. There’s an inherent tension between the efficiencies delivered by 
organisation-wide shared services (such as ITC and facilities maintenance) and the 
clearer accountability of having the three Services manage their own support in-
house. Given the progress made in recent years, I think the best option is to further 
exploit a shared services model; albeit a more pervasive approach than has been 
accepted to date. Others believe returning control to the Services is imperative—
particularly in the case of materiel sustainment. This issue must be resolved as the 
absence of decision encourages a focus on competing positions—not efficiency.  
 
• The future of DMO. Increasingly more radical schemes for revamping DMO have 
been doing the rounds in the media. The government needs to develop a plan for 
DMO, either within the forthcoming broader review of Defence or as an ancillary 
exercise. In doing so, it will be important to consult closely with industry (while 
remembering it has a vested interest in creating a pliant and weak commercial 
counterparty).  
 
• Performance reporting. Defence’s efficiency is highly dependent on the performance 
and funding regime between the government and Defence. The design and details of 
the regime should be a key outcome of the forthcoming review. 
2. Consider the discrete recommendations from the Commission and where possible make 
quick decisions. Work can begin on discrete tasks such as revamping Capability Development 
Group, assessing the outsourcing potential of DSTO, closing the Military Superannuation 
Benefits Scheme, ending the Skilling Australian Defence Industry program and, if we really 
have to, issuing a directive to the Secretary and CDF. And it’s never too late for Defence to 
be more transparent and open about its performance. All of these matters could be 
progressed, and some concluded, relatively quickly. If the government rejects a 
recommendation, it should say so.  
3. The Defence White Paper along with whatever review of Defence emerges have the 
potential to see activities ‘delayed pending’. The government should resist this tendency as 
far as possible. For example and in particular, momentum should be maintained in the 
future submarine program. 
4. Remember that Defence is full of hard-working capable individuals who are committed to 
their job. A lot of good work has been done in recent years and many of the best prospects 
for improved performance lie in continuing work already underway.    
5. Successive reviews have bemoaned the absence of accountability within Defence. Over 
the years, all manner of bad outcomes have been blamed on poor accountability. Although 
organisational structures and processes can both impede and facilitate accountability, in the 
final analysis accountability is something one person imposes on another, starting from the 
top. No amount of reviews will change that fact. If the government wants accountability 
within Defence, it needs to start imposing accountability on Defence. No need to await a 
review, start tomorrow.  
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Chapter 5 – International Defence Economics 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first examines key international defence 
spending trends. The second explores Australian defence spending in an international and 
historical context, and the third explores the continuing impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) on countries’ abilities to spend on defence.  
Throughout this chapter, defence spending statistics from a variety of source are used. Given 
the unresolvable questions of definition and reliability, one source is usually as good as 
another. For that reason, the most convenient source of data has been chosen to allow for a 
consistent comparison in each case.  
International defence spending 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the world 
expended a total of US$1,739 billion on defence in 2013, equivalent to around 2.4% of global 
GDP. With the exception of China, the bulk of the spending occurred in the developed 
economies of North America and Western Europe, with East Asia also figuring highly in the 
data, see Figure 5.1.  
Figure 5.1: Geographic distribution of defence expenditure 2013  
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database 2014 edition, www.sipri.org.  
Global defence spending from 1988 to 2013 is graphed in Figure 5.2, where ‘BRIC’ refers to 
the emerging powers of Brazil, Russia, India and China, and the US allies outside of Europe 
are Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and Taiwan. As can be seen, the peace 
dividend following the end of the Cold War resulted in a contraction in global defence 
expenditure of around 30% over a decade. From 2001 to 2009, the trend reversed as the 
United States mobilised following the attacks 9/11.    
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Figure 5.2: Global defence spending 1988 to 2013 
 
 Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database 2014 edition, www.sipri.org. 
 Russian spending interpolated for 1991. Chinese spending extrapolated for 1988, similarly for Russia pre-1992.  
The United States dominates global defence spending, and the US-led invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq gave rise to a decade-long increase in the global figure. In 2013 the 
United States accounted for 36.4% of global defence spending, and once its friends and allies 
are taken into account the ‘West’ as a whole accounts for just over 62.6%. However, around 
2010, global defence spending peaked as expenditure in the United States and other 
developed nations fell.  
It is now clear that the world (or at least the developed world) is experiencing another 
downward swing in defence spending. The United States and most of the countries of 
Western Europe are projecting either insipid growth or declining defence expenditures out 
to the middle of this decade. In part, this reflects a mini peace dividend from the drawdown 
of Western forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. At least as important, however, are the mounting 
fiscal pressures across developed economies.  
A combination of rising social spending and the legacy of crippling debts due to the 2008 
GFC are forcing many countries to reconsider the priority for defence spending.  Western 
Europe in particular is facing a long-term fiscal crunch due its ageing population; with tax 
revenues falling and pension costs rising, something has to give. In the absence of a serious 
deterioration in the strategic situation in Europe, it’s likely that cuts to defence spending will 
be the most politically expedient course of action for many European countries in the years 
ahead.  
But not all trends are downwards. Falling year-on-year defence spending by the United 
States (-7%), Western Europe (-2.4%) and other US allies (-0.8%) in 2013 was offset by 
growth in the BRICs (+4.2%) and the rest of the world (+4.4%).  
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The United States  
After a decade of strong growth, the US defence budget has moderated over the past five 
years and begun to fall. And the trend is likely to continue; until 2021 US defence spending is 
theoretically capped under the Budget Control Acts of 2011 and 2013 (sequestration) in 
response to mounting fiscal pressures—though some remission has occurred.  
Over the past couple of years, the cuts have been accommodated through reduced 
personnel numbers (and remuneration), base closures, acquisition deferrals, and the early 
retirement of some assets. Most recently, sequestration has put pressure on the readiness 
of the US military by reducing the money available for operations and maintenance.    
Further cuts may be necessary. Figure 5.3 shows historical US defence spending and the 
National Defence Budget Estimates for FY2015 out to 2019. The actual level of defence 
spending post-2014 is uncertain, higher and lower levels of defence spending than depicted 
are possible.  
Figure 5.3: US defence spending 1950 to 2019 
 Source: FY 2015 US budget papers (Tables 7.1 and 7.2) and various sources for the cost of major wars.  
 
Even if US baseline defence spending returns to its long-term historical trend of 0.8% annual 
real growth (relative to the US CPI), the size of US armed forces will continue to decline. 
Over the past six decades, the annual cost of maintaining a US Navy vessel in service has 
risen by around 3% above inflation. Over the same period, the costs of aircraft and soldiers 
have risen in real terms by similar amounts. As a result, the strength of the army has more 
than halved and the numbers of aircraft and ships have been reduced four-fold since the 
1950s (see ASPI Policy Analysis #56, Trends in US defence spending: implications for 
Australia, 2010).  
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Consequently, although the United States remains the most powerful military force on 
earth, its ability to mount large-scale operations is slowly eroding, along with its capacity for 
concurrent operations.  
The People's Republic of China  
China has enjoyed rapid economic growth since the early 1990s. Over the same period, 
defence spending has grown apace. Controversy surrounds the scale of Chinese defence 
spending. US estimates of Chinese spending are substantially higher than the official figure. 
Independent estimates fall somewhere in between, see Figure 5.4.  
By any estimate, Chinese defence spending is rising rapidly; by around 12% to 14% per year 
above inflation over the past decade, as measured in US$. In terms of Chinese currency, the 
growth rate averaged 12.7% between 2002 and 2011 (the ongoing appreciation of the RMB 
and differential inflation means that the growth rate differs from that calculated using US$). 
Because defence spending growth has been matched by strong growth in the Chinese 
economy, the defence share of GDP has remained below 2%—at least according to official 
figures.   
Although China is often criticised (including by Australia) for not being transparent enough 
about its military build-up, its biannual defence white papers are reasonably clear and 
largely consistent with what can be observed; China is developing the military capability to 
exclude the United States and its allies from its maritime approaches with a particular focus 
on operations against Taiwan. This is reflected in a focus on developing and modernising 
what the US term ‘anti-access/area denial capabilities’.  
To a lesser extent, China is investing in power-projection assets—including an aircraft 
carrier—to protect its sea lines of communication and assert its interests further afield. By 
the end of the decade, China will have the ability to deploy and sustain a modest joint force, 
including several battalions on low-intensity operations far from China.  
Figure 5.4: Chinese defence spending 1990 to 2014 
Sources: Analysis of data from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2014, www.sipri.org; Pentagon Report to Congress on the 
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, FY2013.  
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Comparing the United States and China 
Much has been said lately about the changing 
economic and strategic balance between the 
United States and China. Here’s some numbers to 
put things in perspective.  
According to the World Bank, the United States 
economy (US$16.2 trillion) was 2 times larger than 
China’s (US$8.2 trillion) at market exchange rates 
in 2012. If China’s economy grows at 7% per 
annum and the US at 2.5% per annum, it will only 
take 15 years for economic parity to be reached in 
2027.   
The raw statistics for recent military expenditure 
by the United States and the People’s Republic of 
China are shown in Table 5.1. Note that China’s smaller GDP share gives it a relatively 
greater capacity to increase defence spending.  
Table 5.1: United States and Chinese defence spending circa 2013 
 
Baseline defence 
expenditure  
2013/2014 US$ 
Defence  
expenditure 
percentage of GDP 
Rate of growth  
 
United States (official 2014) 586 billion 3.6% 0.8%   
China (official 2014) 132 billion - 13.5%   
China (SIPRI estimate 2013) 186 billion 2.0% 11.8%   
Plausible defence spending trajectories for the United States and China are plotted in 
Figure 5.5 based on the latest SIPRI estimate of Chinese spending (2013), and using growth 
rates commensurate with historical trends. It shows that it is fully possible for Chinese 
defence spending to exceed that of the United States within the next two decades.  
Figure 5.5: Plausible US and Chinese defence spending trajectories  
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United Kingdom 
Like the United States, the United Kingdom ramped up defence spending in the 2000s 
(though not to the same extent). This trend is now being reversed as part of a rapid fiscal 
consolidation. The 2011 UK defence budget set out real reductions in underlying defence 
spending (exclusive of the cost of deployments) of 7.7% over four years from 2010-11 to 
2014-15. Subsequent decisions increased the reductions to 8.8% over four years. The initial 
moves to accommodate the budget cuts include: 
• Military personnel reductions of 25,000 (from a base of 158,500) and civilian personnel 
cuts of 29,000 by 2015, plus the withdrawal of land forces from Germany by 2020. 
Reduction in tank and heavy artillery numbers by 40% and 35% respectively.  
• Immediate decommissioning of an existing Aircraft Carrier, one Landing Platform 
Helicopter and one Land Ship Dock. Continuing with plans to build two new aircraft 
carriers but keeping one at ‘extended readiness’ (mothballing). Putting one existing 
Landing Platform Dock ship at ‘extended readiness’. 
• Scrapping of the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft and Harrier jump-jet fleets and a 
reduction in the number of Chinook helicopters to be purchased from 22 to 12.  
• Five year delay in the replacement of ballistic missile submarine fleet and reduction in 
the number of warheads from 160 to 120.  
On current expectations, UK defence spending is likely to remain flat in real terms at around 
£33.4 billion from 2015 to 2020. Consequently, further capability reductions will be 
necessary unless internal budget pressures are held in check in the years ahead.  
Figure 5.6: United Kingdom defence spending 1955 to 2012  
 
Source: UK House of Commons Library Report SN/SG/113, 2009 & SN/SG/3139, 2012, UK MoD, UK Defence Statistics 2013.  
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North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
Until recently, NATO defence spending (exclusive of the United States) had been remarkably 
static in real terms since the end of the Cold War, with the subsequent expansion of NATO 
doing little to change the situation. However, in recent years spending has fallen.  
Figure 5.7: NATO defence spending 1988 to 2013 
 
 Source: Analysis of data from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2014, www.sipri.org  
The larger members of NATO and the scale of their present defence spending are given in 
Table 5.2. In addition to the United States and United Kingdom, many other NATO members 
are under pressure to reduce defence spending due to fiscal pressures. The resulting cuts are 
being accommodated in various ways.  For example, in 2012 Italy announced plans to reduce 
its troop strength from 183,000 to 150,000, Germany ended conscription in 2011, and since 
2009 France has shed 54,000 military and civilian positions. Because these countries are 
subject to the same cost pressures as the United States, the scale of NATO forces will 
continue to decline in the years ahead making it even more difficult to undertake operations 
such as in Afghanistan.   
Table 5.2: Key NATO members’ defence spending 2013 
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Regional trends 
Defence spending trends in Maritime Southeast Asia and Greater Asia are summarised on 
the following two pages and examined in depth overleaf. 
Maritime Southeast Asia 
Defence spending for 2012 in the seven largest Southeast Asian states plus Australia is 
plotted in Figure 5.8 and further detailed in Table 5.3. Two points are worth making.  
(1) Australia outspends any of its neighbours by a comfortable margin. (2) Only Singapore 
shows any real sign of strategic angst, with a GDP share of 3.44%. Note that changes to 
reporting make New Zealand defence spending data difficult to track.  
Figure 5.8: Defence spending 2013 in Maritime Southeast Asia 
 
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2014. 
Table 5.3: Defence spending 1990 to 2013; Maritime Southeast Asia  
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Greater Asia 
Defence spending for 2012 in the six largest Greater Asian states plus Australia is plotted in 
Figure 5.9 and further detailed in Table 5.4 (Note: US figures have been scaled to fit). Several 
points are worth making. (1) Australia is a minnow in the tank of North Asian security.  
(2) Only India and South Korea shows any real sign of strategic concern with GDP shares of 
around 2.0% and 2.5% respectively. (3) Taiwan and Japan are allowing their defence 
capabilities to atrophy, notwithstanding that Taiwan’s GDP share remains above 2%.  
(4) Although China devotes less than 1.3 % of GDP to Defence, it has been increasing its 
defence spending at an impressive rate over the past two decades.  
On the basis of defence spending, it is clear that the balance of military power in the region 
is slowly shifting from the United States and its allies to China.  
Figure 5.9: Defence spending 2013 in Greater Asia  
Source: IISS The Military Balance 2014 
Table 5.4: Defence spending 1990 to 2012; Greater Asia 
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Regional economic and defence spending trends – the details 
The least ambiguous way to track relative changes in the size of a country’s economy is to 
adjust its GDP in local currency to a single base year using its GDP-deflator. Similarly, the 
least ambiguous way to track relative changes in defence spending is to adjust spending in 
local currency to a single base year using its CPI index.  
With ‘real’ GDP and defence spending so calculated, the relative growth between countries 
can be compared by normalising the initial values in the base year. This has been done for a 
selection of countries in Maritime Southeast Asia and Greater Asia in Figures 5.10 and 5.11. 
Data sources for these and subsequent graphs are listed at the end of this section.  
 Figure 5.10: Relative economic and defence spending growth, Maritime Southeast Asia  
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It’s clear that developing countries have achieved faster economic growth than their more-
developed counterparts. China in particular has achieved spectacular economic growth since 
the early 1990s—though its military spending did not take off until around a decade later. 
Among the countries of Maritime Southeast Asia, Singapore has managed steady economic 
growth which has been reflected in a similar trend in their defence spending. In comparison, 
our closest neighbour, Indonesia, has achieved healthy economic growth but has not seen 
the need to increase its defence spending.   
The impact of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis is apparent in Figure 5.10 and to a lesser extent 
in Figure 5.11.  
Figure 5.11: Relative economic and defence spending growth in Greater Asia 
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Comparative economic performance 
Comparing the relative size of economies (as opposed to the relative rate of growth in size) 
requires converting the domestic currencies involved to a common currency. In practice, this 
is performed in one of two ways; either by converting to US dollars at prevailing market 
exchange rates, or by using the World Bank’s Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates 
which attempt to capture the buying power of the currency within the country it is used. 
Typically, PPP exchange rates yield a significantly larger figure for developing countries than 
market exchange rates. By construction, PPP exchange rates are normalised relative to the 
US dollar. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 plot national GDP at market exchange rates and PPP for 
Maritime Southeast Asia and Greater Asia respectively.  
Figure 5.12: Comparative economic performance, Maritime Southeast Asia 
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Whether market exchange rates or PPP exchange rates present a more accurate picture of 
comparative economic performance is debatable. In some sense, they provide 
complementary views of what is occurring. That said; the substantial volatility of 
international exchange rates (which are driven more by near-term financial factors than 
long-term economic fundamentals) introduces large transient vagaries into time-series. For 
example, the rapid rise of Australian GDP in terms of US$ in Figure 5.11 and the oscillation of 
Japanese GDP in terms of US$ in Figure 5.13 are both artefacts of exchange rate fluctuations 
rather than any reflection of actual changes in economic performance. Note that in Figure 
5.13 the size of the United States economy has been scaled by a factor of ten to 
accommodate it on the chart without compressing the data for other countries.  
Figure 5.13: Comparative economic performance in Greater Asia 
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Comparative defence spending—Maritime Southeast Asia 
Just as was the case with GDP, comparing the level of defence spending between countries 
requires conversion to a common basis, usually either US$ or PPP$. In terms of maintaining 
modern high-tech military capabilities, spending expressed in US$ is probably a better 
comparative measure. Conversely, the cost of maintaining a large low-tech defence force is 
probably better compared using PPP exchange rates. Figures 5.15 and 5.16 plot defence 
spending in Maritime Southeast Asia from 1980 to the present in terms of US$ and PPP$ 
respectively.  
The only countries to consistently and significantly increase their defence spending post-
Cold War are Australia, Singapore and Vietnam. All the others have either decreased their 
spending or are still working to recover ground lost in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. An 
equally sanguine picture emerges from the trends in the share of GDP devoted to defence. 
The long-term trend for all the countries of Maritime Southeast Asia is one of declining 
defence burden, see Figure 5.14. Even for those countries with the fastest growth—
Singapore and Australia—GDP share has not been growing by an appreciable amount in 
recent years.  
In contradicting those who discern a ‘regional arms race’, there is little in the defence 
spending patterns of Maritime Southeast Asia to support such a conclusion. Given that the 
cost of high-tech military equipment is increasing by around 4% above inflation every year, it 
is hard to see how anyone other than Australia and Singapore can afford to modernise or 
significantly expand their air and naval assets on present spending trends. 
 Figure 5.14: Defence burden, Maritime Southeast Asia  
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 Figure 5.15: Real defence spending (2000 US$), Maritime Southeast Asia   
 
 Figure 5.16: Real defence spending (2000 PPP$), Maritime Southeast Asia 
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Comparative defence spending—Greater Asia 
A somewhat more interesting picture emerges of defence spending in Greater Asia and the 
United States. The strongest and clearest trend has been the steady and substantial decline 
in the defence burden carried by countries since 1980, see Figure 5.17. The only countries to 
exhibit a significant rise in defence burden in the nearer term (albeit limited compared with 
historical levels) are China from the late 1990s and the United States from 2001 onwards.  
In terms of absolute spending levels (see Figures 5.18 and 5.19) several points are worth 
making. China’s defence spending has grown appreciably by any measure. The United States 
remains far ahead of any other country but spending is set to slow. India’s defence spending 
continues to rise as does South Korea’s. Taiwan has given up.   
Unlike Maritime Southeast Asia, it is clear that the military balance of power is slowly but 
surely shifting among Greater Asia and the United States—at least to the extent that 
defence spending translates into military capability. China has comfortably overtaken 
Taiwan, South Korea and India, and recently Japan. Critically, the Chinese spending figures 
presented here are taken from official sources and are deemed by many observers to 
understate the true picture. The US Pentagon report to Congress on Chinese military power 
has argued that defence spending by the People’s Republic is appreciably larger than 
disclosed.   
 Figure 5.17: Defence burden, Greater Asia  
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Figure 5.18: Real defence spending (2000 US$), Greater Asia 
 
Figure 5.19: Real defence spending (2000 PPP$), Greater Asia 
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Historical Defence Spending 
Historical Australian defence spending 
Real and nominal Australian defence spending from 1870 to the present appears in Figure 
5.20. Although inflation dominates the nominal data and obscures much of the historical 
detail, the impact of the wars of the twentieth century is clearly visible in the ‘real’ data 
corrected for inflation.  
Figure 5.20: Australian defence spending, 1870–2014  
Source: ASPI collation of data from various sources, real dollars calculated using retail/consumer price index.  
An even more useful graph of historical spending appears in Figure 5.21 where real spending 
has been plotted on a logarithmic scale, on which exponential growth (which is close to 
compounding growth for small rates of increase) appears as a straight line. It shows there 
have been two epochs of underlying steady growth in defence spending; from 1870 to 1929 
spending grew by around 7% per annum, and from 1945 to the present underlying spending 
grew by around 2.7% per annum.  
None of this should be taken to imply that the defence force has expanded significantly 
during the post-war period—it has not. Rather, the observed growth in defence spending 
largely reflects the rising intrinsic cost of delivering modern military capability. The 2003 
ASPI publication, A Trillion Dollars and Counting, estimated that real growth of around 2.65% 
per annum was necessary just to maintain the present scale and range of capabilities in the 
ADF. Comparable analysis of US defence spending and force structure trends leads to a 
similar conclusion. Thus, the recent rise of 3% per annum is more about maintaining than 
significantly expanding the defence force.    
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Figure 5.21: Australian defence spending, 1870–2013  
Source: ASPI collation of data from various sources, real dollars calculated using retail/consumer price index.   
The steady increase in real defence spending since the end of the World War II has been 
possible because of ongoing growth in the Australian economy over the same period. In fact, 
as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) the longer-term trend has been for defence 
spending to account for a progressively smaller share of domestic output. Figure 5.22 plots 
defence spending as both a share of GDP and as a proportion of total Commonwealth 
outlays.  
 Figure 5.22: Australian defence spending as a share of GDP and Outlays.   
Source: ASPI collation of data from various sources.  
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Given the importance of defence spending as a share of GDP, a magnification of the post-
war period has been prepared in Figure 5.23.  
 Figure 5.23: Defence burden (per cent of Gross Domestic Product) 1946–2014  
Source: ASPI collation of data from various sources.  
GDP share is not a measure of the adequacy or otherwise of defence spending—that’s 
something that depends on the task at hand. Rather, it measures the proportion of national 
wealth that a nation devotes to defence.  
The planned growth in Australian defence spending will see share of GDP devoted to 
national defence grow to 2% by 2022-24. While this is high by recent standards, the United 
States has recently been expending more than 4.7% of GDP and the United Kingdom 2.5%. 
Even taking account of the growing fiscal burden due to the ageing of the Australian 
population, there is no reason to conclude that a defence burden in the range of 2% to 3% is 
unsustainable. While it is true that health and ageing will steadily demand a growing share of 
GDP in the decades ahead, the concurrent rise in individual prosperity (as measured by GDP 
per capita) will allow living standards to grow appreciably even if a larger share of national 
product is diverted for public goods like health, aged care and defence.   
A more detailed examination of the affordability of Australian defence spending can be 
found in the 2008 ASPI publication Strategic choices: Defending Australia in the 21st century.  
Australia’s defence effort in an international context 
According to the World Bank, in 2012 Australia had the twelfth largest economy on earth 
measured at market exchange rates (and seventeenth using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
according to the IMF in 2013). From this annual bounty of around 1.6 trillion dollars, 
Australia finds the money to fund its defence. Table 5.5 displays Australia’s 2013 defence 
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spending (the latest year for which comprehensive data is available) along with that of a 
selection of countries including allies, regional neighbours and other developed industrial 
economies around the globe. All figures are given in US dollars calculated at prevailing 
market exchange rates. 
Table 5.5: Defence spending and burden 2013 
2013 GDP 2013 Defence expenditure 2013 % GDP 
Country $US(b) 
 
 
 
Country $US(b) 
 
Country % 
USA 16,227 USA 600.4 Israel 5.98 
China 9,032 China 112.0 USA 3.70 
Japan 5,152 Russia 68.1 Singapore 3.44 
Germany 3,593 United Kingdom 57.0 Russia 3.08 
France 2,743 France 52.4 South Korea 2.53 
United Kingdom 2,426 Japan 51.0 Pakistan 2.47 
Russia 2,211 Germany 44.2 Vietnam 2.44 
Italy 2,066 India 36.3 United Kingdom 2.35 
India 1,973 South Korea 31.8 Taiwan 2.08 
Canada 1,843 Australia 26.0 France 1.91 
Australia 1,595 Italy 25.2 India 1.84 
Spain 1,381 Canada 16.4 Australia 1.63 
South Korea 1,257 Israel 15.1 Malaysia 1.52 
Indonesia 955 Spain 11.6 New Zealand 1.48 
Turkey 849 Turkey 10.7 Thailand 1.46 
Netherlands 813 Netherlands 10.4 Netherlands 1.28 
Sweden 574 Taiwan 10.3 Turkey 1.26 
Taiwan 495 Singapore 9.9 China 1.24 
Thailand 425 Indonesia 8.4 Germany 1.23 
Malaysia 329 Sweden 6.6 Italy 1.22 
Singapore 288 Thailand 6.2 Sweden 1.15 
Philippines 282 Pakistan 5.9 Japan 0.99 
Israel 253 Malaysia 5.0 Canada 0.89 
Pakistan 239 Vietnam 3.8 Indonesia 0.88 
New Zealand 182 New Zealand 2.7 Spain 0.84 
Vietnam 156 Philippines 2.2 Philippines 0.78 
PNG 21 PNG 0.1 PNG 0.48 
Source: IISS: The Military Balance 2014. Note Australian results vary somewhat from local reporting. 
With the caveat that fluctuation in exchange rates can make a significant difference in 
relative ranking, there are three observations worth making. First, our level of defence 
spending gives us a budget broadly comparable with Spain and Canada, but far below heavy 
hitters such as Germany, UK, Japan, France and China. Second, we out-spend all our 
Southeast Asian neighbours by a considerable margin. Third, the United States remains in a 
class of its own. 
In terms of defence spending as a percentage of GDP, even though our GDP share has 
dropped to 1.6%, we devote significantly more than the Netherlands (1.3%), Germany 
(1.2%), Spain (0.8%), Canada (0.9%) and Japan (1.0%). According to the data, the only fully 
developed Western countries to allocate a larger share of GDP than us are the (the nuclear-
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armed) United States (3.7%), France (1.9%) and the United Kingdom (2.4%). Closer to home, 
we devote a smaller share of GDP than Vietnam (2.4%), India (1.8%), South Korea (2.5%), 
and Singapore (3.4%), but more than Indonesia (0.9%), Thailand (1.5%) and the Philippines 
(0.8%). And, perhaps surprisingly, New Zealand (1.5%) appears to be catching up. 
To summarise, we spend a greater share than most developed Western nations but a lesser 
share than many of our significant regional neighbours. This probably reflects two things:  
(1) the synergy derived from collective defence in Western Europe, and (2) that some of our 
less prosperous neighbours have to spend a larger share of GDP to meet the demands of a 
more challenging strategic environment than that of Western Europe.  
An alternative and often illuminating depiction of the economic resources a country 
allocates to defence can be achieved by plotting its position on a graph of GDP against 
defence spending along with other nations. We’ve done this in Figure 5.24 for 137 countries 
based on data collected by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). To properly 
capture the wide spread of GDP and defence spending values, the data has been plotted on 
a dual logarithmic scale.  
 Figure 5.24: GDP and defence spending for 138 countries 2013 
Source: Compiled from data in The Military Balance 2014 (IISS). 
A couple of things are immediately apparent. Most obviously, there is a clear correlation 
between defence spending and economic size; the larger a nation’s economy the more it 
tends to spend on defence. In addition, the vast bulk of nations spend within the band of 
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between 1 and 4% of GDP on defence. Not surprisingly, those countries that spend larger 
shares of GDP tend to have more challenging strategic circumstances than those that spend 
less, or else they are impoverished nations that need to spend a greater share of their 
meagre resources to achieve a credible capability. Small shares of GDP spending tend to 
correlate with advantageous geography, strong alliances and benign neighbours. But 
another factor is also at play. Economically prosperous developed nations tend, 
understandably, to be able to provide for their defence with a smaller share of GDP. 
Money is not the only resource that a nation has available to devote to its defence; there is 
also people. Table 5.6 lists population numbers, permanent defence force numbers and 
population percentage in the armed services for our selection of allies, neighbours and 
Western powers.  
Table 5.6: Human resources circa 2014  
Country Population Country 
Armed 
Forces Country 
% of 
POP 
China 1,355,692,576 China 2,333 North Korea 4.79% 
India 1,236,344,631 United States 1,492 Israel 2.26% 
United States 318,892,103 India 1,325 South Korea 1.35% 
Indonesia 253,609,643 North Korea 1190 Singapore 1.31% 
Pakistan 196,174,380 Russia 845 Taiwan 1.24% 
Russia 142,470,272 South Korea 655 Turkey 0.63% 
Japan 127,103,388 Pakistan 644 Russia 0.59% 
Philippines 107,668,231 Turkey 511 Thailand 0.53% 
Vietnam 93,421,835 Vietnam 482 Vietnam 0.52% 
Turkey 81,619,392 Indonesia 396 United States 0.47% 
Germany 80,996,685 Thailand 361 Malaysia 0.36% 
Thailand 67,741,401 Taiwan 290 France 0.34% 
France 66,259,012 Japan 247 Pakistan 0.33% 
United Kingdom 63,742,977 France 222 Italy 0.29% 
Italy 61,680,122 Germany 186 Spain 0.28% 
South Korea 48,375,645 Israel 177 United Kingdom 0.27% 
Spain 47,737,941 Italy 176 Australia 0.25% 
Canada 34,834,841 United Kingdom 169 Germany 0.23% 
Malaysia 30,073,353 Spain 135 Netherlands 0.22% 
North Korea 24,851,627 Philippines 125 New Zealand 0.20% 
Taiwan 23,359,928 Malaysia 109 Japan 0.19% 
Australia 22,507,617 Singapore 73 Canada 0.19% 
Netherlands 16,877,351 Canada 66 China 0.17% 
Sweden 9,723,809 Australia 56 Indonesia 0.16% 
Israel 7,821,850 Netherlands 37 Sweden 0.15% 
PNG 6,552,730 Sweden 15 Philippines 0.12% 
Singapore 5,567,301 New Zealand 9 India 0.11% 
New Zealand 4,401,916 PNG 2 PNG 0.03% 
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance, 2014. CIA Factbook. 
Here Australia is less well endowed. According to the CIA Factbook, Australia ranked 56th in 
population in 2014; ahead of Sri Lanka and below Cote d’Ivoire. We have about one-third the 
population of the larger European powers and less than one-tenth that of the US. In regional 
terms, we’re just a little smaller than Malaysia, North Korea and Taiwan, but only a quarter 
the size of Thailand and the Philippines. Indonesia has more than ten times our population, 
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and we are but a drop in the ocean compared with India and China. The sobering fact is that 
we account for less than one-third of one per cent of the world’s people.  
Our permanent armed forces in 2014 amounted to around 56,000, which puts us near the 
bottom of the table in our selection of countries. Overall, there are around 56 countries with 
armed forces numerically superior to ours. As a proportion of population, we have around 
one-quarter of one per cent of our population engaged as full-time military personnel. This is 
less than European nations Spain (0.28%), Italy (0.29%) and France (0.34%), and behind the 
United States (0.47%). In fact, in our selection, the only Western countries we comfortably 
beat are those well-known strategic optimists, Canada and New Zealand (both of which have 
their strategic approaches covered by more powerful neighbours) and Sweden which makes 
extensive use of reserve personnel. That said; we do come ahead of Germany (0.23%) and 
the Netherlands (0.22%). In regional terms, we fall well behind Singapore (1.31%), Malaysia 
(0.36%) and Thailand (0.53%). Ranking in terms of proportion of population needs to be seen 
in the context of our avowed ‘maritime strategy’. With the exception of a short period in the 
1960s which saw conscription boost the Army to over 40,000, Australia has never 
maintained a large peacetime standing Army. As a country with no land borders and no 
prospective adversaries with an amphibious capability, the imperative to develop a 
manpower-intensive land force is slight.  
Impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
In 2009, the ASPI Budget Brief devoted an entire chapter to the potential impact of the GFC. 
The key aspects of that analysis are updated below. Figure 5.25 shows the recorded and 
prospective economic contraction globally and for advanced and developing economies 
separately. As can be seen, the impact was more severe in the former. In fact, compared 
with the initial estimates from early 2009, developing countries have gotten off even more 
lightly than expected—typically 2-3% less contraction—thereby widening the gap between 
the impact on developed and developing counties.  
The results for specific countries and sub-regions are shown in the lower graph. Note that 
China and Australia managed to avoid the worst of the recession compared with our 
respective cohorts.  
Over the past twelve months, the world economic outlook has oscillated between 
pessimistic and uncertain. The ongoing sovereign debt crisis in Europe has cast a shadow 
over the global economy, growth in China has been less rapid than anticipated, and the 
United Kingdom is undergoing a double-dip recession. Overall, near-term growth projections 
are slightly less optimistic today than they were this time last year. The United States, in 
particular, is undergoing the slowest and most hesitant recovery from recession in the 
post-war era. Even in Australia, where the impact of the GFC was not severe, the recovery 
has been slow by historical standards.  
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Figure 5.25: The Great Recession 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2014. 
At the time, the GFC only had a limited impact on international defence spending—probably 
because insufficient time was available to make substantial adjustments. Five years later, 
and the longer-term consequences are beginning to emerge. As shown earlier, from around 
2010 onwards, substantial cuts to defence spending have been made in a number of 
countries.  
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From the perspective of defence spending (and government spending more generally), the 
GFC did two things. First, it rapidly exacerbated long-standing problems with government 
debt in many advanced economies, see Figure 5.26.  
 Figure 5.26: The GFC and government debt  
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2014. 
Second, the GFC removed the complacency surrounding the sustainability of the financial 
system in general and government finances in particular. No longer is it possible to pretend 
that advanced economies can live beyond their means forever. Moreover, the GFC forced 
many countries to face up to the fiscal dilemma caused by ageing populations. A 2010 study 
by the IMF projects that, on current policy settings, the average general government net 
debt among G-7 countries will reach 200% by 2030 and 441% by 2050.  
The extent to which a country decides to reduce its defence spending as a result of mounting 
debt will depend on many factors—economic, strategic and cultural. A proper analysis of 
how these factors might come together for even one country is beyond the scope of this 
brief. But as we’ve already seen, a number of advanced economies are already working 
towards fiscal consolidation, including through cuts to defence spending.  
As a guide to the extent of fiscal pressures, key economic and fiscal data for countries of 
interest has been collected in Table 5.7. France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the 
United States all face sizable growing debts. And while the United States used to be a 
possible exception when it came to fiscal pressure because it owns the world’s reserve 
currency, the devaluation of the US dollar is eroding that comfort.   
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As the data makes clear, there will be much more pressure on advanced economies to rein 
in defence spending than on developing ones. Among the advanced countries, Australia is in 
a relatively strong position given its low debt and relatively shallow downturn.  
It is worth noting that the debt held by advanced economies will be more difficult to pay off 
than that in developing countries. Not just because advanced economies tend to owe a 
greater share of GDP, but also because developing economies grow two or three times 
faster than their advanced counterparts. Japan, in particular, faces an increasingly serious 
situation where its ageing population will impede growth at the same time as aged care and 
health costs rise in the years ahead. China, on the other hand, could erase its public debt 
within several years if it chose to do so.  
 
References and sources 
Economic data including GDP, deflators and CPI indices comes taken from the International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database 2014 (April 2014) available at www.imf.org. Most of the 
defence spending data is taken from successive editions of the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies’ The Military Balance from 1980 to 2014. Additional data has been drawn from the 
Department of Defence’s Defence Economic Trends produced by the Defence Intelligence 
Organisation between 2000 and 2007. Defence Economic Trends is available at 
http://www.defence.gov.au/dio/product.html. Additional national defence spending data has been taken 
from: Analysis of the FY 2012 Defense Budget Request, 2012, from the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Analysis available at www.csbaonline.org; China’s National Defense in 2010, the Defense 
White Paper for the People’s Republic of China, available at http://china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm; 
Historical Statistics of Japan; The Statistical Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, Japan, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/index.htm. The IMF study referred 
to is ‘Long-term Trends in Public Finances in the G-7 Economies’, Carlo Cottarelli and Andrea 
Schaechter, SPN/10/13, 2010.  
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Table 5.7: Pressures on government spending that might curtail defence spending 
 
Fiscal 
balance 
 2013 
(% GDP) 
 
 
Percentage annual  
GDP growth 
 
 
Net general government debt (IMF)  
or  
Public debt (CIA) 
 
as a share of annual GDP  
 2007 2009 2013 2005 2012 2018 
Advanced 
economies 
        
Australia -1.1% 4.6% 1.4% 3.0% -3.8% 11.6% 5.6% 
Canada -2.8% 2.1% -2.8% 1.5% 31% 34.6% 34.9% 
France -3.9% 2.3% -3.1% -0.1% 61% 84% 82% 
Germany -0.3% 3.4% -5.1% 0.6% 53% 57% 51% 
Italy -2.6% 1.7% -5.5% -1.5% 89% 103% 101% 
Japan -9.8% 2.2% -5.5% 1.6% 82% 134% 155% 
Korea 2.4% 5.1% 0.3% 2.8% 27% 32% 22% 
Netherlands -3.4% 3.9% -3.7% -0.5% 26% 32.5% 44% 
New Zealand -1.9% 3.5% -1.6% 2.7% 11.3% 26.4% 26.9% 
Singapore 5.0% 9.0% -0.8% 2.0% 102% 111% - 
Spain -6.6% 3.5% -3.7% -1.6% 35% 72% 98% 
Taiwan   -3.0% 6.0% -1.8% 3.0% 32% 36% - 
United Kingdom -7.0% 3.6% -4.0% 0.7% 37% 83% 91% 
United States -6.5% 1.9% -3.1% 1.9% 49% 88% 87% 
Regional 
economies 
       
Indonesia -2.8% 6.3% 4.6% 6.3% 56% 24.8% - 
Malaysia -4.0% 6.5% -1.5% 5.1% 45% 53.5% - 
Philippines -0.8% 6.6% 1.1% 6.0% 74% 51% - 
Thailand -2.7% 5.0% -2.30% 5.9% 48% 43.3% - 
Vietnam  -4.0% 8.5% 5.3% 5.2% 66% 48.2% - 
Emerging 
powers 
       
China -2.1% 14.2% 9.2% 8.0% 31% 31.7% - 
India -8.3% 10.1% 5.0% 5.7% 60% 51.9% - 
Russia -0.3% 8.5% -7.8% 3.4% 28% 12.2% - 
Source: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, April 2013, CIA Factbook 2013.  
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Chapter 6 – The Cost of War 
Introduction 
This chapter includes an explanation of how 
Defence is funded for deployments, updated 
information on historical deployment costs and a 
summary of the cost of recent operations including 
Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, the accumulating 
number of disability pensioners arising from recent 
deployments is surveyed. 
What do we mean by the cost of a war? 
As a rule, Defence is supplemented for the net 
additional cost of any major military operation. This 
makes good sense because, in principle at least, it ensures that Defence does not have to 
compromise peacetime training to fund operations, and avoids them having to maintain a 
contingency reserve to cover unanticipated costs. This practice was suspended in 2008-09 
because of a surplus of funding. It was then reinstated in 2009-10 but was only applied 
partially in the case of force protection measures in Afghanistan for which Defence absorbed 
much of the cost.  
Figure 6.1 shows how the net additional cost of an operation is calculated. In the past, 
Defence only disclosed the aggregate net additional operations cost, the total value of new 
capital investment and the amount recovered from third parties. However, although offsets 
remain undisclosed, Defence sometimes provides itemised lists of the individual costs 
incurred in operations. 
Figure 6.1 Calculating the ‘Net Additional Cost of War’ 
 
 
Net Additional 
Cost of War 
 
  = 
Net  
Additional 
Operations 
Cost 
 
 + 
Net 
Additional 
Capital 
Investment 
 
Where: 
 
Net Additional 
Operations 
Cost 
 
 Additional 
costs above 
normal 
peacetime 
expenditure 
 Offsetting 
savings due to 
cancelled 
peacetime 
activities 
 Costs 
recovered 
from 
3rd parties 
= − − 
   
 
The net additional operations cost includes the additional cost of personnel allowances, 
shipping and travel, repair and maintenance, health and inoculations, ammunition, 
contracted support, fuel, inventory, consumables etc. Offsetting savings includes the money 
saved from foregone activities like the cancelled Exercise Crocodile 99 and the Avalon Air 
Show in 1999-00 due to the deployment of Australian Forces to East Timor. Those costs 
Key Points 
Since 1998, Australia has committed 
more than $16.5 billion on military 
operations/overseas deployments. 
ADF deployments to Timor-Leste and 
Solomon Islands have now concluded.  
The total commitment to operations in 
Afghanistan has been $9.3 billion. 
Defence has absorbed $1.6 billion of 
the cost of operations. 
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recovered from 3rd parties include the partial recouping of costs from the UN when 
participating in a UN peacekeeping operation.  
The net additional capital investment usually represents the accelerated filling of capability 
gaps specific to the operation. Recent examples include the purchase of additional electronic 
warfare self-protection (EWSP) equipment for the AP-3C maritime patrol aircraft for Iraq, 
and the rapid acquisition of the Javelin anti-armour missile for Afghanistan. Capital costs 
sometimes also include modifications to platforms and additional inventory purchases.  
It’s also worth being specific about what is not included. The net additional cost of an 
operation does not include pay and allowances that would normally be incurred, or the cost 
of operating platforms within the planned peacetime rate of effort. Nor does it cover the 
costs incurred outside of Defence by the Australian Federal Police, DFAT or others involved 
in operations. Thus, aside from additional items like new equipment, ammunition, transport 
and contracted services, the net additional cost is the marginal cost of increased ADF activity 
due to an operation. 
What’s the big picture? 
Figure 6.2 shows the net cost of Defence deployments from 1998-99 to 2016-17. Note that 
Defence had been directed to absorb costs of $22 million in 2007-08, $1,082 million in 
2008-09, $43.1 million in 2009-10, $271 million in 2010-11, $368 million in 2011-12, $176 
million in 2012-13, $32.3 million in 2013-14 and $24.3 million in 2014-15.  
 Figure 6.2: The net additional cost of ADF operations 
Source: Defence Annual Reports and Budget Papers 
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Minor operations include: Bougainville, which cost $109 million between 1998 and 2003 (of 
which $43.3 million was absorbed by Defence); the 2006 Commonwealth Games ($13 
million); and support to the G20 Summit in 2014 ($15.1 billion).  
Figure 6.2 excludes the ‘force generation’ costs nominally associated with expanding the 
ADF by 3,555 troops for East Timor in late 1999. This was roughly $450 million per annum 
permanently included into the Defence funding base at the time of the 2000 White Paper. In 
the figure, ‘Afghanistan’ includes the Multinational Interception Force (MNIF) which became, 
for a time, part of the Iraq operation in March 2003.  
As shown in Figure 6.2, the cost of operations fell for the first time in eight years in 2011-12. 
The total cumulative real cost of recent operations is given in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1: Total real cost of recent and ongoing operations 
 
Dates (funding) Length Cost 2014-15 $ (million) 
Minor Operations 1998-99 to 2014-15 17 386 
Border Protection 2001-02 to 2015-16 15 294 
East Timor 1998-99 to 2013-14 16 3,230 
Afghanistan  2001-02 to 2016-17 16 9,261 
Iraq 2002-03 to 2009-10 8 2,995 
Solomon Islands 2003-04 to 2013-14 11 429 
Total 1998-99 to 2016-17 19 16,595 
Source: DAR and 2014-15 PBS. CPI deflator used throughout. Afghanistan includes MEAO and Gulf maritime operations.  
East Timor, ‘Force Generation’ funding to temporarily expand the Army and Air Force (which did not occur) is not included. 
New money for operations in the 2014-15 Budget  
Afghanistan and the Middle East Area of Operations (Op. Slipper, Accordion and Manitou) 
The government has funded the ADF deployment to Afghanistan until June 2015 at a cost of 
$240.8 million for 2014-15, including $16.2 million for enhanced force protection measures. 
In addition, a further $52 million will be spent on maritime security operations in the Middle 
East Area of Operations (MEAO) and $57 million supporting operations in Afghanistan and 
the MEAO from within the Gulf States.  
Border Protection (Operation Resolute) 
Between 1999 and 2012-13, $150 million was spent of maritime surveillance/border 
protection operations to Australia’s north west, representing an annual cost of around $11 
million. However, expended border protection operations resulted in costs of $59.7 million 
in 2013-14 and an anticipated $59.7 million in 2014-15. 
Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 – search (Operation Southern Indian Ocean) 
Defence will receive funding of $27.9 million over two years from 2013-14 for the costs of its 
activities to 30 June 2014 in searching for MH370. 
Support to 2014 G20 Summit  
A total of $7.1 million will be spent in 2013-14 and $8.0 million in 2014-15 for ADF security 
support to the 2014 G20 Summit in Brisbane. The cost of the support is being absorbed by 
Defence.  
 192 
 
Current operations at a glance 
Source: DAR and 2014-15 PBS. Includes MEAO and Gulf maritime operations. 
Indicative deployed personnel numbers, circa May each year. 
 
 Note: numbers do not include 400-500 personnel on border protection duty. 
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The human cost of war 
The financial costs of Australia’s military deployments do not account for the human cost 
incurred by deployed personnel and their families. A partial picture of this complex area is 
reflected in battle casualty statistics and disability pensions awarded to ADF members in 
recent conflicts. These are presented below in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. In Figure 6.4, the Special 
rate refers to totally and permanently (or temporarily) incapacitated. 
Figure 6.3: Battle casualties in Afghanistan 2002 to 2013 
Source: Department of Defence website, data as at 28 October 2013. 
Figure 6.4: Pensions arising from recent conflicts 
 Source: Department of Veteran’s Affairs, DVA Pensioner Summary, December 2013. 
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Chapter 7 – Defence Industry  
Since at least the 1970s, Australia has aspired to be 
self-reliant when it comes to its own defence. The 
caveats and qualifications to what’s meant by 
self-reliance are many and changing, and needn’t 
concern us here. What’s important is that everyone 
agrees that an essential component of self-reliance 
is a local defence industry that can (at the least) 
repair, maintain and adapt the equipment used by 
our defence force.  
To this end, successive governments have adopted 
policies to ensure that Australia’s defence industrial 
base is adequate for the task. This outcome is 
deemed to be important enough for governments to publish formal defence industry policy 
statements from time to time. The last such statement was made by the Rudd government 
in June 2010. In recent years, Defence has also released ‘health checks’ of particular defence 
industry sectors as part of an ongoing process of assessment.  
There’s also a series of mostly long-standing government programs designed to assist local 
industry. These include support for skills development (≈$23 million p.a.), research and 
development (≈$30 million p.a.) and export facilitation (≈$11 million p.a.). The government 
also tries to leverage its foreign arms purchases to allow local firms to bid into global 
defence materiel supply chains.  
Despite the effort and priority accorded to maintaining a healthy local defence industry, 
there’s surprisingly little hard data in the public domain about the size and shape of the 
sector. This chapter tries to redress that shortfall by collating and analysing what 
information is available. Our aim is to analyse macro trends, such as the rate of growth and 
pace of commercial consolidation or diversification. Readers seeking a detailed 
company-by-company description of the sector should consult the latest Australian Defence 
Magazine (ADM) Top-40 Defence Contractors (see ADM magazine Dec 2013/Jan 2014), a 
reliable and informative source from which much of the data used here is derived.  However, 
because of its unique status of being 100% government-owned, a detailed analysis of the 
shipbuilder ASC Pty Ltd has also been included along with a discussion of naval shipbuilding 
more generally, including the pending ‘valley-of-death’ in demand. Finally a stand-alone 
discussion of the Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) project has been included. 
Australian Defence Industry 
According to the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), the Australian defence industry 
employs around 25-26,000 people (2013-14). Structurally, the sector is dominated by a small 
number of large prime contractors which account for around 50% of employment. DMO 
further estimates that there are over 3,000 SMEs operating in local defence industry, mostly 
as subcontractors to the larger prime contractors. An SME is typically defined as a firm 
Key Points 
Local defence industry grew two-fold 
between 1995 and 2006 in terms of 
revenue, but has remained stagnant 
since.  
Local defence industry is dominated 
by a handful of foreign-owned 
companies. 
The future of naval shipbuilding in 
Australia remains ambiguous despite 
large projects in preparation.      
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employing fewer than 200 employees. In most cases, SMEs operating in the defence sector 
also trade in the civilian economy.  
Of the amount spent on materiel acquisition and sustainment in Australia, DMO estimates 
that around a third goes directly to local SMEs and two-thirds to prime contractors. Some of 
the money going to prime contractors will flow on down to subcontracting SMEs.  DMO 
advises that in 2013-14, around $5.4 billion was spent in Australia on defence materiel 
acquisitions ($1.8 billion) and materiel support ($3.6 billion). The latter figure includes $500 
million of fuels, oils and lubricants. 
Applying a little arithmetic to these official estimates reveals several interesting things. 
Taking the mid-point in DMO’s employment range, 25,500, the average revenue per 
employee for prime contractors is $282,353, and for non-prime contractors is only $141,176 
per employee (excluding fuels, oils and lubricants in each case). The relatively low revenue 
per employee in defence non-prime contractors probably reflects the fact that they receive 
further revenue as subcontractors from the primes (i.e. in addition to what they receive 
directly from Defence). Quite literally, some defence spending gets double handled so the 
consequential turnover in local defence industry exceeds the amount that Defence initially 
spends. Assuming that non-prime contractors actually generate revenue per employee at 
the same rate as large defence firms, total revenue for the sector would be $7.2 billion (of 
which around $1.8 billion is double counted).  
But in absolute terms, even revenue of $282,353 per employee is low compared with the 
average ($428,100) for Australian manufacturing firms (ABS series 8155 for 2011-12). But 
this latter figure is inflated by the high output per employee in the large-scale 
capital-intensive petroleum and primary metal production industries. Arguably better 
comparators are ‘transport equipment manufacture’ ($352,100 per employee) and 
‘machinery and equipment manufacturing’ ($325,748 per employee). The remaining 
difference in revenue per employee probably reflects a combination of three factors: poor 
economies of scale leading to relatively high fixed labour-intensive administrative 
overheads, an absence of mechanisation (due to poor economies of scale), and intrinsically 
labour-intensive software and computer work.   
The size of the Australian defence industry sector is compared with manufacturing and 
Australian industry overall in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1: The scale of Australian defence industry (circa 2010-2013) 
 
Australian  
Industry 
Australian Manufacturing 
Sector 
Australian  
Defence Industry 
employees 10,727,000 929,000 25,500 
revenue ($m) 2,789,052 397,705 7,200 
value add ($m) 1,012,252 102,146 *2,025 
revenue per employee $260,000 $428,100 $282,353 
Source: ABS series 8155, DMO and ASPI analysis. *estimated as explained below 
It follows that defence industry accounts for 0.24% of jobs in Australia, equivalent to 2.74% 
of jobs in the manufacturing sector. In terms of annual revenue, defence industry accounts 
for 0.26% of Australian industry and 1.81% of the manufacturing sector. Moreover, if we 
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assume that defence industry results in the same ratio of value added to revenue (33%) as 
the (relatively high value add) machinery and equipment manufacturing sector, the defence 
sector gives rise to a value add of $2.4 billion representing only around 0.16% of Australia’s 
GDP. So although Australian defence industry is undoubtedly important for our defence 
force, it represents only a trifling fraction of the overall Australian economy.  
A closer look 
Getting below the aggregate data for local defence industry is difficult because there aren’t 
any official statistics on the detailed size and shape of the sector. Fortunately, however, the 
ADM has been surveying local defence contractors since 1995 and has generously made its 
nineteen years of data available to us. Two points need to be made before proceeding. First, 
the nature of the survey results in both limitations and uncertainties on the data set—these 
will be pointed out as we go. Second, ASPI takes full responsibility for the analysis and 
conclusions that follow. Whatever violence is done to the data is our fault alone. 
The best way to understand the data set is to look in detail at the latest results presented in 
the Dec 2013/Jan2014 edition of the ADM. The Top-40 Defence Contractors list, as it’s 
known, details the top 40 firms contracted to deliver goods and services to Defence either 
directly or via sub-contracting work to prime contractors. This includes not only defence 
materiel production and maintenance, but also functions such as catering, cleaning and 
facilities construction. Because these latter activities draw services from the highly 
competitive broader economy, they’re of less interest to us and are therefore excluded as 
far as possible in what follows.  
This isn’t to imply that such suppliers are irrelevant to the operation of the ADF—far from it, 
they’re absolutely essential. But our concern is with companies with specialist defence 
materiel knowledge that are usually highly dependent upon defence contracts for survival.  
Irrespective of what Defence might do, there will always be companies ready to build 
facilities, cook meals, clean buildings, mow lawns and transport goods. The same isn’t true of 
firms capable of supplying and sustaining military equipment, hence our focus.  
Table 7.2 lists the ADM Top-40 for 2013 with defence materiel and non-defence materiel 
companies separated. Some companies straddle the boundary between providing civil and 
defence specific items, particularly in the information and telecommunications sector. 
We’ve done our best to assign such companies on the balance of their activities. 
It should also be kept in mind that the ADM Top-40 survey is voluntary and from time to 
time companies have chosen not to participate—sometimes reflecting a policy of 
non-disclosure.  
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Table 7.2: ADM Top-40 Defence Contractors 2013 
    
Revenue ($m) Personnel Revenue per employee ('000s) 
  Predominately defence materiel contractors        
1 BAE Systems Australia 1,400 5,000 280 
2 ASC Pty Ltd 915.7 2,400 382 
3 Thales Australia 795 3200 248 
4 Raytheon Australia Pty Ltd 711 1252 568 
5 Australian Aerospace Limited 540 1300 415 
9 Transfield Services Limited 290 1,200 242 
10 Boeing Defence Australia  273.5 1200 228 
11 Lockheed Martin Australia Pty Limited 270 900 300 
13 Saab Australia Pty Ltd 182.8 296 618 
15 ESS Support Services Worldwide (ESS) 110 650 169 
17 Qantas Defence Services 99.9 290 344 
18 Austal 88 470 187 
19 SAFRAN Pacific 87 210 414 
20 Sikorsky Helitech 85 185 459 
21 CSC Australia  82 500 164 
21 Elbit Systems of Australia Pty Ltd (ELSA) 82 123 667 
24 Babcock Pty Ltd 67 343 195 
25 Nova Systems  60 220 273 
25 CAE Australia Pty Ltd 60 152 395 
27 Qinetiq Pty Ltd 55 300 183 
30 Rockwell Collins  44 85 518 
32 CEA Technologies Pty Ltd 43.4 280 155 
33 Airbus Military 39.5 10 3950 
34 KBR, Defence & Government Services 36.5 242 151 
35 Chemring Australia 36 86 419 
37 L-3 Oceania 35 100 350 
38 Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd 34.7 684 51 
39 Australian Defence Apparel Pty Ltd (ADA) 32.5 181 180 
40 Safe Air Limited 30 170 176 
40 General Dynamics Land Systems - Australia 30 80 375 
  Total 6,615 22,109 435 
 
Predominately non-defence materiel       
6 John Holland Group Pty Ltd 435.8  ?   
7 Serco Sodexo Defence Services Pty Ltd 332 2800 119 
8 Spotless Group Limited 310 950 326 
12 Serco Systems 225 400 563 
14 Aspen Medical 163 2182 75 
16 IBM Australia Limited 102.5 260 394 
23 Accenture 72.4  ?   
28 Adagold Aviation Pty Ltd 48.5 11 4409 
29 Sinclair Knight Merz (SKM) 44.8   ?   
30 GHD Pty Ltd 44   ?   
35 DHL Global Forwarding 36   ?   
  Total 1814     
Source: ADM Top-40 Defence Contractors –1995-2013, published by Australian Defence Magazine, Dec/Jan edition each year. 
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Surveying the data reveals several interesting things. To start with, several companies have 
surprisingly low revenues per employee, as low as $51,000 in one instance, which probably 
reflects an overstatement of the number of employees engaged in defence work within the 
firm. Conversely, a number of firms have surprisingly high revenues per employee, of the 
sort more commonly attached to large-scale capital-intensive primary production. Setting 
aside the possibility that Defence is simply paying egregious monopoly rents, there are two 
likely explanations. First, some firms might have included revenue earned from retailing 
imported equipment. Indeed, several of the companies in question import weapons systems 
on a large scale. Second, other firms (particularly in the facilities construction sector) have a 
natural heavy reliance on subcontractors.  
Taking the data at face value, it says that the top thirty contractors by defence revenue have 
a collective turnover of $6.6 billion and employ around 22,100 people, implying average 
revenue per employee of $299,000 a year. In comparison, DMO estimate average turnover 
at $200,000 to $250,000 per employee on the basis of other sources. These figures are 
broadly commensurate with those derived earlier from Defence’s estimate of employment 
in the sector. 
Over the past eighteen years, the top five firms in any given year have accounted for, on 
average, 65% of total revenue of defence materiel contractors in the ADM Top-40. In 2013, 
as shown in Figure 7.1, that share was 66%.   
Figure 7.1: Revenue distribution for ADM Top-40 2013 
 
Source: ADM Top-40 Defence Contractors –1995-2013, published by Australian Defence Magazine, Dec/Jan edition each year. 
The actual companies in the top five change from year to year as contracts ebb and flow. Yet 
the current major players are easily identified. Table 7.3 reproduces the key prime 
contractors identified in the government’s 2010 defence industry policy statement. It’s 
important to note that only one of the firms—the government-owned ASC Pty Ltd—is 
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controlled by an Australian-based entity, with the remainder split between the United States 
and Europe.   
Table 7.3: Key Australia-based prime contractors 
Prime 
Parent 
company or 
owner 
Country of 
origin 
Key activities 
Per cent of 
parent 
revenues 
Stock exchange 
listing 
ASC Pty Ltd 
Australian 
Government 
Australia 
submarines and 
ships 
n/a n/a 
Australian 
Aerospace 
EADS 
France, 
Germany & 
Spain 
helicopters < 1 Paris 
BAE Systems 
Australia 
BAE United Kingdom varied 3.2 London 
Boeing Defence 
Australia 
Boeing United States aerospace 0.5 New York 
Raytheon 
Australia 
Raytheon United States 
systems 
integration 
1.3 New York 
Saab Systems Saab AB Sweden 
land and 
maritime 
3.1 Stockholm 
Lockheed 
Martin Australia 
Lockheed 
Martin 
United States 
electronic and 
information 
systems 
<1 New York 
Thales Australia Thales France 
maritime and 
varied 
2 Paris 
Source: 2010 Defence Industry Policy Statement. 
Foreign ownership of our key prime defence contractors brings benefits and risks. On the 
plus side, we undoubtedly get better access to foreign weapons systems than we otherwise 
would. In addition, foreign subsidiaries in Australia can ‘reach back’ to their parent owners 
for skilled personnel, knowledge and intellectual property. And because we have 
relationships with arms manufacturers on both sides of the Atlantic, competitive pressures 
can in theory be brought to bear when making purchases.   
On the minus side, because foreign-owned Australian primes account for very small shares 
of parent company revenue, they’re unlikely to command priority if a commercial or 
strategic conflict of interest arises. For example, if a foreign parent has to choose between 
supplying Australia or its home country with munitions in a crisis, there’s no question about 
what will happen. In most areas this is unavoidable; Australia doesn’t have sufficient 
demand to support fully indigenous defence industrial capabilities in all but a limited range 
of niche areas. Choosing and maintaining such capabilities is a strategic challenge of the first 
order.  
The relatively small number of prime contractors operating in Australia is consistent with the 
consolidation of defence manufacturing that has been underway in Europe and the United 
States since 1945 and which accelerated following the end of the Cold War. However, in our 
particular case, the local cycle of having a small number of large defence projects 
dominating spending at any one time is probably also important. It’s perhaps noteworthy 
that revenue among local defence firms broadened between 1995 and 2006 (as the Anzac 
and Collins programs were completed) and narrowed again between 2006 and 2012 (see 
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Figure 7.2). The consolidation of various local companies over the years might have also 
played a role. Some of the key mergers and acquisitions are depicted in Figure 7.3.  
Figure 7.2: Revenue distribution for top-30 defence contractors 1995 to 2013  
Source: ADM Top-40 Defence Contractors –1995-2013, published by Australian Defence Magazine, Dec/Jan edition each year. 
Figure 7.3: Key mergers, acquisitions and name changes in local defence industry  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With nineteen years of data on local defence industry, the obvious question is whether the 
sector has grown or contracted over time. Figure 7.4 provides the answer using the 
Consumer Price Index to inflate historical data. Because total revenues are dominated by a 
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small number of large turnover firms every year, changes to the ADM Top-40 over time are a 
credible indicator of trends in the sector. Roughly speaking, the size of the sector in revenue 
terms has almost doubled since the mid-1990s. Looking more closely, three eras can be 
identified; moderate growth during the late 1990s, rapid growth in the early- to mid-2000s, 
and stagnation over the past six years at a higher than usual level. It’s not surprising that 
revenues grew in the years following the 2000 White Paper as extra money flowed into 
Defence. Similarly, the mounting deferrals of investment and various efficiency measures of 
recent years broadly accord with the observed stagnation in growth.   
Figure 7.4: Growth and stagnation: Turnover of defence materiel contractors in ADM Top 40 
 Source: ADM Top-40 Defence Contractors –1995-2013, published by Australian Defence Magazine, Dec/Jan edition each year. 
At this point it’s natural to compare the trends in local defence industry with spending by 
Defence on materiel. However, this can only be done with the caveat that repeated changes 
to Defence's accounting rules and reporting make this difficult, as does the absence and 
unreliability of data in the years around the turn of the century. Our best attempt to make 
sense of the available data appears in Figure 7.5. It looks as though the share of local work 
rose and fell with the wave of large naval construction and aviation upgrades in the 1990s. 
It’s possible that the levelling off in revenue for local firms after 2006 (and the corresponding 
reduced share of total investment) also reflects the increasing tendency of governments to 
purchase equipment off-the-shelf from foreign suppliers. Recent examples include the 24 
F/A-18 Super Hornet fighters and five C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft. Fortunately, the 
United States Government collects and discloses detailed information on commercial and 
government-to-government arms exports through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
program. Similarly, the European Union publishes the value of export licences granted each 
year. Historical trends in US and EU defence exports to Australia are shown in Figure 7.6, 
where it should be noted that the figures include both equipment acquisitions and 
sustainment goods and services such as spare parts and repair of rotable items. To allow 
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comparison, the value of each year’s exports has been converted from US and Euro to 
Australian dollars at the prevailing exchange rate before being translated into 2012 dollars. 
Figure 7.5: Percentage of equipment by cost purchased locally 1975 to 2014-15  
 Source: Defence Annual Reports and FAD&T SLC Question on Notice 44, 29 May 2012. 
Figure 7.6: US defence exports and European Union export licences to Australia (billion 2012 A$)
 
Source: Data from US Security Cooperation Agency, US State Department export controls reports, EU arms exports reporting.  
Conclusion 
Hopefully, the brief analysis presented here will provide grist for the mill for those interested 
in the local defence industry. To the extent that conclusions can be drawn from the data, the 
picture is mixed. While the past decade and a half has seen the scale of local industry grow 
substantially, growth has all but stalled since around 2007. The likely main reasons are 
slowing defence investment and a rise in imports. Accordingly, the future prospects for local 
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industry will depend on whether and how quickly defence spending recovers from the 
current retrenchment and the extent to which future purchases come from offshore.  
ASC Pty Ltd (formerly the Australian Submarine Corporation) 
The Australian Submarine Corporation was formed in 1985, and in 1987 was awarded the 
contract to build six Collins class submarines. Initially, ownership of the corporation was 
shared between the Australian Government, submarine designer Kockums of Sweden, 
Wormald International and Chicago Bridge and Iron, but by 1991 only Kockums and the 
government remained shareholders. In 2000, the Australian Government bought out 
Kockums and became the sole owner.  
Overview 
At present, ASC is operated as a Government Business Enterprise (GBE) under the 
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 with the Minister for Finance as sole 
shareholder. Consistent with its status as a GBE, the company has a board made up of 
executive and non-executive members. The corporate structure appears below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The three direct subsidiaries of ASC reflect the diversification of ASC into areas beyond the 
construction, upgrade and maintenance of the Collins class. ASC Engineering was established 
to undertake the design, construction and project management of civil heavy engineering 
projects. At present, ASC Engineering isn’t an active entity. Deep Blue Tech was established 
to secure a role in the design of the Collins class replacement. With around 60 personnel, 
Deep Blue Tech is working on options for the future submarine. The largest of the three 
entities, ASC Shipbuilding, was established to bid for what has become the $8.1 billion Air 
Minister for Finance and 
Deregulation 
ASC  
Pty Ltd 
ASC 
Shipbuilding  
Pty Ltd 
Deep Blue  
Tech  
Pty Ltd 
ASC 
Engineering  
Pty Ltd 
ASC  
Modules 
Pty Ltd 
ASC AWD 
Shipbuilding 
Pty Ltd 
205 
 
Warfare Destroyer project for the RAN. Its two subsidiaries ASC Modules and ASC AWD 
Shipbuilding were created to operate within the AWD Alliance, which we explore in detail in 
the next section. ASC also runs a submarine training school for the RAN that’s based in WA. 
Putting aside the latent ASC Engineering and nascent Deep Blue Tech, there are two main 
projects underway at ASC: the construction of the AWD, and sustainment and upgrade of 
the Collins fleet. The former occurs at the ‘ASC South’ facility at Osborne SA while the latter 
occurs mostly at the (original) ‘ASC North’ facility at Osborne SA. Some additional submarine 
work is also undertaken at ‘ASC West’ in WA near the RAN submarine homeport. ASC South 
and ASC North are separated by the SA Government’s taxpayer-funded Common User 
Facility which includes the massive ship-lift and hardstand being used for the consolidation 
and later launch of the three AWDs by ASC.  
There are two ways to track the scale of activity at ASC over time: financial turnover and 
personnel numbers. As shown in Figure 7.7, the ASC workforce grew during the construction 
of the Collins fleet and fell before rising again as the full volume of Collins class remediation, 
upgrade and maintenance work was felt. In recent days, the ASC workforce has grown to 
around 2,480 as the AWD workload approaches its maximum.  
Figure 7.7: ASC workforce 1987 to 2013 
 
 Source: ASC Pty Ltd Annual Reports 
Only a small number of personnel were employed by ASC on the AWD project prior to 2006 
(and even in that year the AWD workforce was only about 60 staff). Consequently, by the 
middle of the last decade, the size of the ASC workforce engaged in submarine 
post-construction work was close to the peak reached during the Collins construction 
program twelve years earlier. This demonstrates the relative high labour-intensity of Collins 
through-life-support compared with construction.  
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The consolidated corporate turnover and profit for recent years is shown below in 
Figure 7.8, where the increase in revenue after the commencement of AWD construction in 
mid-2007 is clear. Note, however, that ASC’s after-tax profit as a share of revenue fell from 
9.7% in 2007 to 1.1% 2013. In at least the first part of the period, this reflects a decision to 
reinvest profits back into the business, including into facilities and Deep Blue Tech.  
Figure 7.8: ASC Key Financial Results   
Source: ASC Pty Ltd Annual Reports 
We now turn to examine in Dickensian fashion the various activities of ASC in a little more 
detail before concluding with some observations about its future ownership. 
The ghost of submarines past—Collins through-life support 
For reasons that we don’t understand, Defence failed to have a through-life-support strategy 
or contract in place for the Collins class at the end of the construction program. Instead, ASC 
undertook piecemeal work as requested to maintain, repair and upgrade the fleet. In 2003, a 
long-term Through Life Support Agreement (TLSA) was established between Defence and 
ASC. Nominally a 15-year $3.5 billion agreement, the TLSA is essentially a cost-plus contract 
with limited options for incentives and sanctions.  
Because we don’t know the price paid each year to ASC to maintain the Collins, we have to 
rely on the reported total sustainment costs for an indication of costs. Note that total 
sustainment costs include many things that don’t result in payments to ASC (such as fuel and 
government furnished equipment). In particular, sustainment of mission system items such 
as sonar, combat system and electronic warfare is provided separately by other suppliers 
through DMO. Total sustainment costs for the Collins fleet are given in Figure 7.9, beginning 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
po
st
-t
ax
 p
ro
fit
 %
 o
f r
ev
en
ue
 
m
ill
io
n 
$A
 (c
ur
re
nt
 ye
ar
) 
Revenue
Post tax profit (%)
Collins Build 
AWD Build 
207 
 
with the first year that data is available, 2007-08. To allow a comparison over time, historical 
costs have been inflated using the 2.5% deflator applied to the Defence budget. Known 
payments to ASC under the TLSA for sustainment and projects have also been included. 
Figure 7.9: Total annual Collins class sustainment costs  
  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, 2013-14 PAES, 2014-15 PBS and FAD&T QoN 19, 17 October 2012 & Q196, 28/29 May 2012. 
Caution must be exercised when inferring anything from Figure 7.9. Large year-to-year 
fluctuations naturally arise due to the timing of full-cycle-dockings, spares purchases, and 
the number of boats actually being operated by the RAN (as opposed to lying idle absent a 
crew). 
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the overall cost of sustaining the Collins fleet is 
perceived to be high. Coupled with long-standing problems with the availability and 
reliability of the vessels, this has led to three initiatives that are reshaping the sustainment 
of the fleet and ASC’s role therein.  
First, ASC has a comprehensive program to boost labour productivity. As a 
government-owned entity working under what are effectively cost-plus contracts, it would 
be surprising if inefficiency hadn’t crept in over time. Initial reports confirm this to be the 
case, with substantial improvements achieved over the past couple of years—including a 
boost in labour utilisation from 30% to 75% in some areas.  
Second, in June 2012 Defence and ASC agreed to a performance-based In-Service Support 
Contract (ISSC). By moving away from cost-plus reimbursement for work, ASC will have 
strong incentives to continue productivity and performance improvements within its 
business. 
Third, the government is implementing the recommendations of a review of Collins 
sustainment undertaken by an independent expert, Mr John Cole. The phase one report, 
which was delivered in December 2011, identified a host of problems within and between 
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Defence, DMO, Navy and ASC that contribute to poor and/or costly outcomes for Collins 
class sustainment. The phase two report was delivered in December 2012 and suggested the 
following target levels for the Collins fleet: 
• 2 boats available 100% of the time 
• 3 boats available 90% of the time 
• 4 boats available 50% of the time. 
The report made 25 recommendations for how to achieve this, including reducing the length 
of full-cycle dockings from three to two years, moving to a cycle involving a one-year mid-
cycle docking and six-month intermediate dockings, and appointing a Transformation 
Manager to implement the report’s recommendations. 
A follow-up report released in April 2014 concluded that ‘submarine availability has 
improved significantly with the submarine force achieving usually two and frequently three 
submarines materially available on any one day’ as measured over successive financial years. 
The improvement is attributable to a combination of ‘greatly enhanced availability of spares, 
[fewer] planned maintenance over-runs, few breakdowns and faster repairs to operational 
boats’. 
In the longer term, to meet the targeted availability of the vessels it’s critical that major 
refits are completed in two years. The first two year Full-Cycle Docking is due to commence 
in June 2014 (HMAS Farncomb) and will be a major test for ASC and the new maintenance 
regime.  
Overall then, it looks as though the arrangements for sustainment of the Collins class have 
finally been put on a solid technical and commercial base and, so far, the results are very 
encouraging. 
The ghost of ships present—the Air Warfare Destroyer project 
In October 2001, the last of the RAN’s three Charles F Adams class DDG destroyers, HMAS 
Brisbane, was decommissioned, leaving a capability gap in the area of fleet air defence. The 
2000 Defence White Paper (produced sometime after the stable door had been left wide 
open) included Project SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer to redress the shortfall. After 
preliminary studies in the first half of the decade, the project effectively gained first pass 
approval in mid-2005 when two companies, ASC Shipbuilding and Raytheon Australia, were 
selected as alliance partners to work with Defence to take the proposal forward to second 
pass. A third firm, Gibbs and Cox, was designated as the preferred designer, with Spanish 
builder Navantia also engaged as a design partner. 
Two options were developed for second pass consideration: an Australianised (and smaller) 
version of the US DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer, the so-called ‘baby Burke’, and the 
military-off-the-shelf Spanish F-100 frigate with an Australianised combat system. In each 
case, the core of the combat system was to be the Lockheed Martin Aegis system with its 
phased array radar. Purchase of the combat system commenced in 2006 under an FMS 
program with the US Government. 
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When the F-100 was announced as the winner in June 2007, some people were surprised. 
Gibbs and Cox, the designer of the DDG-51, had been designated as the ‘preferred designer’ 
of the evolved option back in 2005 and many perceived the F-100 as a 'stalking horse' to put 
commercial pressure on the US option. As it turned out, the extra cost and risk associated 
with a scaled-down but on-paper-only DDG-51 tipped the balance in favour of the smaller 
pre-existing Spanish vessel.  
From the commencement of the project through to second pass, a total of $251 million was 
spent, excluding long lead-time purchases for the Aegis combat system. Most of the money 
(roughly $211 million) was spent in the two years between mid-2005 and mid-2007. It 
remains to be explained how so much money was spent simply to make a decision between 
two designs. 
The AWD Alliance, as it’s known, involves three parties in a contractual arrangement, which 
is novel for Australian Defence (see Figure 7.10). ASC is the designated shipbuilder, Raytheon 
Australia is the combat system integrator and DMO acts as both the customer on behalf of 
the RAN (and ultimately the Commonwealth) and as a full participant in the alliance. 
Governance is exercised by a Board made up of representatives of the three parties with a 
commitment to consensus decision-making.  
The alliance is predicated upon an ‘equitable sharing of risks and rewards’ between the 
three participants. In practice, this revolves around achieving a Target Cost Estimate (TCE) 
for the project that was developed back in 2007. The TCE is around $4.5 billion for the work 
covered by the alliance. This includes the direct recovery cost of planned activities by the 
participants and their respective subcontractors. The remainder of the overall $8 billion 
project cost involves other expenses to be covered directly by DMO, including government 
furnished equipment such as the Aegis combat system.  
 
Figure 7.10: The AWD Alliance   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Last year’s budget brief included an extensive discussion of the alliance contracting 
framework and its incentives (perverse and otherwise). Rather than repeat that material this 
year, we turn now to look at how the project has been going.  
Defence Materiel 
Organisation 
ASC  
Shipbuilding 
Raytheon  
Australia 
 
 
 
 
Commonwealth of Australia 
Subcontractor 
Subcontractor 
Subcontractor 
AWD Alliance 
BAE Australia  
 
Forgacs Group 
 Subcontractor 
 
Subcontractor Subcontractor 
US Government  
Navantia (Spain)  
 
Subcontractor  
Subcontractor  
210 
 
According to ASC Ltd, the AWD project was 50.5% complete as at June 2012 and 69.9% 
complete as at June 2013. To date, the build phase of the project has spent $5,192 million 
from an approved project budget of $7,848 million, representing about 66% of available 
funds. Some care needs to be taken in inferring progress from aggregate expenditure 
because a significant share of the budget is allocated to the combat system and weapons 
purchases, which are somewhat unrelated to the progress in physical construction. A better 
measure comes from comparing planned and actual expenditure on a year-by-year basis as 
in Figure 7.12. As can be seen, the project exceeded its spending targets for the first two 
years, fell well short for the next two, but came close to planned expenditure targets over 
the past two years.   
Figure 7.11: AWD expenditure ($m)  
 Source: Defence Annual Reports and 2014-15 PBS 
Figure 7.12: Planned and actual expenditure ($m)  
 
Source: Defence Annual Reports and 2013-14 PAES 
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At the time of second pass approval, the first AWD was scheduled to be delivered in 
December 2014, the second in March 2016 and the third in June 2017. Due to early 
problems with the construction of modules, the schedule for the delivery of the first AWD 
has slipped by twelve months to December 2015.   
Specific issues included the difficulty of activating new, and reactivating long unused 
fabrication operations, as well as problems with learning to work with the style of drawing 
provided by the Spanish designer. As a result, responsibility for fabricating 18 of the 90 
modules was reallocated in May 2011. Then, in March 2012, a further reallocation of 
modules occurred, resulting in additional work going offshore to Spain. The allocation of 
module construction as at June 2013 was: 
Ship 1: ASC 8, BAE Systems 7, Forgacs 14, Navantia 1, MG Engineering 1.  
Ship 2: ASC 7, BAE Systems 4, Forgacs 13, Navantia 6, MG Engineering 1.  
Ship 1: ASC 7, BAE Systems 4, Forgacs 13, Navantia 6, MG Engineering 1.  
When the module work was reallocated it was hoped that the changes, coupled with 
refinements within the consolidation yard, would be sufficient to make the revised schedule 
feasible. Indeed, work was well underway on the fabrication of the first two vessels and 
work had commenced on modules for the third.  
However, in September 2012 it was announced that there would be a further delay to AWD 
delivery. The formal announcement was unhelpfully ambiguous about the reasons for the 
delay. On the one hand it said that the ‘revised AWD plan will reduce peak demand on 
project critical resources and facilities, and reduces project risk’. On the other, it said that 
‘the delay will help avoid a decline in naval shipbuilding skills before the commencement of 
Australia’s largest and most complex naval project—the Future Submarine’.  
Table 7.4: Progressive delivery schedule for the AWD project  
 Original delivery date 2011 reschedule 2012 reschedule 
HMAS Hobart December 2014 December 2015 March 2016 
HMAS Brisbane March 2016 March 2017 September 2017 
HMAS Sydney June 2017 June 2018 March 2019 
Source: Various Ministerial Media Releases. 
It’s unlikely the preservation of naval shipbuilding skills was a significant factor in bringing 
about the delay. As Figure 7.13 shows, most of the workforce was planned to have 
dissipated well prior to the delivery of the final vessel, so even with the additional 
nine-month delay for the final vessel, most of the workforce will have moved on from the 
maritime sector by 2016.  
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Figure 7.13: AWD workforce demands – alliance plus local contractors  
Source: presentation by Defence official, January 2012 
What’s more, the skills needed at the end of a shipbuilding project are different to those 
needed at the start of a submarine project. Add to this that the Future Submarine project 
isn’t due for second pass consideration until 2016–17 at the earliest, and it’s clear that 
maintaining skills in the sector for that purpose was largely irrelevant to the reschedule.  
One way that the workforce issue might be relevant (now if not necessarily back at the time 
of the announced delay) is if the government brings forward other work in the maritime 
sector, such as the Future Frigates. This possibility is discussed in the next section. 
Finally, there’s a curious point to be considered about the announcement of the delays. 
According to the Minister, the ‘new schedule won’t increase the cost of the project’. At first 
blush, this is difficult to make sense of, at least from an industrial production perspective. By 
extending the project by nine months, the overheads due to the fixed administrative and 
engineering workforces will be extended, as will facilities operations costs. So even if the 
actual blue-collar production activity can be rescheduled at zero cost (which it probably can 
for a large project such as the AWD), additional costs will still arise in the production 
process. 
Of course, that doesn’t necessarily mean that the price of the project to the government has 
to rise. One explanation for the ready embrace of the delays by industry is that it was having 
trouble delivering on schedule and was happy to be cut some slack. So happy in fact, that it 
was willing to bear the additional cost of an extended production schedule in order to avoid 
the risk of larger losses due to missed deadlines over the next few years. 
According to DMO’s 2013 Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan (FSISP) the financial 
consequence of the delays to the AWD project has been in the order of $200 million, which 
it attributes to ‘lack of experience across production engineering and production 
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supervision’. An alternative measure of the impact of the delays can be garnered from the 
shipbuilding workforce profiles provided in the FSISP for the period prior, and subsequent, to 
the delays (Scenario 2 verses Scenario 5). The workforce demands in the charts group 
together the LHD and AWD projects, but since the LHD project is apparently going well, the 
difference must be due to the extension of the AWD schedule. With a sharp pencil and a 
little care, the additional workload can be measured. The result is around an additional 
2,153 work-years (representing 19% of the total) to complete the project.  
According to an ANAO report released in March 2014, it was estimated in November 2012 
that ‘the contract for the construction of the DDGs would be completed at an estimated cost 
of some $302 million or 6.8% in excess of the Target Cost Estimate’. 
 Again, according to the ANAO, the project has experienced a range of difficulties including 
‘immaturity in detailed design documentation and block construction problems leading to 
extensive, time consuming and costly re-work’, and ‘substantially lower than anticipated 
construction productivity’.  On the latter issue, by November 2013 it was costing $1.60 to 
produce work originally estimated to cost $1.00.  
It would be a mistake to blame the problems experienced with the ‘immaturity in detailed 
design documentation’ solely on Navantia. In the period leading up to selection of the design 
and final government approval, the three members of the alliance had every opportunity to 
assess the suitability of Navantia as a supplier of design documents and to test their ability 
to make use of those documents.  
Similarly for industry and Defence’s claim that productivity is low because of having to 
recommence shipbuilding after an extended hiatus. In the final analysis, the delays to the 
project reflect a failure by the Alliance to understand what could be achieved with the 
workforce it knew would be available. Nonetheless, problems with the AWD continue to be 
depicted as the result of externalities beyond the control of Defence or Industry.  
With the project ‘behind the curve’ in meeting the TCE, participants stand to forego at least 
some of their anticipated profit and corporate overhead. That doesn’t mean that the project 
will necessarily go over budget relative to the 2007 government approval (DMO presumably 
holds substantial contingency funds in reserve), but it does mean that the commercial 
participants stand to lose all or part of their fee if productivity doesn’t improve sufficiently.  
In December 2013 government announced an external review of the AWD program.  
With 33 months before the first vessel is delivered, there’s a lot that could happen. The 
construction of modules and their consolidation are but initial steps along the road of fitting 
out the vessels with their propulsion, communications, navigation and weapons systems. On 
the basis of past experience, it would be fair to say that the hard parts are yet to come. 
Some appreciation of the complexity of the project can be gained from the workforce 
breakdown in Figure 7.13. 
Of the 135 worker-centuries of toil involved in the construction of the three AWD (pre 2012-
delays), fewer than half actually entail tradespersons fabricating the vessels. Despite being a 
proven off-the-shelf design, there are close to six centuries of design work needed. The 
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remaining three and half millennia of effort is divided between 32 worker-centuries of 
white-collar engineering and administration and 34 worker-centuries for the development 
and installation of the combat system and its peripheral components. The former is hard to 
judge in the absence of a benchmark; certainly the project demands the close coordination 
of compatible inputs from a great many different suppliers—not to mention the 
administrative burden of the alliance itself.  
But what’s certainly surprising, at least initially, is the very large workload associated with 
the combat system and components. However, the explanation is simple: despite much talk 
of the F-100 being an off-the-shelf option, the combat system was always intended (even 
prior to the choice of platform) to be ‘Australianised’ through the integration of a number of 
new peripheral systems with the core Aegis combat system. In the past, systems integration 
has been the bane of many a defence project. There’s no doubt that there are risks intrinsic 
to the systems integration around the combat system akin to those that have caused serious 
problems in defence projects previously. For the moment at least, things are reportedly 
‘progressing well’. And it’s encouraging that when other countries have adapted the Aegis 
system to their specific requirements the problems have been manageable. We’ll have to 
wait and see.   
Finally, before leaving the AWD project, there’s the long-term question of through-life 
support. Successive naval platforms have been delivered to the RAN without a coherent 
sustainment plan or contract in place. The Collins class is perhaps the most visible failure of 
this type, but other classes of vessel have suffered similarly. Regrettably, defence projects 
have sometimes sacrificed the purchasing of spares to accommodate cost pressures during 
acquisition. Let’s hope that a plan emerges soon.  (For the record, we said this last year, and 
the year before that.) 
The ghost of submarines future—replacing the Collins 
Just prior to the 2012 May budget, the government announced the next steps in the process 
of replacing the Collins class submarine. In broad terms, the goal was to achieve first pass 
approval in late 2013 or early 2014 and second pass approval in 2017. The options being 
considered were (verbatim):  
• An existing submarine design available off-the-shelf, modified only to meet 
Australia’s regulatory requirements. 
• An existing off-the-shelf design modified to incorporate Australia’s specific 
requirements, including in relation to combat systems and weapons. 
• An evolved design that enhances the capabilities of existing off-the-shelf designs 
including the Collins Class. 
• An entirely new developmental submarine. 
Concurrent with the release of the 2013 Defence White Paper in May 2013, the government 
announced that it would:  
’…suspend further investigation of the two Future Submarine options based on military-off-
the-shelf designs in favour of focusing resources on progressing an ‘evolved Collins’ and new 
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design options that are likely to best meet Australia’s future strategic and capability 
requirements’.  
Two points are worth noting. First, the effective shortlisting means that efforts will now be 
directed towards the two most costly, risky and time-consuming options for Collins 
replacement. Second, the word ‘suspend’ is far from accidental. The previous government 
reserved the option of returning to the less costly and risky options at some point in the 
future.  
Also in May 2013, the government identified the US AN/BYG-1 as the reference combat 
system for the development of the Future Submarine and announced the results of a study 
of the service life of the Collins:  
‘The study found there is no single technical issue that would fundamentally prevent the 
Collins Class submarines from achieving their indicative service life or a service life extension 
of one operating cycle for the fleet, which is currently around seven years, excluding docking 
periods’.  
Given the extended time necessary to execute the two options now being concentrated on, 
the extension of the Collins life-of-type by an additional operating cycle is now a foregone 
conclusion. Fortunately, the favourable results of the last Coles review are encouraging that 
the Collins will render useful service in the years ahead.  
A Defence-Industry Integrated Project Team (IPT) is developing a submarine design brief in 
preparation for a round of formal industry consultations.  Interestingly, ASC’s Deep Blue 
Tech initiative hasn’t formed the core of the IPT, instead it has been absorbed into ASC’s 
engineering division.  A more extensive ASPI analysis of the submarine program will be 
available mid-year. 
Shipbuilding and the ‘valley of death’ 
The looming end to the AWD program has brought calls for additional orders to keep 
production going at Australian shipyards.  In part the argument is about ‘keeping jobs’, 
which is a perfectly understandable position for trade unions to adopt.  More generally, 
however, industry and its lobbyists are making the case for additional work in order to 
maintain continuity and its build productivity in the sector. Put simply, if we keep practising 
we’ll eventually get it right.  
In its purest form, the argument isn’t just for more work in the short term, but for Australia 
to adopt a continuous production model—one for submarines and one for surface 
combatants. Under such as scheme, old vessels would be retired as new vessels are built.  
If Australia had a fleet of 20 submarines and 20 surface combatants it would be an easy case 
to make. By building a vessel every eighteen months we’d be able to keep the construction 
program running forever assuming a 30-year life of type for the vessels. To do that with 
fewer vessels requires either the production interval to be extended (thereby adding to 
overhead costs per vessel) or to retire vessels more frequently (thereby accepting a reduced 
return on investment). One way or another, a sub-critical continuous build program will add 
additional costs.  
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On the other side of the coin, a continuous build program would allow skills to be 
maintained and productivity to grow through learning. There’s no obviously correct answer; 
we build cars continuously in factories and we build bridges as unitary projects. For a given 
fleet size, it’s a matter for detailed analysis as to whether a continuous build program will be 
more cost effective than period projects in the long term. While I’m sceptical that Australia 
has sufficient demand for either submarines or surface vessels to support a continuous build 
program, I’m firmly of the view that we should crunch the numbers to find out. 
The plaintive cries to fill in the valley-of-death with work—any work—introduces the risk 
that the government will take precipitous action without the opportunity for analysis.  The 
risk could manifest in any number of ill-advised ways. For example, it looked as though a 
fourth AWD was a real possibility for a while.  
Another poor idea is to bring forward the retirement of the Anzac class frigates—an idea the 
previous government said it would consider. Last year’s FSISP prepared by DMO even 
included modelling of an early frigate replacement ‘based on the Air Warfare Destroyer hull 
and produced in a rolling build program’ commencing in 2017.  
According to the 2012 Defence Capability Plan, the Anzac class frigates aren’t due to be 
replaced until the period 2027 to 2030. Commissioned into service between 1996 and 2006, 
the Anzac class are presently undergoing several upgrades, including Anti-Ship Missile 
Defence Phase 2A ($386 million), Anti-Ship Missile Defence Phase 2B ($676 million) and the 
just-commenced Electronic Support Systems Improvements ($260 million). The replacement 
for the Anzac is envisaged as an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)-optimised frigate.  
From an industrial perspective, and noting the desire to provide continuity in shipbuilding 
and skills retention after the end of the AWD program, there are two broad options for an 
acceleration of the Anzac replacement: 
• Immediately commence work on acquiring a foreign design that can be put into 
production overlapping with the latter part of the AWD program.  
 
• Evolve the AWD hull to be the basis of a new class of Australian-unique frigates and 
commence production overlapping with the latter part of the AWD program. 
A degree of overlap is required in each case because the skills employed at the end of a 
shipbuilding program (combat system fit out, set-to-work and operational test and 
evaluation) are different to that needed at the start of a new construction program 
(platform design, combat system development and module construction). If the future 
frigate commences at the end of the AWD program, the only continuity will be in a subset of 
white collar jobs. For skills to be retained across the full range of trades and professions, 
substantial overlap is required.  
Given the short time before the end of the AWD program, it’s not credible that a new design 
can be chosen and put into production quickly enough to provide continuity. That leaves the 
adaptation of the AWD design to create a frigate. While it might, just might, be possible to 
achieve sufficient overlap by beginning to build modules for the new vessels concurrent with 
the design of what would be an Australian-unique frigate, the challenge would be to adapt 
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the AWD platform hull and propulsion system to meet the low noise demands of ASW. It’s 
noteworthy that the United Kingdom explored the possibility of adapting its Type 45 
Destroyer design for the ASW role and decided not to proceed. 
Thus, if skills are to be retained through the early replacement of the Anzac class, it would 
require finding a way to rapidly adapt the AWD hull/propulsion design to meet the demands 
of ASW while simultaneously designing the ASW package for the vessels, including sensors, 
weapons and the combat system. The result would be an Australian-unique vessel designed 
and executed in double-quick time.  
Setting aside the abundant risk in such a scheme, it would also require us to dispose of a 
perfectly good fleet of vessels that are only part way through their life, and are still being 
upgraded at a substantial cost. The proposition that this veritable mountain of additional 
cost and risk is worthwhile in exchange for continuity and skills retention in the naval 
shipbuilding sector is difficult to accept.  
The only realistic option for carrying forward skills from the AWD program is to establish a 
project office for the Future Frigates over the next couple of years and get to work on 
project definition studies and other preliminary work. Although this would only allow a 
limited number of project and engineering positions to be carried forward, it would help put 
the Future Frigate project on a firm footing. Of course, it would do nothing to close the 
valley of death for the bulk of shipbuilding workers.  
For a full and critical discussion of the 2013 FSISP see this chapter in last year’s Budget Brief.  
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Chapter 8 – Capability planning and delivery 
Even if the government makes good on its promise to boost defence spending to 2% of GDP, 
the feasibility of what’s planned for the ADF will be far from assured. The unambiguous 
lesson since 2000 is that while planning for new capability is easy, delivering it can be very 
difficult.  This Chapter examines the planning and delivery of ADF capability and presents a 
case study of the development of the LHD-enabled amphibious capability to show the many 
complexities attendant to bringing new capabilities into service.  
Capability planning 
Since 2000, the government’s plans for developing the ADF have been set out in a series of 
public Defence Capability Plans (DCPs), which distil key information from their classified 
namesakes. Table 8.1 lists the public DCPs released since 2001. The public DCP is an 
important source of information for defence firms developing business plans. Note that in 
2012 the DCP was augmented by a Defence Capability Guide (DCG), which reinstates 
decade-long coverage. For ease of reference, the combined public DCP-DCG package will be 
referred to as the DCP below.  
Table 8.1: Public Defence Capability Plans 2001-2012 
Year Title Coverage Updates 
2001 Defence Capability Plan 2001-1010 10 years 2002 
2004  Defence Capability Plan 2004-1014 10 years  
2006 Defence Capability Plan 2006-1016 10 years  
2009 Defence Capability Plan 2009 4 years 2010 (x2) 
2011 Defence Capability Plan 2011 4 years 2011 (x2) 
2012 Defence Capability Plan 2012 4 years  
2012 Defence Capability Guide 2012 6 years  
No DCP was published following the 2013 Defence White Paper, and a new edition isn’t 
anticipated until after the 2015 White Paper. Thus, when the next DCP is released in the 
second half of 2015 it will have been more than three years since the Australian Government 
had disclosed its plans for defence procurement. 
Over the years, ASPI has tracked the approval of projects relative to the plans set out in 
successive DCPs. In the next section, the feasibility and delivery of the latest available DCP, 
July 2012, is examined in tandem with a discussion of the difficulties faced in planning and 
approving defence materiel. 
Approval and commencement of projects 
Before an item of major capital equipment can be purchased, the acquisition has to be 
approved by the National Security Committee of Cabinet or, for projects valued less than 
$100 million, by the ministers for Defence and Finance. Under the arrangements introduced 
following the 2003 Kinnaird Defence Procurement Review, each major project is considered 
twice. Initial approval (known as first pass) allows a project to begin planning in earnest, 
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including collecting information on potential options. Sometime later, final approval (second 
pass) is sought to allow a project to proceed to contract with a supplier.  
Tracking the achievement of first and second pass approval of major capital investment 
projects isn’t straightforward. The public DCP no longer includes specific years for the 
planned approval of projects. Instead, there are now only multi-year brackets, which 
obscure what’s going on with individual projects. However, with a bit of work, it’s possible to 
generate a clearer picture of plans for the overall program. This can be done by tabulating all 
the multi-year windows for the individual projects, and in the absence of more precise data, 
assigning an equal probability of an approval in each year of the window.  
For example, if a project has a window of 2011-12 to 2012-13, it’s assigned a 50% chance 
that it will be approved in each of the years. Weighting the probabilities for all the projects 
available in the 2012 revision of the DCP in this way yields the project approval patterns in 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2. For comparison, previously planned and achieved approvals for the 
period 2004-05 to 2011-12 have been included. Because they aren’t listed in the DCP, we’ve 
excluded the approval of classified projects. Where project have been split into additional 
phases at the time of approval, these have been added to the number of approvals planned 
(that way we can count all of the projects approved without double counting split projects).  
Figure 8.1: Projects planned for second pass approval  
Source: Past and current DCP, PBS and Annual Reports. 
Several points stand out from Figures 3.13 and 3.14 in Chapter 3: 
• The pace of second pass approvals improved substantially in 2011-12 and 2012-13, 
although some of the approvals in 2011-12 were ‘one-off’ non-DCP projects such as 
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long-lead items for the Growler upgrade and another C-17 purchased as the financial 
year came to a close.  
• First pass approvals—the lead indicator of future work—are still very badly behind 
schedule, despite some improvement in 2011-12. 
• The failure to approve projects has created a ‘bow wave’ of approvals over the next 
3-5 years that isn’t apparent in the charts because the planned approvals are taken 
from the 2012 DCP. 
• As expected, because second pass is contingent on first pass, the peak of planned 
second pass approvals occurs a year or two after that for first pass.  
Figure 8.2: Projects planned for first pass approval  
Source: Past and current DCP, PBS and Annual Reports. 
2013-14 was a reasonable year for second pass approvals but disappointing for first pass. As 
of mid-May, the government had achieved 6 first pass approvals and 9 second pass 
approvals this financial year. It’s possible that further approvals will occur prior to 30 June.   
Perhaps it’s unfair to compare the approval of projects with a plan that’s almost 2 years old. 
Since 2012, the PBS has included a list of projects anticipated for approval in the 
forthcoming year. On this basis, the difference between plans and actuals is a little less 
dramatic as shown in Table 8.2. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that the PBS only 
reflects near-term anticipated activities while the DCP reflects the longer-term plan for the 
development of the ADF—it’s the latter that matters.   
Despite the reforms to the Capability Development Group, an examination of historical 
patterns of project approval warrants caution about how much can be achieved in the near 
term. As Figure 8.3 shows, high approval rates commensurate to those planned recently 
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have been achieved in the past, but not since the introduction of the more demanding two-
pass process in 2004.  
 
 
Table 8.2: Near-term planned and actual project approvals 
Year 
1st Pass 2nd Pass 
planned actual planned actual 
2012-13  6 4 19 15 
2013-14 12 6 17 9 
2014-15 5  12  
Source: PBS and DAR. Note that additional approvals may occur in 2013-14.  2013-14 actual numbers are as at 13 May 2014. 
Excludes classified projects to ensure a consistent comparison because they aren’t foreshadowed for approval.  
Figure 8.3: Planned approvals (second pass); 1984 to 2022 
Source: DAR and 2012 DCP/DCG, excludes classified projects.  
Recent performance in achieving planned project approvals needs to be seen in the context 
of resource instability and other countervailing factors over the past several years. An 
election (and attendant caretaker period) plus a White Paper combined to disrupt approvals 
in 2013. More importantly, the successive cuts to defence funding between 2009 and 2012 
demanded repeated revisions to the DCP. In the past three, years Defence has had to delay 
over 120 unapproved projects and reduce planned funding in 44 projects.  
Understandably, with resources reduced, priority was given to projects that had already 
received first pass approval and were subject to industry solicitation.  As a result, first pass 
approvals suffered the most. 
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Hopefully we’re entering a period of greater funding stability. However, with a White Paper 
under development (which historically reduces the number of approvals) there may be a 
reduced throughput of approvals over the next 12 months.   
Performance in delivering capital equipment 
The critical path to expanding and modernising the ADF goes through the physical 
acquisition of major capital equipment. In this section we examine recent and historical 
trends in the Approved Major Capital Investment Program. For more than a decade, Defence 
struggled to deliver on its plans for re-equipping the ADF. Between 2000 and 2012, around 
$6.2 billion of investment was deferred into the future. In the first part of this period, it was 
because DMO was unable to spend the money. The typical pattern was DMO would hand 
money back at the end of a year, and then have funding for future years taken away with the 
promise that it would be returned at some point in the more distant future. More recently, 
DMO has been able to spend the money it has been given, but delays have been imposed by 
the government to meet broader fiscal imperatives.  
But as seen in 2011 and 2012, there’s no guarantee that deferred funds will be available in 
the future. Up to the constraint placed by contractual obligations, it’s entirely at the 
discretion of the government how much it funds investment from year to year irrespective 
of any undertakings made in prior years, especially if those undertakings are made by a 
different government.   
In each budget the government sets out how much it intends to spend on major capital 
investment, usually for the next four years but sometimes over the next 10 years. Successive 
plans and actual results are plotted in Figure 8.4.  
Figure 8.4: Major Capital Investment – plans and actual results  
Source: 2013-14 PAES, 2014-15 PBS and speeches by Defence officials. Planned figures include approved and unapproved 
projects. Historical figures pre 2013-14 provided by DMO. 
Even when projects are approved and funding is available, acquisitions tend to progress 
more slowly than anticipated. Usually this is managed through the mechanism of 
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‘overprogramming’ whereby more spending is planned than available money. The 
systematic slippage in projects then, more or less, brings things into balance at the end of 
the year (with a little management intervention as necessary). Sometimes things don’t go to 
plan and money has to be handed back, as occurred in the early to mid-2000s.  
To track the evolving performance of delivering projects on schedule, we’ve collected data 
on the planned and actual expenditure on the top 20 or 30 projects reported each year. 
Within these projects, figures aren’t overprogrammed and therefore reflect a project’s 
anticipated and actual in-year performance. Because foreign exchange rates sometimes 
change mid-year, these need to be taken into account. Unfortunately, the impact is hard to 
assess because the projects for which information is available only represent a sub-set of the 
total program, and the impact of foreign exchange is only available over the entire program. 
But because foreign exchange has been relatively small (apart from in 2009-10), a 
reasonable comparison is possible. The results are shown in Figure 8.5. Note that the results 
from 1993-94 to 1995-96 only take into account ‘significant’ changes. As a result, the figures 
for these years probably slightly underestimate the extent of underperformance. 
A couple of points are worth making. First, given the consistent tendency of projects to 
underperform, the current and longstanding application of overprogramming is entirely 
appropriate. Second, if projects are being more carefully developed prior to approval, as is 
claimed, an improvement should be expected as newer projects replace the old. Similarly, 
the development of a more commercially adept and professional acquisition workforce 
should be reflected in improved in-year performance of projects old and new. Although this 
isn’t apparent from the Top-30 dataset presented here, this may reflect the limitations of 
using publicly available data and employing financial results as a proxy for schedule. 
Encouragingly, the ANAO have analysed the performance of more recently approved 
projects and reported a systematic improvement.  
Figure 8.5: Per cent under- and over-spent on top 20/30 capital equipment projects  
Source: Defence Budget Papers and Annual Reports. Only the revised figure is available for 2012-13 
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Responsibility for the performance of the approved major capital investment program is 
shared between DMO and Industry. Each side is naturally eager to see the other take 
responsibility for problems. This year, we looked carefully at the causes of slippage in the 
top 30 projects as given in the 2013-14 PAES. The story is somewhat more complex than 
‘them’ or ‘us’. Of the payment delays reported at that time, fully $38 million were ‘good 
news’; including cost reductions and early payments in the previous reporting period. Of the 
roughly $101 million in ‘bad news’, our assessment was that industry was primarily 
responsible for the delays (remembering that this assessment is based on DMO reporting). 
Our best estimate of the situation appears in Table 8.3.  
Table 8.3: ASPI assessment of ‘responsibility’ for slippage 2013-14 
  Commonwealth Suppliers Unallocated 
Positive $6 million $32 million 
$74 million 
Negative $6 million $95 million 
Source: ASPI assessment of information in the 2013-14 PAES 
The feasibility of current plans  
Based on the experience of the 2000s, when investment had to be deferred on a number of 
occasions, we can only be confident of ramping up investment by an average of around 5% a 
year in real terms. Beyond that rate, there’s a demonstrated risk of industry and/or DMO 
being unable to marshal capacity quickly enough. As Figure 8.6 shows, current plans entail a 
very rapid increase in Major Capital Investment well beyond what has been achieved in the 
past. Fortunately, there’s a series of recent large off-the-shelf purchases that will help 
mitigate the risk of the rapid increases. These include the Growler airborne electronic attack 
aircraft ($797 million), P-8 maritime patrol aircraft ($324 million), Caribou replacement 
($314 million), Seahawk helicopter replacement ($505 million), and the Joint Strike Fighter 
($238 million). The figures in brackets represent the planned 2014-15 spend. All of these 
projects will contribute strongly to investment spending over the next several years. 
Figure 8.6: Past and planned Major Capital Investment – corrected for inflation 
Source: Historical figures pre 2013-14 provided by DMO, 2013-14 PAES, 2014-15 PBS  
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Notwithstanding the recent large off-the-shelf purchases, the balance of risk over the next 
several years will be towards under- rather than over-spending on major capital investment. 
It wouldn’t be surprising if money was handed back unspent in the years ahead. Given the 
systemic underfunding of the past several years, this is an unavoidable challenge to be faced 
if momentum is to be regained in re-equipping the ADF. 
The planned rapid increase in capital investment begs the question of staffing. Calls for 
drastic cuts to the DMO workforce may play well in the media, but the reality is that the 
planning and oversight of complex acquisition projects requires large numbers of 
experienced people. As explained in Chapter 3, the increase shown in Figure 8.6 is likely to 
be only the start of an even more massive and sustained investment hump in the years that 
follow. Unless Defence’s capability planners (including but not limited to CDG) and DMO’s 
acquisition workforce are available in adequate numbers, failure is assured.  
ADF amphibious capability: issues of interest and concern 
Tom Muir 
Executive Summary 
The planned introduction into RAN service of two new 27,000+ tonne amphibious assault 
vessels (Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships), and the 2009 Defence White Paper’s maritime 
strategy for the ADF have brought new focus on this country's slowly improving amphibious 
capabilities, their purpose, and issues regarding their employment in an Australian context. 
Joint operations with coalition partners are another potential application of this capability. 
But until the two new Canberra class LHDs and their watercraft are brought into service, the 
four remaining Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) are replaced, and a new strategic sealift capability 
introduced to replace the ageing, role-limited HMAS Tobruk, this country will be hard 
pressed to meet its amphibious capability aspirations.  
In the meantime, to turn this new hardware into capability, the ADF has to develop new 
operational concepts, new doctrine, tactics and procedures, and training. And the Army has 
to adapt to a maritime strategy beyond that of a token force within Plan Beersheba. 
Background 
The need for an ADF amphibious capability had been growing during the 1980s and led to a 
proposal to replace HMAS Tobruk, a Landing Ship Heavy (LSH), with a new dual role training 
and helicopter support ship. But the proposal to construct one ship at a cost of $500m was 
cancelled as too expensive, with the option of acquiring a second-hand ship from other 
navies remaining a possibility.  
Two of the USN’s Newport Class Landing Ship Tank (LST) were judged the most appropriate 
and cost-effective capability for the ADF for sea training and helicopter support. In RAN 
service they were to be modified to each carry four helicopters, 450 troops and their 
vehicles and equipment, and were re-designated Landing Platform Amphibious (LPA).  
Following limited inspections by an RAN technical team, they were purchased in August 
1994 and, newly commissioned as HMAS Manoora and HMAS Kanimbla, they arrived in 
Australia in September and November 1994 respectively. But detailed hull inspections of the 
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two ships soon revealed extensive corrosion, necessitating extensive repairs before the 
vessels actually underwent their extensive modifications.  
Other costly bungles included the awarding of a contract by the DMO for the construction of 
landing craft for the LPAs which turned out to be the wrong size—they were too big for 
mounting on the ship, and couldn't be used! Thus began a saga of mounting costs and 
recrimination that showed RAN maintenance (and accountability) in a poor light. Withdrawn 
from service in 2011 and decommissioned in 2012, the sale of the two LPAs for scrap was 
announced on 24 June 2013. 
Today Australia’s core amphibious capability rests with the Heavy Landing Ship HMAS 
Tobruk, (which was due to be retired in 2012 but is currently ‘soldiering on’ until the first of 
the LHDs is commissioned this year), the Landing Ship Dock HMAS Choules, the ADV Ocean 
Shield, and four of the eight Balikpapan Class LCHs that are yet to be decommissioned, but 
are due for retirement later in 2014. 
The LCHs have been used continuously since the early 1970s and have provided outstanding 
service, but they are relatively slow and vulnerable to adverse weather. The new class of 
landing craft will provide intra-theatre lift to augment the LHDs and other future strategic 
sealift vessels. The new watercraft will have improved seakeeping characteristics and faster 
transit speeds than the LCHs they’re replacing.  
Other components of the future amphibious capability include 12 new LCM-1E high speed 
landing craft that will operate in conjunction with the two LHDs. These craft are purpose-
built for the LHD and are intended to deliver troops and equipment onshore where there are 
no fixed port facilities.   
ADAS Operational Concepts 
Perhaps the best way to gain an appreciation of the broad Amphibious Deployment and 
Sustainment (ADAS) system, now being developed under Joint Project (JP) 2048’s program of 
Amphibious and Maritime Support, is to revisit the original operational concepts document 
(OCD) and other related sources, such as Australia's Amphibious Concept (AAC). 
The AAC establishes the ADF approach to contemporary and future expeditionary 
amphibious operations. The concept not only describes this country’s strategic environment 
and guidance but also the development of ADF capabilities, reflecting current and future US 
/ UK / NATO Doctrine and practices. It also reflects joint and single service forward-looking 
operational concepts. 
At the highest level, the Defence White Paper 2009 (DWP 2009) reinforced the need for an 
amphibious capability when it stated that the principal task for the ADF was to deter and 
defeat armed attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations without 
relying on the combat or combat support forces of other countries. This was seen to entail a 
fundamentally maritime strategy, requiring forces that could operate independently with 
decisive effect throughout the northern maritime and littoral approaches to Australia and 
the ADF's primary operational environment (POE). That strategy would be a proactive one, in 
which the ADF would aim to control the dynamics of a conflict, principally by way of sea 
control and air superiority, and also by defeating hostile forces in their bases, in staging 
areas, or in transit.  
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In the ADF’s Future Maritime Operating Concept, the section on Future Maritime 
Manoeuvre considers the ambitions of the joint land and air forces for complex and 
expeditionary warfare and integrates them with the maritime elements that enable these 
aspirations. It notes that: 
Amphibious warfare is the most complex proposition for future ADF combat power 
development to 2025. Preparing the battlespace by establishing local sea control, deploying 
joint combat elements ashore, supporting them and then extracting them to manoeuvre or 
at the cessation of operations will require at least two significant task forces; one 
amphibious task force and one strike force.  
The amphibious mission of deploying a brigade size force will occupy the vast majority of 
Australia's maritime combat power, even if the adversary is only capable of small-scale 
denial operations. 
DWP 2009 identified the requirement for amphibious and sealift ships, and expeditionary 
combat support assets to provide the ADF with the ability to project and sustain military 
power throughout Australia’s primary operational environment—and on occasions beyond. 
JP 2048 is now a multi-phased program of projects that will provide the ADF with important 
elements of an amphibious warfare capability that will integrate within the ADAS system. 
The rationale for a national amphibious capability was largely reiterated in the subsequent 
Defence White Paper 2013 (DWP 2013).  
Peter Dean1 who has written extensively on amphibious issues, has pointed out that the 
emphasis on the amphibious capability isn’t without its problems. 
As the 2013 White Paper noted, the challenges for training and institutional culture involved 
in developing the capability to conduct amphibious operations will be significant. This is 
reflected in the difficulties the ADF has faced in developing clear strategic guidance for its 
use, the slow progress of amphibious concepts and a lack of integration between some of 
the amphibious plans and the capability projects. 
Of major concern is the erosion of the ADF’s littoral amphibious capabilities, especially the 
retirement of the Landing Craft Heavy, and the delays in implementing and funding 
replacement programs for these and other brown water amphibious capabilities as the 
LHD’s come online. But these are not insurmountable problems.   
C4I capability 
While the original concept of the ADAS capability wasn’t aimed at any specific capability 
solution, a key assumption was that it would eventually be delivered via two large 
amphibious vessels with supporting aircraft and watercraft, together with follow-on support 
by strategic sealift. And the ADAS system requires a very significant communications fit to 
support the extensive range of joint and single service C4I functions. Interoperability, 
compatibility and a degree of commonality will all be needed to contribute to efficient 
operational command and control.  
The central concept of the ADAS C4 System lies in Project SEA 1442’s upgrade and 
modernisation of RAN maritime communications systems enabling network centric 
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connectivity between major surface vessels in a Task Group. Internal LANs will need to be 
linked to external communications systems for real-time data transfer to ships management 
and administration systems. 
Ships involved in amphibious operations must be capable of communicating with a raft of 
organisations such as HQADF and HQJOC, the landing force, ADF aircraft, other RAN and 
Allied ships and government agencies. According to the type and level of operation, data 
links may need to be established to HF networks, and the various ADF command support 
systems down to their subordinate elements. 
Amphibious support ships will need to receive high bandwidth data from remote sensors 
(such as AEW&C, AP3C, P-8A/MUAS) and from cooperative engagement systems and other 
sources contributing to the situational awareness common operating picture. 
RAN Fleet C4I systems  
So how closely does equipment on order, or recently introduced, meet the capability 
proposals of the broader ADAS system? 12 major fleet units, including HMAS Success and 
HMAS Choules, are currently operational with the Sea 1442 Phase 3 Maritime Tactical Wide 
Area Network (MTWAN) and the upgraded Message Handling System. Installation in 
remaining ships will be completed as they become available. The MTWAN provides packet 
based switching for all security levels within a ship, enabling applications on those networks 
to access line-of-sight and beyond line-of-sight communications bearers (such as 
MILSATCOM, INMARSAT, UHF, and so on). By interfacing existing shipboard LANs with 
existing bearers over an IP based packet switched infrastructure, this capability provides 
much improved access to video, chat, web browsing, email and databases, as per the OCD. 
Phase 4 will see an upgraded radio system to support wideband network communications, 
communications management and switching, secure voice and tactical intercom, and 
meshed high data rate line-of-sight radio communications. 
The two Canberra-class LHDs will have extensive ICT infrastructure to support the ADF’s 
command support systems and to provide C2/C3 capability for the embarked force. They will 
be equipped with an integrated communications system, internal and external, including the 
Message Handling Systems, Link 11 and 16, and satellite links.  
The LHD’s sensor suite comprises Sea Giraffe 3D air search radar, helicopter control and 
surface radar, and navigation radar. Other systems include Sagem Infrared Search and Track 
(IRST) System, and Rafael Gun and Electro-Optical Sight (EOS) system. This suite is in close 
alignment with that sought in the OCD. 
Cybersecurity 
While contributing significantly to task group capabilities, the extensive communications 
systems described bring with them significant liabilities in terms of their protection from the 
various forms of cyber or electronic warfare. The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) is 
responsible for safeguarding Australia's government information networks and collecting 
foreign electronic and digital intelligence. While Defence doesn’t provide information as to 
how it manages cybersecurity issues, it’s anticipated that measures introduced to protect 
the ADF’s range of vulnerable electronic systems—including wireless systems, sensors, 
  230 
radars, electronic surveillance systems, emitters—is, or will be, handled internally under 
advice/approval of the ASD. 
The DWP 2013 notes that the potential impact of malicious cyber activity has grown with 
Defence’s increasing reliance on networked operations through net-centric enablers like the 
MTWAN. Reducing Defence’s vulnerability to cyberattacks or intrusions in a crisis or conflict, 
including protection of deployed networks and information systems, will remain a high 
priority.  
DWP 2013 also acknowledges that an adversary could use a cyberattack against Australia to 
deter, delay or prevent Australia’s response, including the ADF’s deployment of forces. This 
would probably include the targeting of information systems, networks and broader support 
infrastructure perceived to be integral to the ADF’s decision-making and warfighting 
capabilities. Finally it says Defence capability would be seriously undermined by 
compromised sensitive information on command and control, operational planning, 
platform design or weapon system performance.  
Amphibious operations involving a variety of networked air and surface platforms, such as 
troop carrying LCMs equipped with battle management and command support systems, 
troop carrying helicopters with their own communication systems, weapons systems, 
navigational systems and so on would all be vulnerable to portable high-powered RF 
jammers at the beachhead.  
Embarked force communications 
Under the Project Land 75/125 Battle Group and Below C3 (BGC3) program, embarked land 
forces, from battle group to company ready element levels, will be fully networked with 
command support and battle management systems, which would include mounted 
(including in LCM-1Es) and dismounted systems linked back to a command post in whatever 
Joint Operations Room arrangements determined for the Commander Amphibious Forces 
and the Commander Land Forces. From there communications reach back to HQ Joint 
Operations Command’s significantly upgraded ICT infrastructure, and to 2RAR Bde HQ. As 
noted above, there are serious issues here with their vulnerability to cyberattack. 
And thanks to JP2072 Battlefield Communication Systems (Land), embarked forces will be 
equipped with advanced combat radio systems, tactical data radio systems such as EPLRS 
Microlites, and tactical HF and satellite radios. Some of these systems will serve as bearers 
for the BMS network, underpinned by new network management and support systems. In 
addition to multiband handheld radios and their in-vehicle adaptors, HF manpack radios will 
also connect soldiers to the BMS and serve as hubs for other soldier-carried C4 devices. 
For wider conflicts perhaps, and where Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) or Special 
Operations Task Group (SOTG) elements are included, radios will include models with 
wideband architecture such as AN/PRC-117G used to support network-enabled missions 
such as close-air support, precision fires (AFATDS) and MEDEVAC operations. On current 
deployment however, battle groups (or smaller) are provided high bandwidth for essential 
operational services (e.g. SOTG with AN/PRC-117F). 
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Amphibious force structure 
The Army’s 2RAR forms the core of the amphibious force and its proposed Amphibious 
Ready Group (ARG) construct, which comprises a medium weight Battle Group of some 2056 
personnel and associated stores, consisting of infantry, armour, artillery, engineers and 
other vehicles and is supported by armed reconnaissance helicopters (ARH) and medium lift 
helicopters. An ARG is expected to be capable of conducting coordinated air and surface ship 
to objective manoeuvre (STOM) assaults from 30 nautical miles over the horizon (OTH). 
Short notice amphibious capability will be provided by an Amphibious Ready Element (ARE), 
based on an infantry company with protected mobility, indirect fire support and ISTAR 
assets. An ARE may include medium lift helicopters and should be capable of conducting 
coordinated air and surface STOM type actions, of up to four platoon/troop elements, from 
30 nm OTH. 
For doctrine, training, tactics and procedures, the ADF’s amphibious force will draw heavily 
on its counterparts in the US Marine Corps (USMC) and the Royal Marines. The American 
counterparts of the ARGs and AREs are the USMC’s Amphibious Ready Groups and their 
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) respectively. The USMC’s forward presence consists of 
multiple MEUs which spend at least six months training for a variety of amphibious 
operations before being deployed. 
The Royal Marines provide the backbone of the UK’s amphibious forces. The major 
operationally deployable element of the amphibious force is 3 Commando Brigade, 
headquartered in Plymouth. The Brigade has three Commando units, 40, 42 and 45 
Commando Royal Marines and has its essential combat support and combat service support 
elements provided by the Army.  
While 2RAR has some 10 Battle Groups and a Commando Regiment available for tasking, 
with only three amphibious ships currently available, there has been insufficient capacity to 
generate 10 amphibiously trained Battle Groups. Faced with a number of options, Army has 
yet to decide on its final ARG construct. It seems likely that it will focus on providing one ‘on-
line’ Battle Group for the conduct of amphibious operations, at the same certification levels 
as those of its coalition partners, while ensuring the remainder of the Army is at least 
exposed to sealift and follow-on operations. 
Yet to be determined is the role of the 2nd Commando Regiment and the requirement for it 
to also be incorporated into the landing force. Similar to the MEU (Special Operations 
Capable) approach of the USMC, or the Bde Recce Force of the Royal Marines, it seems likely 
that a Commando Company would be regularly rotated with the landing force.  
Amphibious training 
Certification for deployment in the ADF is a stated requirement of Commander Joint 
Operations, and each service has a requirement to demonstrate the certification of 
individuals and force elements deploying on operations. HQJOC is responsible for the 
operational command of all assigned operations and thus will take a significant role in the 
development and execution of joint, combined and interagency training activities as part of 
an on-going program to ensure that assigned forces are capable of executing major, high-
scale war fighting activities in accordance with government policy. 
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To achieve the delivery of an expeditionary amphibious capability as per the AAC, it's 
intended to use existing resources more efficiently, blending what has previously been seen 
as single service training events into a coherent joint and combined interagency training 
program. Assigned forces for exercises will be expected to train as they’ll fight, as a Joint and 
Combined or Interagency force at all times, not just during one major exercise every few 
years. 
Between 2012 and 2017, a series of exercises will build upon the AAC and single service 
lines, developing into a joint force for final certification on Exercise Talisman Sabre 2017. 
Forces in training last year were assigned to HQJOC for the conduct of joint and combined 
training in a series of progressively more capable amphibious support exercises. The AAC 
provided the framework for these exercises, set within a Talisman Sabre war fighting 
scenario. Joint Doctrine guided the interaction of joint and combined forces and, where 
necessary, was modified and updated before the next biennial certification activity.  
The Army has adopted an Amphibious Pre-deployment Training Program, similar in concept 
to the USMC’s pre-deployment training. The Program is aligned with the Army Training 
Continuum and will commence when the Amphibious Infantry Battalion and enablers have 
met individual and collective training proficiencies within their respective core trades. 
Elements of 2RAR have undergone extensive training in Australia focused on planning 
amphibious operations, expeditionary logistics and expeditionary communications. Training 
has been supported by USMC Mobile Training Teams and UK Royal Marine experts and 2RAR 
members benefited from the opportunity to observe USMC certification exercises overseas. 
Training for headquarters staff has included three weeks of planning and command post 
exercises with Navy staff for a number of amphibious tasks.  
Most personnel have qualified in Helicopter Underwater Escape Training while a larger than 
normal number of soldiers have completed training to rappel from helicopters in order to 
secure landing sites or to conduct assaults in areas where there are no suitable landing sites. 
Watercraft training has also been a feature, with some of the rifle companies working with 
LCHs and LCMs. 2RAR’s B Company and attachments worked from HMAS Choules through a 
series of exercises to raise them to a standard of readiness for short-notice amphibious 
contingencies. 
The Army validated its pre-deployment training through the conduct of a trial certification 
exercise synchronised with Exercise Talisman Sabre 2013, supported by Navy with HMAS 
Choules. 
Army Aviation and the Royal Australian Navy Fleet Air Arm are developing the rotary wing 
capability for the LHDs, which will see MRH90, ARH Tiger and CH-47F Chinook embarked in 
support of the Amphibious Task Group. Development of LHD Aviation capability will begin 
with First of Class flight trials for each aircraft type and will then undergo a graduated 
increase in aviation capability in line with the development of the ABG, culminating in a 
mixed fleet Rotary Wing Group operating from both LHDs. 
HQJOC has decreed that training should at all times resemble the conditions of actual 
operations to the maximum extent possible, including the use of operational information 
networks, such as CENTRIX or equivalent systems. 
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The Joint and Combined Training Centre, (JCTC) will build on and strengthen existing MOUs 
with regional coalition partners, especially US PACOM, who will facilitate in the conduct of 
certification for HQJAAF and HQJOC.  
The concept of STOM 
The Australian Amphibious Capability has fully adopted the ship-to-objective-manoeuvre 
(STOM) concept introduced by the USMC and which replaces phasing landing forces ashore 
at beachheads, awaiting the arrival of reinforcements and equipment, before striking inland 
to the actual objective. However, as far as Defence is concerned, amphibious landings are 
and will be a part of normal amphibious operations—not amphibious assaults. 
Serving Army officer Thomas Lonergan had this to say regarding STOM assaults in ASPI’s 
Strategist blog on 7 November 2013:  
No astute military force in the world promotes the types of amphibious assaults undertaken 
in World War II or the Korean War as a feasible tactic in contemporary conflict.  
Not even the US Navy and US Marine Corps—undoubtedly the world’s most powerful and 
capable amphibious force—believe in the utility of directly opposed amphibious landings. 
Twenty-first century amphibious manoeuvre, underpinned by concepts like Ship-To-
Objective Manoeuvre and Sea Basing, are about avoiding direct engagement when lodging a 
force from the sea to the land objective. 
According to the USMC’s STOM concept paper, the old way of phasing landing forces ashore 
was dictated by necessity. Technologies then available to landing forces required the Navy to 
provide the means to move from ship to shore.  
The STOM concept calls for the amphibious ready group (ARG) to remain over the horizon, 
defeating enemy attacks through manoeuvre allowed by the expanded seaward battlespace. 
Ships well out at sea generally have more warning time to avoid or defeat attacks, and are 
harder to target. In STOM, the manoeuvre force use both vertical assaults and surface 
assaults to move rapidly to inland objectives, requiring assault systems with the speed, 
range, precision navigation capabilities, protection, and firepower to launch from over the 
horizon into the littoral area.  
Sustaining vertical assault forces and fast-moving surface assault forces far inland from a 
seabase presents a formidable challenge, complicated by the size of the assault force, the 
size of enemy defensive force, and the time/distance analysis of movement from the 
seabase to shore. Then there’s the challenge of identifying a tailored logistic-support 
package that can be sent ashore in a responsive manner. 
The USMC uses heavy air cushion vessels (LCACs) to provide most of the heavy lift to shore. 
An amphibious ready group will have six to eight unarmoured LCACs, which can lift up to 60 
tons for transport at better than 40 knots and have a range of 300 nautical miles. In the face 
of opposition, armoured amphibious vehicles (AAVs) are used. Similarly, the Royal Marines 
employ air-cushion vehicles and tracked amphibious vehicles for these tasks. 
In the event that the ADF was to mount an independent STOM operation (for example to 
dislodge insurgents from a town at the request of a friendly neighbour) the action would 
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likely be limited to an aerial assault, possibly without the need for watercraft, but still from 
over the horizon to ensure surprise. It is unlikely that the ADF would mount a major STOM 
amphibious operation, calling for both aerial and land assault, other than as part of an Allied 
force, in which case troop movements would likely be via partners’ protected/armoured 
amphibians, rather than the LHD’s own watercraft.  
The LHD’s LCM-1Es have the ability to be used OTH, being equipped with radar navigation, 
GPS, gyro needle/magnetic and HF, VHF and UHF communications equipment, they’re more 
suited for use as ship/shore transports in benign humanitarian and other operations than to 
30 nm OTH movements in contested waters. 
Similarly, the replacements for the Balikpapan Class LCHs might be better suited to 
independent STOM operations involving amphibious landings rather than assaults. In these 
circumstances the ADF would more likely use both MRH90 and CH-47 helicopters for 
successive waves of assaults by AREs. STOM calls for rapid projection of combined arms 
teams ashore, so success in an air assault depends on the ADF’s ability to land the largest 
force in the shortest time.  
UK Marines insights 
Royal Marines’ BRIG Will Taylor2, until recently Defence Advisor to the British High 
Commissioner, kindly provided the following insights into how an amphibious force might 
operate in a medium level assault based on UK practice: 
Extensive Operational Analysis (OA) in the UK showed that the ideal assault force consists of 
a minimum of three rifle companies (each 100–120 personnel) in the first wave. An 
Australian amphibious force should be able to call on a total of 18 helicopter spots 
(departure points), comprising six from the two LHDs, two from the LSD (A), two from 
support vessels (AOR/AFSH) and one from FFG or FFH escorts.  
A CH-47 uses 2 spots, has no folding head (and cannot be stowed in the LHD hangar). An 
MRH uses 1 spot and has manual blade fold and can be hangared. ARH uses one spot and 
has manual blade fold and can be hangared. 
Thus it needs to be determined in which order to bring aircraft onto flight deck spots, spread 
them, load them and launch them to constitute a ‘wave’. Some aircraft such as ARH could be 
loaded and armed and then moved to support shipping or escorts to preserve fuel while 
troop lift aircraft load and launch.  
Likewise with troop lift a judgement would need to be made on how many CH-47s to embark 
(the Royal Marines routinely embark 2 x CH-47 in the LPH), and in which order to load and 
launch to maximise range. For example, load and launch the longer endurance CH-47s which 
then loiter while the MRH are spread and loaded. The radius of operation is restricted by the 
time spent loitering. 
Limitations on surface movements depend on a combination of beach gradient, sea state, 
tide state, waves and surf, reefs, vehicle wading depth/waterproofing, and landing craft 
capability. 
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Logistics is another area likely to impose operating constraints. The UK and USMC operate a 
‘single fuel’ policy, under which all equipment is run using aviation fuel. Aviation is the single 
largest demand on fuel ashore, and so a single supply chain geared to keeping helicopters in 
the air also keeps the vehicle fleet on the move. It seems that the ADF plans to run three fuel 
supply lines (aviation, diesel and CIVGAS). 
ADAS self-defence capability 
The ADAS major ship element (the LHDs) should be considered one of the nation’s most 
valuable assets, not simply because of their capital acquisition cost but rather because of the 
number of sailors, soldiers and airmen involved. One of the key performance parameters of 
the proposed ADAS system will be the ability to embark, sustain and transport by sea an 
Amphibious Battle Group (ABG) of approximately 2,000 personnel and equipment for up to 
45 days, and deliver the force in good physical condition.  
Given the strategic value of the ADAS, it needs to be able to contribute to its own self-
defence across a spectrum of threat scenarios (that were detailed in classified supplement to 
the OCD) to protect the cargo whether supported by other ADF elements or somewhat 
remote from them, although it’s anticipated that RAAF E-7A Wedgetail airborne early 
warning aircraft would be used as an airborne tactical HQ providing control of the airspace 
where possible.  
Amphibious forces operating in the immediate neighbourhood may face a range of threats 
that will have implications for the defensive measures that would have to be undertaken for 
a successful operation and which may restrict aspects of the operation. These threats may 
come from the land, sea or air. DSTO studies have indicated that the survival probability of 
an escorted mission-essential unit increases by 80% with specified level of self-defence, but 
engagement must be coordinated with escorts.  
If unescorted, the weapons will need organic cueing from the task group’s organic sensors 
and in any event this may be necessary in the littoral environment. According to the OCD, 
the ADAS system will need to be able to contribute to its own defence via a range of soft and 
hard kill measures appropriate to the final design. Thus, while the ADAS should be protected 
by escorts, proximity to land may adversely affect escorts' capabilities, increasing the 
possibility of anti-shipping missiles ‘leaking’ through. Thus the ADAS must have the ability to 
contribute to its own layered defence through a range of means including NCW-enabled 
hard kill and soft kill measures, possibly augmented by cooperative engagement links to 
escorting forces.  
However given the sophistication and cost associated with combat systems to counter more 
advanced threats, it is expected that the ADAS elements would carry relatively modest 
short-range air and missile defence systems. A full suite of soft kill and supporting electronic 
warfare measures including electronic support and attack and off-board decoys could 
augment the hard kill options. The LHD’s self-defence systems are understood to comprise 
four Rafael automated 25mm gun systems, Nulka and Nixie decoy systems, and possibly 
pintle-mounted RBS-70 short-range air defence systems. While these are a close match to 
those proposed in the OCD, without suitable armed escorts, the LHD and its supporting 
systems would be more suited to relatively benign operations within the POE than in hotly 
contested areas. 
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Chapter 9 – Australia’s Foreign Aid  
Australia’s foreign aid was administered by the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID), until that department was  absorbed into the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in late 2013. As a result, new budgeting arrangements for 
Australia’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) program were put in place in the 2014 
Budget.   
Unfortunately, the new arrangements make it difficult to compare this year’s budget with 
those from previous years. To make matters worse, the long-standing Ministerial Statement 
on International Development Assistance (‘Blue Book’) has been discontinued. In what 
follows, we do our best to maintain a historical time-series where it’s feasible. Further 
information on Australia’s foreign aid program is available from the DFAT website.  
Australia’s approach to foreign aid 
One of Prime Minister Abbott’s first acts after being sworn-in on 18 September was to 
announce that, along with some other administrative changes, the agency known since 1995 
as AusAID would be integrated back into DFAT. The aid organisation had been an 
‘autonomous agency’ within the foreign affairs portfolio from 1973, and an even more 
independent ‘executive agency’ from 2010. Although the Coalition’s pre-election foreign 
affairs policy had indicated it was unsatisfied with the strategic priorities and governance of 
Australia’s aid program, and Coalition frontbenchers had signalled a shake-up was likely, few 
observers had expected such a quick or comprehensive re-amalgamation. 
In announcing the change, the Prime Minister pointed to a need to more closely align the aid 
and diplomatic arms of Australia’s international policy. Foreign Minister Bishop has made 
the better coordination of Australia’s aid, trade and foreign policies and programs a 
centrepiece of her approach to helping promote regional peace and prosperity and our 
broader objectives. She believes reducing poverty and advancing Australia’s interests aren’t 
incompatible but overlap significantly—especially in our near neighbourhood. Bishop has 
commissioned a series of reviews, including on aid benchmarks, the role of the private 
sector in promoting growth and poverty-reduction, and some key bilateral relationships, in 
order to inform the development of a ‘more responsive and flexible’ aid policy to be 
released in coming months. 
Signs of some of the major themes expected to be included in the new policy seem to be 
apparent in this year’s aid budget. These include the further consolidation of our aid efforts 
in the ‘Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean’ region; more deliberate efforts to try to harness the private 
sector’s potential contribution as an engine of development; a focus on more strategically-
targeted but slightly reduced aid spending; efforts to enhance performance measurement, 
benchmarks and effectiveness; and the further prioritisation of drivers and enablers of 
economic growth (trade, infrastructure, health, education, and empowering women). 
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New budgeting arrangements  
Following the absorption of AusAID into DFAT, Australia’s aid program is funded through 
DFAT under Outcome 1: 
The advancement of Australia’s international strategic, security and economic 
interests including through bilateral, regional and multilateral engagement on 
Australian Government foreign, trade and international development policy 
priorities.  
Funding relevant to Australia’s aid program is mentioned in several places in the DFAT PBS 
(see below Tables 9.1 – 9.3). According to the DFAT website, ODA will amount to $5,031.9 
million in 2014-15. We’re unable to find that figure within the DFAT PBS. 
Table 9.1: Australia’s ODA-related funding by DFAT program 
Program 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 
1.6 ODA – PNG & Pacific 
 
637,366  966,618  1,017,308  1,044,863  1,081,537  
1.7 ODA – East Asia 
 698,217  1,047,521  1,091,148  1,117,698  1,144,967 
1.8 ODA – East Asia AIPRD 
 23,936  17,636    
1.9 ODA – Africa, South and Central 
Asia, Middle East and Other 606,696  1,131,335  1,081,112  1,123,907  1,440,023 
1.10 ODA – Emergency, Humanitarian 
and Refugee 182,606  338,636  349,680  361,875  373,843 
1.11 ODA – Multilateral 
Replenishments 3,473,939  117,622  -  2,434,284  12,622 
1.12 ODA – UN, Commonwealth and 
Other International Organisations 265,418  344,428  342,941  421,170  424,614 
1.13 ODA – NGO, Volunteer and 
Community 76,278  203,864  208,710  213,679  218,770 
ODA Program Support 
 254,860  249,505  247,878  262,525  271,595 
Total 6,219,316 4,417,165 4,338,777 6,980,001 4,967,971 
 Source: 2014-15 DFAT PBS 
Table 9.2: Administered International Development Assistance funding  
Program 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 
International Development 
Assistance 
2,100,773  3,686,467  3,746,451  3,860,533  4,257,651 
Other - International Development 
Assistance 538,386  462,050  342,941  549,680  437,236 
IDA/ADF grants 
 99,079    248,764  
Total 6,219,316 4,417,165 4,338,777 6,980,001 4,967,971 
 Source: 2014-15 DFAT PBS 
Table 9.3: Cash for International Development Assistance  
Program 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 
International Development 
Assistance 
3,692,411  4,191,079  4,306,712  4,461,114  4,825,262 
 Source: 2014-15 DFAT PBS 
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How much does Australia spend on foreign aid? 
In 2014-15 Australian foreign aid will amount to $5.0 billion. Funding is about the same as 
last year in nominal terms but represents around a 0.5% decrease using the non-farm GDP 
deflator. This year brings to an end a long period of robust growth in the aid budget. 
Between 2000-01 and 2013-14 foreign aid increased in real terms by an average of 6.6% per 
annum.  
 Figure 9.1: Australian spending on foreign aid 1971-72 to 2014-15 
 
Source: 2013-14 Ministerial Statement on Australia’s International Development Assistance Program, 2014-15 DFAT PBS. 
In much the same way that defence spending is measured as a share of GDP, foreign aid 
spending is often measured as a share of Gross National Income (GNI) (see Figure 9.2). 
However, in contrast to previous years, the share of GNI hasn’t been disclosed—and no 
estimate of GNI is to be found in the Budget Papers. In the future, we’ll be able to update 
the GNI share using retrospective national accounts figures.  
Figure 9.2: Australian foreign aid as a share of GNI 1971-72 to 2013-14 
 
Source: 2013-14 Ministerial Statement on Australia’s International Development Assistance Program 
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In international terms, Australian foreign aid spending isn’t especially impressive. In 2011, 
the last year for which comparative data is available, Australia ranked 12th out of 22 OECD 
countries for aid as a share of GNI (see Figure 9.3). Not only do we fall below the average for 
industrialised nations, but our last reported GNI figure of 0.37% is barely more than half of 
the agreed United Nations target of 0.7%, now met by five OECD-DAC countries, including 
the UK, plus the UAE. (According to ANU’s Development Policy Centre, new data suggests 
Australia—the OECD’s 8th largest and the world’s 12th largest economy—fell to 10th place 
in overall spending and 13th place as a percentage of GNI in 2013. It’s set to fall further as 
our spending drops but global aid expenditure rebounds with OECD countries recovering 
from the Global Financial Crisis and ‘non-traditional donors’ that operate outside OECD 
guidelines, such as China, increasing their development spending.) 
A bipartisan consensus from the late Howard era to the first Rudd government to increase 
Australia’s foreign aid to 0.5% of GNI by 2015-16 was faltering by 2012 as the then 
government grappled for an elusive surplus—abruptly reallocating hundreds of millions of 
dollars within the aid budget to meet domestic asylum-seeker costs, and deferring the 
timetable to meet the 0.5% target out to 2017-18. In 2013-14 ODA was only budgeted to be 
0.37% of GNI. 
The Coalition’s pre-election foreign affairs policy recommitted to the 0.5% target as a 
benchmark but announced it would ‘stabilise the aid budget’ by reducing previously planned 
growth to just rises in the consumer price index over the forward estimates, so that only 
nominal increases in funding could be expected in the immediate term. Before the election, 
the Coalition signalled it intended to make significant cuts to the aid budget for each of the 
next several years, and in January 2014 the new Government cut $650 million spending for 
the remainder of 2013-14. 
The current budget caps aid spending at $5.03 billion over the next two financial years, after 
which it will grow in line with the CPI. This is actually $1 billion more than promised by the 
Coalition at the time of the 2013 election. 
Although ODA remains almost unchanged in nominal terms from the revised 2013-14 figure, 
January’s $650 million cut and anticipated inflation in 2015-16 and 2016-17 constitutes a 
decrease of nearly 10% in real terms over three years from the baseline of May 2013. But 
while the 10% real fall is about equal to the aid cuts early in the Howard government, it 
occurs off a base that has more than doubled in real terms. Moreover, its effects should be 
partly offset by three major sources of savings (totalling nearly $600 million) identified by 
the Development Policy Centre at the Australian National University in the budget figures 
and statements. These are: the return for development purposes of $375 million previously 
allocated to support asylum seekers in Australia; a reduction of $100 million previously spent 
in Africa and Latin America (partly associated with our UN Security Council campaign); and a 
reduction in administrative expenses with the end of the duplication of back-office functions 
performed by DFAT and the decreased staff requirement due to the evaporation of 
previously planned growth in the program. 
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Figure 9.3: Comparison of ODA from OECD nations 
 
Source: 2013 OECD Factbook  
Where does the money go? 
The annual aid budget as administered by AusAID is composed of a country-specific program 
and a global program, see Figure 9.4. The latter includes payments to various development 
banks and UN and Commonwealth agencies, including emergency aid through the World 
Food Program. Because of multi-year payments, the global program can vary greatly from 
one year to the next (accrual accounting smooths the payments in reporting). 
Australian country-specific aid is mostly focused on Asia and Pacific Island states, although 
locations further afield also benefit. Figure 9.5 shows the amount of country-specific aid by 
region since 1998. As noted, PNG and regional programs stand out as particular beneficiaries 
of this year’s budget. 
Traditionally, Australian aid tended to be overwhelmingly focused on countries close to 
Australia. This priority is still apparent in Figure 9.6 where the category of ‘immediate region’ 
includes PNG, East Timor and the island states of the Pacific. Though not shown, most of the 
aid to East Asia goes to Southeast Asia and to Indonesia in particular.  
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Figure 9.4: AusAID — Global and Country Programs 
 
Source: AusAID annual reports and 2014-15 DFAT PBS – excludes spending by other departments and departmental spending 
 
Figure 9.5: AusAID country programs— spending by region 1998-2014 
Source: AusAID annual reports and 2014-15 DFAT PBS 
Table 9.4 lists Australia’s total ODA by value for 2013-14 and 2014-15 (including 
apportionment from global programs where possible and including non-AusAID programs). 
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An additional roughly $2 billion is provided through core contributions to multilateral 
organisations. This country-specific data provides an interesting picture of Australia’s 
changing aid priorities. It underlines the fall in funding for Africa and the Middle East. 
Table 9.4: Australian aid — spending by partner country/region 2014-15 
 2013-14 
Estimated 
Outcome 
($m) 
2014-15 
Budget 
Estimate 
($m) 
 
2013-14 
Estimated 
Outcome 
($m) 
2014-15 
Budget 
Estimate 
($m) 
Indonesia 601.6 605.3 Sri Lanka 40.8 42.8 
Papua New Guinea 519.4 577.1 Samoa 36.4 37.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 243.8 186.9 Nepal 35.3 33.9 
Solomon Islands 164.4 168.1 South /West Asia Regional 27.7 33.1 
Philippines 175.2 143 Tonga 29.3 30.3 
Vietnam 138.9 141.3 Nauru 29.5 27.1 
Afghanistan 149.3 134.2 Kiribati 26.3 26.9 
Pacific Regional 105.4 129.1 Mongolia 16.7 16.3 
East Asia Regional 81.4 100 Latin America 19 16.1 
Timor-Leste 112.3 96.6 Bhutan 13.9 14.8 
Bangladesh 84.4 94.2 North Pacific 12.9 13.5 
Burma 81.4 90 Tuvalu 10.1 10.4 
Cambodia 77.5 79 Middle East / North Africa 42.2 8.8 
Pakistan 78.3 79 Maldives 6.4 7 
Fiji 59.5 61.9 Niue and Tokelau 5.5 6.3 
Vanuatu 60.1 60.4 Caribbean 10.6 5 
Palestinian Territories 54.8 56.5 Cook Islands 3.7 4 
Laos 56.4 55.6 Iraq 4.1 0.3 
Source: DFAT website 
How does aid further Australia’s national interests? 
Aside from making us feel better about ourselves, foreign aid furthers our national interests 
in two ways. First, bilateral aid to countries establishes a quid pro quo that facilitates access 
to, and influence with, foreign governments. Second, aid can bolster the institutions, 
infrastructure and human capital necessary for economic development and political stability. 
The rationale for the first category is self-evident; the second furthers our national interest 
by improving the stability of countries important to our security.  
Much of Australian aid is of the first sort. Until recently, for example, we gave a small 
amount of aid to China each year, which had no significant impact on its 1.3 billion people or 
its economic development. Other aid, like that to Solomon Islands, is directly focused on 
achieving tangible improvements in governance, human security and economic 
development. Beyond seeking to address severe deprivation and inequality as potential 
sparks for violence and instability in nearby countries, aid’s direct security dimensions 
include: stabilising fragile states (whether in regional interventions such as RAMSI, or by 
supporting ODA-eligible police and other preventive security partnerships before challenges 
reach crisis-point); assisting security sector reform to help demobilise, disarm and 
reintegrate ex-combatant groups and prevent violence re-emerging once stabilisation 
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missions wind-down; and civil-military cooperation to provide planning, logistics, transport, 
communications, and medical equipment and skills following disasters and emergencies. 
Significantly, DFAT Secretary Peter Varghese has stated that there’s no talk of a return to 
using the aid program to directly assist Australian firms and exports, which existed as 
AusAID’s third, commercial, aim—alongside humanitarian and strategic goals–until 1997. 
An informative picture emerges by examining the ratio of Australian aid to a recipient 
country’s GDP. High ratios indicate a real effort to make a difference in a country; small 
ratios reflect largely diplomatic gestures that will hopefully be repaid through access and 
influence. Table 9.5 lists Australian aid recipients in ascending order of the ratio of Australian 
aid to national GDP. The figures for smaller nations are unreliable. Not surprisingly, Pacific 
Island states head the list followed by other countries in the immediate region. Note that 
some smaller Pacific countries have been omitted because economic data wasn’t available. 
For comparison, the latest GDP per capita in PPP dollars has been included as a measure of 
the relative level of poverty in recipient countries. Clearly, Australian aid is only loosely 
directed on the basis of need. 
Table 9.5: Australian aid as a share of GDP  
Country 
Ratio of 
Australian 
aid to 
GDP 
(PPP) 
2014-15 
Australian 
Aid 
(A$m) 
2014 
per 
capita 
(PPP) 
Country 
Ratio of 
Australian 
aid to 
GDP 
(PPP) 
2014-15 
Australian 
Aid 
(A$m) 
2014 
per 
capita 
(PPP) 
Tuvalu 27.28% 10.4 3,617 Maldives 0.23% 7 9,543 
Solomon Islands 8.81% 168.1 3,568 Cambodia 0.20% 79 2,777 
Vanuatu 4.92% 60.4 4,847 Mongolia 0.09% 16.3 6,631 
Kiribati 3.97% 26.9 6,533 Nepal 0.08% 33.9 1,576 
Tonga 3.73% 30.3 8,406 Burma 0.08% 90 1,867 
Samoa 3.43% 37.6 6,384 Indonesia 0.05% 605.3 5,499 
PNG 2.91% 577.1 2,977 Vietnam 0.04% 141.3 4,256 
Fiji 1.44% 61.9 5,254 Philippines 0.03% 143 4,962 
Afghanistan 0.39% 134.2 1,178 Sri Lanka 0.03% 42.8 7,046 
Timor-Leste 0.36% 96.6 23,338 Bangladesh 0.03% 94.2 2,216 
Bhutan 0.31% 14.8 6,864 Pakistan 0.01% 79 3,231 
Laos 0.26% 55.6 3,285 Iraq 0.00% 0.3 7,703 
Sources: DFAT website, IMF World Economic Outlook April 2014.  
The ratio of aid to GDP at which aid becomes an entirely diplomatic gesture is impossible to 
define, though it’s hard to argue that figures below 0.5% of GDP reflect a serious effort to 
have a significant impact—except perhaps in a limited area like governance.    
Conversely, it’s clear Australia is trying to make a real difference in those countries where 
aid approaches or exceeds 5% of GDP. As Table 9.5 shows, this category is entirely within our 
immediate region. (Satish Chand shows that, statistically, the crucial determinant of who 
receives our aid and why appears to be physical proximity to Canberra. In that study, poverty 
levels only appear significant after recipients have been chosen, and funding shows a strong 
inverse correlation to the good governance likely to promote aid effectiveness.) 
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Australia’s military cooperation program 
Allied to Australia’s international aid effort is the $92 million a year Defence Cooperation 
Program run and funded by the Department of Defence. According to the 2014-15 Portfolio 
Budget Statement, the Defence Cooperation Program supports Australia’s network of 
bilateral and multilateral relationships by engaging selected international partners, with a 
focus on practical engagement to help build capacity and professionalism, foster 
transparency and mutual understanding, and improve the ability of regional defence and 
security forces to work with Australia and each other. The aims and objectives are to:  
• support regional security 
• work with regional partners and others to shape a stable regional environment 
• consolidate Australia’s position as a key partner on regional security issues 
• encourage and assist the development of defence self-reliance within regional 
countries.  
In practice, the Defence Cooperation Program provides assistance to regional security forces 
through military advisors, training initiatives, bilateral exercises, capacity building, and 
equipment and infrastructure projects. A long-standing part of the Defence Cooperation 
Program is the Pacific Patrol Boat (PPB) Program, which provided 22 Patrol Boats along with 
ongoing training and technical support to 12 Pacific Island countries. These vessels allow the 
countries involved in the Program to independently police their maritime territories. Funding 
to support the follow-on Pacific Maritime Security Program, due to start replacing the first 
PPBs from 2018, isn’t specifically identified in the forward estimates, but is likely to be 
included in the Defence Capability Plan that will accompany the 2015 Defence White Paper. 
Figure 9.7 sets out the spending on the Defence Cooperation Program over the past 20-odd 
years. For ease of display, individual country spending has been aggregated into convenient 
categories. Country specific data for 2013-14 and 2014-15 appears in Table 9.6.  
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Figure 9.7: Defence Cooperation Program—1987 to 2014  
Source: Defence Budget Papers and Annual Reports 
Table 9.6: Defence Cooperation Program—2013-14 and 2014-15 
Country 
2013-14 
($’000) 
2014-15 
($’000) 
Country 
2013-14 
($’000) 
2014-15 
($’000) 
South Pacific   Southeast Asia   
Timor-Leste 3,599 3,717 Singapore 111 72 
Vanuatu 580 878 Philippines 3,214 2,743 
Solomon Islands 756 851 Thailand 2,344 2,640 
Tonga 3,793 4,863 Malaysia 3,234 3,176 
Samoa 166 116 Indonesia 3,298 3,796 
Cook Islands 33 98 Vietnam 2,218 1,977 
Fiji   Cambodia and Laos 1,095 1,240 
Marshall Islands 169 171 Brunei 6 11 
Micronesia 229 112 Myanmar 28 167 
Tuvalu 132 237 Sub-total 15,548 15,822 
Kiribati 152 166 Other regional activities 6,006 6,807 
Palau 299 376 
Defence International 
Training Centre 
5,151 5,855 
Program Housing 4,114 4,263 Total 87,211 91,954 
Pacific Patrol Boats 20,976 21,705    
Sub-total 34,998 37,553    
Papua New Guinea 25,508 25,917    
Source: 2014-15 PBS 
Further reading  
Satish Chand, Who receives Australian aid and why?, Discussion Paper 6, Crawford School of 
Government, ANU, June 2011. 
Sam Bateman. Anthony Bergin and Haley Channer, Terms of engagement: Australia’s 
regional defence diplomacy, ASPI, July 2013. 
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About The Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is an independent, non-partisan policy 
institute. It has been set up by the government to provide fresh ideas on Australia’s defence 
and strategic policy choices. ASPI is charged with the task of informing the public on strategic 
and defence issues, generating new ideas for government, and fostering strategic expertise 
in Australia. It aims to help Australians understand the critical strategic choices which our 
country will face over the coming years, and will help government make better-informed 
decisions. 
For more information, visit ASPI’s web site at www.aspi.org.au. 
ASPI’s Research Program 
Each year ASPI will publish a number of policy reports on key issues facing Australian 
strategic and defence decision makers. These reports will draw on work by external 
contributors. 
Strategy: ASPI will publish up to 6 longer studies on issues of critical importance to Australia 
and our region. 
Strategic Insights: A series of shorter studies on topical subjects that arise in public debate. 
Special Reports: Generally written by ASPI experts, SPECIAL REPORTS are intended to 
deepen understanding on critical questions facing key strategic decision-makers and, where 
appropriate, provide policy recommendations. In some instances, material of a more 
technical nature may appear in this series, where it adds to the understanding of the issue at 
hand. 
Specialist Publications: ASPI also produces valuable reference tools, such as The Cost of 
Defence and the Australian Defence Almanac. 
Strategic Policy Forums: These are online roundtable discussions undertaken when a subject 
of critical importance requires debate.  They bring together a range of experts to discuss the 
main policy alternatives, the results of which provide policy makers and the broader public 
with accurate and authoritative information about crucial strategic policy choices. 
Policy Analysis: Generally written by ASPI experts, POLICY ANALYSIS is provided online to 
give readers timely, insightful opinion pieces on current strategic issues, with clear policy 
recommendations when appropriate. 
Commissioned Work: ASPI will undertake commissioned research for clients including the 
Australian Government, state governments, foreign governments and industry. 
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Glossary 
ADF Australian Defence Force 
AES Additional Estimates Statements 
AEW&C Airborne Early Warning & Control  
ANAO Australian National Audit Office 
APS Australian Public Service 
CDF Chief of the Defence Force 
CIOG Chief Information Officer Group 
CSP Commercial Support Program 
CUC Capital Use Charge 
DAR Defence Annual Report 
DCP Defence Capability Plan 
DFRB Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits 
DHA Defence Housing Authority 
DMO Defence Materiel Organisation 
DRP Defence Reform Program 
DSG Defence Support Group 
DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation 
EWSP Electronic Warfare Self Protection 
FADT Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade 
FBT Fringe Benefits Tax 
FMA Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 
GDP  
GNI 
Gross Domestic Product 
Gross National Income 
GST Goods and services tax 
NPOC 
OPA 
Net Personnel and Operating Costs 
Official Public Account 
PAES Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 
PBS Portfolio Budget Statement 
SES Senior Executive Service 
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